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Abstract 
 
This dissertation seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the 
political pressure group the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which formed in 
1976. The group’s establishment, attainment of credibility, and influence in critical 
national security debates during the late 1970s has not yet been given sufficient 
attention. 
The Committee on the Present Danger has often been interpreted as a 
disingenuous propaganda group that dishonestly compiled an alarmist message to 
deceive politicians and journalists of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the 
dissertation argues that the Committee’s alarmism was genuine. The fact that CPD 
board members themselves became so fearful of the Soviet threat is the most striking 
aspect of the group’s first four years of operation, and is the primary focus of this study. 
An examination of the group’s formation and activities from 1976 to 1980 permits a 
more sophisticated appreciation of the group’s goals, the promotion of its views, and the 
effects of its campaign on national security debates during this period. The dissertation 
adopts a chronological approach that recognises the creeping alarmism of the CPD over 
these years: warning of the dangers of détente gave way to prophesising an imminent 
Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 
Keeping the CPD as the focus of study in this period permits one to argue that 
the Committee’s members, as a private citizens’ group without government oversight 
and a shared worst-case methodology for assessing national security risks, sincerely 
came to believe in the veracity of their analysis of imminent Soviet military expansion. 
Committee experts generated and publicised a number of metrics that purported to 
demonstrate a military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Over 
time, and seemingly confirmed by alleged Soviet global aggression, the Committee 
came to believe that their worst-case estimates reflected reality.   
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Introduction 
 
Détente failed to usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence and was instead 
losing the United States the Cold War. So argued the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD) who announced in November 1976 that 'Our country is in a period of danger, and 
the danger is increasing.'1 Many journalists at this public unveiling judged the group as 
a caricature of missile gap alarmists of the late-1950s. The news magazine New 
Republic slammed the CPD's warning, calling the group 'ghosts returned' from that 
earlier nuclear age. 2  Less than two years later, however, the group was frequently 
introduced as 'non-partisan', 'prominent', and 'influential'. 3  Furthermore, following a 
series of crises culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, the 
CPD's repeated warning of the Soviet Union's enduring hostility appeared to have 
'always been right' to a number of observers in hindsight.4 Ignored or dismissed by 
numerous national newspapers and politicians in 1976, dozens of CPD board members 
would join the Reagan Administration in 1981.  
 This was a substantial change of fortune, and this dissertation seeks to 
understand how in just four years the perception of this group shifted from being an 
unwelcome group of alarmists to a respected authority on national security issues. In 
doing so, the dissertation examines the role of the CPD in ending détente, preventing 
SALT II ratification, and its function in Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign over 
                                                
1 CPD Executive Committee, “Common Sense and the Common Danger: Policy Statement of the 
Committee on the Present Danger”, in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present 
Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 3. 
2 Morton Kondracke, “Is There a Present Danger?”, The New Republic, 29 January, 1977, 18. 
3 Robert S Allen, “‘SALT Negotiations in Troubled Waters - The Tribune’ in ‘The Second Year as 
Reflected in the Media’”, 1978, Box 2, CPD Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA, 17. (Hereafter 
CPD Papers.); Roscoe Drummond, “‘The Divided Democrats - The Christian Science Monitor’ in ‘The 
Second Year as Reflected in the Media,’” 1978, Box 2, CPD Papers, 24.; “‘Quest of National Survival - 
The San Diego Union’ in ‘The Second Year as Reflected in the Media,’” 1978, Box 2, CPD Papers, 14. 
4 “‘Detroit News, 18 February 1980’ in ‘The Fourth Year: What We Have Said 1976 - 1980 and What 
Has Been Said About Us’”, 1980, Box 2, CPD Papers, 9. 
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the summer of 1980. Most importantly, the dissertation considers the evolution of the 
CPD's alarmist message: how did a concern that détente was eroding support for 
adequate defence expenditure morph into a prediction of an imminent Soviet invasion 
of Western Europe between 1976 and 1980? The dissertation concludes that a group of 
national security experts came to believe that their own worst-case analysis of Soviet 
capabilities and intentions was not just a tool for planning future national security 
requirements but was a prediction unfolding in reality. 
The 1970s was a turbulent period in American domestic and foreign affairs.5 
The Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, oil shocks, and persistent stagflation all acted 
to erode confidence in American national strength.6 In this 'Age of Limits', détente 
became the basis of foreign policy, which was President Nixon and Henry Kissinger's 
solution to maintain America's superpower status while recognising the fact that the 
Soviet Union was reaching military parity. The policy was an attempt to foster a 
mutually beneficial reduction of political tension in order to preserve international 
stability.7 In return for political engagement and the pursuit of trade agreements with the 
Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger expected Soviet help in ending the Vietnam War 
and a restraint on international competition. Superpower summits and arms control 
negotiations – most notably SALT I, agreed in 1972 - seemed to offer an alternative to 
the Cold War stalemate, a far more satisfying prospect than a continuation of the 
disruptive and disorientating 1960s.8 
                                                
5 See “The Poverty of Power” in Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974-1980 (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co, 2010), 38. 
6 See Chapter 1, “The Crosscurrents of Crisis in 1970s America” in Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A 
New Global History From Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012), 19. 
7 Raymond L Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 28-39. 
8 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 5 
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However, to some national security experts, détente was an unacceptable and 
dangerous approach to relations with the Soviet Union.9 The Committee on the Present 
Danger, whose founding board members began planning the group's activities from late 
1975, attracted many prominent figures who shared a concern that détente was 
undermining American national security. In particular, they argued that the policy 
encouraged a dangerous underestimation of the threat from the U.S.S.R. In their view, 
the Cold War rivals were not peacefully coexisting because continued Soviet military 
growth directly threatened American interests. For them, Soviet military power could 
not be ignored simply because Premier Brezhnev had temporarily adopted a conciliatory 
tone in political relations. 
 The Committee on the Present Danger attracted supporters who shared this 
conviction that peaceful coexistence was a dangerous myth, and that the American 
military required substantial investment in order to counteract the effects of unabated 
Soviet military growth. They argued that this expansion of Soviet military capabilities 
had continued despite the pursuit of détente and remained a direct threat to American 
national security just as it had since the late 1940s. Détente changed nothing; CPD 
board members were adamant that seeking improved relations with the Soviets would 
not alter the fact that the U.S.S.R. was doctrinally committed to Socialist revolution and 
therefore a present danger to American national security. 
 The CPD's board members assessed that détente gave the appearance of peace, 
but had two fundamental flaws. First, in their pursuit of détente, American leaders did 
not inform voters of the threat that the Soviet Union posed to their security. This 
contributed to reduced support for the public expenditures necessary to maintain an 
adequate military strength. Second, the CPD argued that détente had permitted the 
                                                
9 Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents”, in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 
1970s, ed. Bruce J Schulman and Julian E Zelizer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 227. 
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Soviet Union to 'catch-up' and perhaps even surpass American strength. Soviet military 
growth over the 1960s and early 1970s had been substantial and resulted in approximate 
military parity.10 A continuation of détente offered no assurance that the U.S.S.R. would 
cease this growth and resist the temptation to attain unambiguous overall military 
superiority. The effects of parity were uncertain but the CPD's board members were 
convinced, given its commitment to global socialist revolution, that a militarily superior 
Soviet Union would not be a benign force in the world. It was therefore dangerous for 
American leaders to act as if détente had solved the Cold War’s security dilemma. 
 Urging caution over the pursuit of détente was perhaps a legitimate concern at 
the Committee's inception, but between 1976 and 1980 the CPD took the fears of its 
board members too far. By 1980, this rejection of détente had become a prediction of 
imminent Soviet action in Western Europe. Why did their caution turn to panic? The 
Committee's leading board members were predominately strategic planners and military 
commanders, and had been involved in planning American Cold War strategy since the 
late 1940s. This group of national security experts regarded the American strategy of 
containment as a successful policy that was undermined by détente. They believed that 
deviating from a resolute application of military containment risked defeat.  
Their fear was a result of assessing the Cold War exclusively through the lens of 
military power; they judged that this was the only language of diplomacy that Kremlin 
leaders understood. Given the importance that Committee board members assumed that 
Soviet leaders attached to military strength, the group chose to adhere to a worst-case 
methodology when assessing Soviet military capabilities. They assumed that only by 
planning on this basis could America be certain to maintain a deterrent strength capable 
of averting Soviet expansion. It was axiomatic to the CPD's board members that there 
                                                
10 David M. Walsh, The Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976-85 (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2008), 198. 
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should be no doubt over American deterrent capabilities, and they therefore rejected 
what they perceived as optimistic assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions, 
encouraged by the intoxicating climate of détente. As the Cold War confrontation was 
potentially existential, the optimism represented by détente was an unacceptable risk to 
CPD supporters. 11  The Committee argued that if Soviet leaders perceived military 
superiority then they would be tempted to use their strength to extend their global 
influence in the name of socialism. It was the responsibility of American leaders to deny 
this opportunity. 
Committee board members felt that it was their duty to inform ordinary 
Americans of this substantial and growing threat posed by the Soviet Union. The 
establishment of détente as the guiding principle of U.S.-Soviet relations had never been 
publicly debated and the CPD was established to ensure that there would finally be a 
fully informed 'national discussion' on American national security before it was too late 
to restore an effective deterrent.12 To highlight this risk the Committee issued pamphlets, 
attended local debating groups, appeared on national television programming, met 
privately with senators and congressmen, gave Senate and Congressional testimony, and, 
later, received invitations to discuss their concerns with President Carter at the White 
House.13 The Committee on the Present Danger, as its provocative name suggests, 
would not be neutral in its desired debate on national security policy. It had a clear 
preference for a higher defence budget and a restoration of the strategy of military 
containment. For the CPD, this meant bolstering strategic and conventional forces, 
                                                
11 See “The Charter Problem and the Credibility Problem” for more on the tendency towards worst-case 
scenario estimate among military service intelligence organisations in Noel E. Firth and James H. Noren, 
Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990 (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1998), 26. 
12 CPD Executive Committee, “How the Committee on the Present Danger Will Operate- What It Will Do, 
and What It Will Not Do”, in Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, ed. 
Charles Tyroler II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 1. 
13 See Appendix II, CPD Publications 1976 – 1980. 
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rejecting restrictive arms control agreements, and opposing Soviet expansion into any 
area that threatened American national interests.  
This intention to spark a national discussion on security policy was not seen as 
particularly controversial by early CPD board members. Numerous liberal, Democratic, 
public figures enthusiastically joined the group to assist in this effort, which they 
regarded as a sensible and objective mission, and certainly not a brazen, unsubstantiated 
propaganda effort. Yet between 1976 and 1980 this pursuit of a national discussion 
morphed into an effort to express an amalgamation of CPD board members' fears of 
Soviet capabilities and intentions. With an illustrious and determined membership, the 
CPD's message came to reflect the combined worst-case assessments of individual 
board members, and the belief that this was an accurate representation of reality. 
Starting in 1976, CPD Executive Committee members attended fortnightly meetings, 
authored more than sixteen major pamphlets, and delivered hundreds of speeches 
warning of Soviet military strength. By 1979, after three years of repeated public 
warning of the Soviet threat, CPD members believed that their worst-case estimates of 
Soviet military strength and intentions were judicious assessments. 
Strobe Talbott, a political correspondent for Time magazine, concluded at the 
close of the Cold War that  
for more than four decades, Western policy has been based on a 
grotesque exaggeration of what the U.S.S.R. could do if it wanted, 
therefore what it might do, therefore what the West must be prepared 
to do in response … Worst-case assumptions about Soviet intentions 
have fed, and fed upon, worst-case assumptions about Soviet 
capabilities.14  
 
This certainly characterises the Committee's own path in the first four years of its 
activities. The CPD was a microcosm of this wider phenomenon; unbridled by direct 
political supervision and supercharged by the professional background of its Executive 
                                                
14 Strobe Talbott, “Rethinking the Red Menace”, Time, 1 January, 1990, 37. 
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Committee membership, the group rapidly made this progression from discussing a 
hypothetical threat to proclaiming an unfolding disaster.  
It was the prestige of the Committee's board members and their determined 
pursuit of publicity that meant that the effect of this alarmist message was particularly 
significant. Committee members included notable national security experts – Paul Nitze 
and Elmo Zumwalt especially commanded attention – who had the respect of politicians 
and journalists.15 These board members ensured that CPD analysis would be seriously 
considered even though the group's launch in 1976 was initially a disappointment. 
James Fallows, a speechwriter for President Carter, claims that CPD members were 
eventually invited to the White House for discussions with administration officials 
because ‘everyone thought it was necessary … They were too politically strong to win 
over.’ 16  This sentiment of the CPD's prestige was echoed by another Carter 
Administration official, who regarded the group as ‘in the community of experts … the 
most influential’ interest group during the SALT II ratification process. 17  The 
Committee achieved significant political influence in addition to receiving extensive 
media coverage, and its reputation has resulted in considerable scholarly attention. 
The CPD, given its stature, has featured in scholarly studies ever since the group 
began contributing to national security debates in the late-1970s. However, a number of 
important questions about the Committee have been left unanswered. Should their 
                                                
15 Paul Nitze was the Committee’s highest profile member. After entering government in 1940, Nitze 
would serve in every Cold War era administration except the Carter Administration. He had worked on 
American Cold War strategy since the late 1940s, most significantly in his role as Director of Policy 
Planning in the State Department where he authored National Security Council document 68. Nitze was 
also involved in negotiating the SALT I agreement, as well as the ABM Treaty. Nitze’s appointments also 
included Secretary of the Navy and Deputy Secretary of Defense; Elmo Zumwalt was another high profile 
Committee member. After his appointment as Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam from 1968 to 
1970, Zumwalt became Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974. He was a close friend of Nitze, 
who had been his superior while Secretary of the Navy. 
16 James Fallows quoted in Beth Ann Ingold, “The Committee on the Present Danger: A Study of Elite 
and Public Influence, 1976-1980”, (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1989), 418–9. 
17 Unnamed Carter Administration spokesperson quoted in David Carl Kurkowski, “The Role of Interest 
Groups in the Domestic Debate on SALT II”, (PhD diss., Temple University, 1982), 153. 
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overestimation of the Soviet threat be regarded as disingenuous threat inflation or as 
prudent worst-case scenario thinking? What was the more important goal to the CPD: 
the abandonment of SALT II or the more abstract effort of re-establishing the Cold War 
consensus in support of containment? What was the influence of the Committee in the 
Reagan campaign in 1980? While we have an understanding of the substance of the 
CPD's message of danger as well as a number of interpretations of its influence on the 
Carter Administration, current scholarly literature lacks sufficient detail of how the 
group directed its informational campaign and how it functioned as an organisation. 
Most importantly, there has not yet been an investigation as to why the Committee’s 
message became progressively more alarmist. 
 This existing historiography of the Committee on the Present Danger can be 
divided into four approaches. First, initial studies of the CPD, written before the end of 
the Cold War, tended to act as warnings of the group's continued alarmist message of 
Soviet military power. This approach was to undertake a discourse analysis of the 
group's pamphlets and was sometimes augmented by interviews with CPD board 
members. This body of literature illuminates how the Committee contributed to the 
creation of a new ‘security discourse’ surrounding the ‘Soviet threat’ in the late 1970s. 
This focus of study was most prominent during and immediately following the most 
active years of the CPD, which can be explained as an attempt by political scientists and 
journalists to understand what the group was intending to accomplish through its 
activities. It focused less on the influence of the CPD’s ideas and messages on national 
security policy, which at the time appeared substantial given the media coverage the 
group received, and more on understanding the political objectives of the CPD. 
The first comprehensive analysis of the CPD remains a key study for 
understanding the historical significance of the group. Peddlers of Crisis by Jerry 
 
9 
 
Sanders, a sociologist, utilises interviews with CPD members as well as an analysis of 
their pamphlets and an evaluation of the group’s policy objectives. Sanders’ key finding 
is that ‘as a result of this well-organized and even better financed campaign, the policy 
debate took place within increasingly narrow limits veering sharply to the right’.18 One 
objective of Sanders' study is to raise awareness of a group whose influence in national 
security debates troubled him. Sanders registers his concern that ‘by its continuing 
presence the CPD will be able to control the terrain between domestic politics and 
foreign policy’.19 While Sanders’ study is well researched and provides detailed analysis 
of the activities of the CPD, the overriding theme of his analysis is to warn of what the 
group might yet accomplish. With the Cold War now over and the CPD's papers 
accessible it is no longer necessary to warn of the group’s alarmist message, and the 
nature and development of the Committee’s alarmism can now be assessed with less 
emphasis on the group's future conduct. 
Also in this first approach, Simon Dalby has undertaken a detailed study of CPD 
discourse in Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics, written in the 
late 1980s. He seeks to examine, 
the discursive strategies of the CPD arguments, how the Other [the 
Soviet Union] is defined, how alternative formulations are rendered 
invalid and how their various concerns with the security discourses are 
articulated in a geopolitical scheme structured in terms of their 
omnipresent threatening Other.20 
 
Put simply, Dalby deconstructs the Committee’s pamphlets and argues that it used its 
expert status to make its assessment of increasing Soviet military threat dominant within 
national security debates of the era. He suggests that the group’s experts acted as if their 
                                                
18 Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of 
Containment. (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 17. 
19 Ibid., 18. 
20 Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics, (London: Pinter, 1990), 14. 
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interpretation was the only possible way to evaluate Soviet intentions and capabilities.21 
A great limitation of studying the CPD’s discourse in this way is that while it evaluates 
the group's written material and assesses what board members hoped to achieve, the 
approach offers little on how the group worked to popularise its views. Dalby’s 
approach, by focusing predominately on the output of the CPD as ‘security intellectuals’, 
offers limited analysis on the strategy and coordination of the CPD’s public campaign. 
Its message was tailored to appeal to influential journalists and politicians in national 
security debates, yet Dalby does not offer an explanation of how the CPD was organised 
to ensure that its warning would reach and persuade this prominent audience. 
Other studies within this first approach that feature the CPD's message without a 
thorough analysis of the group's success in popularising its assessments include Gregg 
Herken's Counsels of War and Fred Kaplan's Wizards of Armageddon.22 These studies 
seek to offer an analysis of the strategists who administered America's Cold War 
campaign and demonstrate the continuity of personnel in the creation of American 
strategy. Kaplan argues that Paul Nitze, through his CPD membership, ‘dominated the 
debate’ over SALT II ratification.23  Herken also recognises the CPD’s stature, and 
states that the group’s ‘rise to prominence … marked a stunning and portentous 
change’. 24  But as the purpose of these studies is to explain the development of 
American strategy in the post war era there is no discussion of how the CPD was able to 
achieve this prominent position. It is not sufficient to state that the CPD had influence 
without an adequate explanation of how it was acquired. 
In The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War 
Consensus, Alan Wolfe asks ‘why, when the evidence is always ambiguous, [do] the 
                                                
21 Ibid., 59 
22 Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Fred M. Kaplan, The Wizards of 
Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). 
23 Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 381 
24 Herken, Counsels of War, 318 
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more negative perceptions develop at the time they do?’ However, he does not answer 
this question as it relates to the CPD.25 Wolfe argues that the CPD ‘took steps to launch 
a new surge in anti-Soviet perceptions’ but, aside from mentioning the group’s 
‘ideological fervor’ and its ‘host of statistics’, the methods used by the CPD to gain 
respectability for its message are left unexamined.26 The Committee’s statistics were not 
dismissed – they were regularly cited in national security debates, and therefore their 
formulation needs to be examined in much greater depth. These early studies of the 
CPD too often take its influence for granted and do not adequately examine how the 
group attained its reputation. 
The second approach to CPD study has been to evaluate the group’s influence 
over the Carter Administration and its role in ending détente, particularly through its 
efforts in the SALT II ratification process. In light of Carter's single term as president, 
these studies identify the CPD as a key and vocal administration opponent and seek to 
ascertain the extent of the group's influence on national security politics in the late 
1970s. This approach remains highly politicised. Those on the left argue that the CPD 
helped destroy détente through disingenuous argument, which derailed President 
Carter’s attempts to reorient American foreign policy away from East-West relations 
and towards human rights issues. For example,  Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert 
Gould in Rollback!: Right-wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy claim that the ‘CPD was 
so successful that it turned Carter’s foreign and military policies around’.27 The CPD, 
the study suggests, achieved this result via a propaganda campaign: ‘By the late 1970s, 
the renewed media blitz of right wing groups such as the Committee on the Present 
                                                
25 Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Threat: Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus 
(Boston: South End Press, 1984), 39. 
26 Ibid., 31. 
27 Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert Gould, Rollback!: Right-Wing Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: 
South End Press, 1989), 165. 
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Danger had a major impact on renewing public Cold War fears.’28 Charges of being 
right-wing propagandists, however, fail to consider that the Committee was in fact a 
majority Democrat organisation, which included both Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson 
Democrats and liberal Democrats.29 For example, the group's composition included a 
union leader, Lane Kirkland, and a feminist campaigner, Estelle Ramey.30 A carefully 
selected, diverse board membership makes it difficult to sustain an argument that the 
CPD was comprised exclusively of right-wing members. 
Studies conducted by those on the right claim that the CPD alerted Americans to 
the adversely shifting U.S.-Soviet balance of power and ensured that Soviet abuse of 
détente ended. In this view, the CPD forced Carter to reconsider his own policies by 
highlighting their contradictions and dangers, especially given that the Soviet Union 
continued to present an ominous military threat. For example, Brian Auten in Carter’s 
Conversion: The Hardening of American Defense Policy asserts that their activities ‘had 
little influence’ on Carter’s conversion towards confrontation.31 He argues that ‘Carter’s 
“Conversion” … is best understood when examined from the external-in rather than as 
something that was constructed out of the warp and woof of domestic politics.’32 If 
Bodenheimer overemphasises the right-wing make-up of CPD board members, Auten 
underestimates its political influence. The Carter Administration consulted the 
                                                
28 Ibid., 234. 
29 Scoop Jackson Democrats were supporters of Senator Henry Jackson, a Democrat often regarded as a 
Cold War ‘Hawk’ due to his opposition to détente and his advocacy of increased military strength. A 
number of Jackson Democrats would end up leaving the Democratic Party and supporting Ronald 
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30 Lane Kirkland was a labor union leader and held the position of secretary-treasurer president of the 
AFL-CIO union in 1976 before becoming its president in 1979. He was a founding member of the CPD 
and was one of the group’s Honorary Chairmen; Estelle Ramey was an endocrinologist at Georgetown 
University Medical Center in the 1970s. She had become a prominent feminist activist after challenging a 
Democrat National Convention committee member, Edgar Berman, when he had claimed that women 
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31 Brian J. Auten, “Carter’s Conversion: An Analysis of Defence Policy Transformation Administration 
(1977-1979)”, (PhD diss., University of Reading, 2004), 302. 
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Committee on numerous occasions between 1976 and 1980, and especially during the 
SALT II negotiations when the group directly influenced administration proposals.  
Apportioning blame for the limitations of the Carter Administration has not 
facilitated an objective assessment of the Committee on the Present Danger. Rather than 
continuing to focus on whether it is Carter or the CPD who should be blamed for a 
failure to reform foreign policy, it would be more useful to examine the ability of the 
CPD to gain credibility by nature of its board membership, and recognise a more 
complicated relationship with the Carter Administration. In 1977, the new 
administration and the Committee expected to work together on national security issues; 
it is not true that the group was started specifically to oppose Carter, as is often 
argued.33 
The third approach to analysing the CPD, less politicised than the previous 
approach, has been to emphasise the continuity of the group's alarmist message in a 
Cold War context. In The Committee on the Present Danger: A Study of Elite and 
Public Influence, 1976-1980 Beth Ann Ingold demonstrates how the group expanded its 
appeal by focusing on long standing national security concerns. Ingold argues that the 
CPD’s message succeeded ‘by tapping into deeply-ingrained convictions concerning 
America’s special mission while playing on fears and frustrations of a nation in 
decline … [and] successfully revitalized the well-worn foreign policy ideology’.34 Her 
study is a rhetorical analysis of the Committee and of the Carter Administration, and is 
more interested in examining the CPD’s ability to control the national security narrative 
rather than how the Committee’s analysis evolved from 1976 to 1980. Her conclusion is 
that the CPD ‘provided the analyses, evidence, and arguments’ that supported what 
                                                
33 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 306; Dan Caldwell, The Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms 
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many Americans already believed – that the U.S.S.R. was militant and expansionist.35 
Ingold emphasises how the Carter Administration ceded the ground on national security 
issues due to the president’s inability to build a consensus for his policies. There is less 
attention given to how the Committee’s own analyses become progressively more 
alarmist, a task which can now be completed with the opening of the group’s archive. 
A similar study on the CPD’s role in advancing evidence of Soviet malevolence 
has been made by Edward Linenthal, who suggests the CPD message tapped into the 
‘fear and frustrations’ of the distrust in American government in the post-Watergate 
climate.36 He argues that the CPD’s ‘ability to construct a milieu of crisis at a time when 
the perplexing memories of Vietnam and more current foreign policy dilemmas made 
Americans susceptible to the comfortable, if not comforting, symbols of the Cold 
War’.37 The Committee did indeed construct the case for crisis, but Linenthal does not 
consider that the group did legitimately sense a mounting crisis. In The Making of the 
Second Cold War, Fred Halliday also proposes that the CPD created the ‘mythical 
“Window of Vulnerability”… [for which] much of the argument rests upon a 
combination of linguistic slippage and debatable systems of measurement’. 38  Once 
again, by focusing on the group’s supposedly fear-mongering statements, these studies 
do not examine how the CPD gained credence for its viewpoint among policymakers, 
which was a necessary precondition for the Carter Administration to feel compelled to 
address the concerns highlighted by the CPD. Other groups with similar ambition to 
influence the direction of national security policy – notably the American Committee 
for East-West Accord who were committed to pointing out the dangers of nuclear war – 
                                                
35 Ingold, “The Committee on the Present Danger: A Study of Elite and Public Influence, 1976-1980,” 
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36 Edward T. Linenthal, “War and Sacrifice in the Nuclear Age: The Committee on the Present Danger 
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37 Ibid. 
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did not achieve the prominence enjoyed by the CPD, and this failure requires 
explanation. 
Strobe Talbott's Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II, and Dan Caldwell's The 
Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: The SALT II Treaty Ratification 
Debate also attribute significant responsibility to the Committee for the failure of SALT 
II ratification, but do not examine the CPD's rise to prominence outside the confines of 
the SALT II ratification debate.39 The CPD established its credibility as an authority on 
national security issues before the SALT II debate, and this is an important 
consideration when weighing the historical importance of the group. 
This third approach of assessing the Committee has been revisited more recently, 
with its alarmist warnings being incorporated within an assessment of a numbers of 
organisations accused of threat inflation in post war America. This scholarship 
examines the CPD in the context of threat inflation that stretches from 1950s missile 
gap concerns to early 21st century fears of terrorism. These studies are useful in placing 
the CPD’s message into historical context, showing that the Committee's alarmism was 
not a novel feature in the 1970s but was in fact a resilient feature of the American post 
war experience. 
Historian Sheldon Ungar, for example, argues that ‘the generalized and 
relatively constant fear of the Soviet threat was punctuated by moral panics unleashed 
by the perception of spectacular and startling Soviet challenges’ to U.S. hegemony.40 In 
his view, the CPD propagated just such a panic, undertaking ‘a concerted propaganda 
effort … [that] used the window of vulnerability as the fulcrum of the panic’.41 In 
Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA, Anne Hessing Cahn also argues that the 
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CPD ‘viewed themselves as modern Paul Reveres attempting to awaken a sleeping 
nation’.42 These claims are not sufficiently explained, however. The implication is that 
the Committee consciously decided to incite panic among Americans in order to 
encourage its plea for higher defence spending to be accepted. Yet this dissertation 
argues that it was the CPD board members themselves that panicked, and this was not a 
concerted, deceitful effort to incite a panic among ordinary Americans. These studies, 
however, treat the CPD as one example within a long line of threat inflators and do not 
examine the group’s own alarmism in sufficient detail. They therefore fail to explain 
why board members themselves grew so fearful of the Soviet Union, and how they 
subsequently gained recognition for their alarming interpretation of Soviet capabilities 
and intentions. 
This trend of approaching the CPD within the theme of threat inflation has 
expanded in the wake of intelligence failures in the run up to the Iraq War of 2003, 
which has prompted renewed focus on the CPD's activities. In America's Cold War: The 
Politics of Insecurity, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall emphasise the enduring 
feature of threat inflation in American national security policymaking. They point out 
the tendency of the political middle ground to drift 'in the direction of alarmism and 
militarism’.43 They argue that the structure of American politics was often conducive to 
threat inflation for a number of reasons, including presidential politics, international 
politics, and, ultimately, fear of threats to the American way of life. Studies that adopt 
the threat inflation approach, including America's Cold War, tend to argue that the CPD 
was influential because it exploited this feature of U.S. politics, successfully incited 
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panic, and secured the adoption of its preferred defence policies. 44  However, this 
approach lacks a detailed examination of exactly how the CPD was able to take 
advantage of this enduring feature of American national security politics. The CPD did 
not attain prominence by nature of its alarming message alone – other contemporary 
alarmist groups, the National Security Information Center for example, did not match 
the CPD's stature. It is also important, therefore, to understand how the group's 
membership composition legitimised the CPD’s message. Accordingly, this dissertation 
pays particular attention to the Committee's board members and how the group’s 
warning of increasing threat resonated as a consequence of their claim of the ‘common 
sense’ nature of their warning. 
The fourth and most recent approach to the study of the CPD has been to place 
the group within the ideological lineage of neoconservatism. There has been substantial 
scholarly interest in the intellectual roots of the movement since the recognition of 
neoconservative influence in American foreign policy making. These studies have 
provided a detailed understanding of the intellectual background of the CPD members 
who scholars consider to be neoconservative. Through this approach a number of 
studies clearly demonstrate how neoconservative national security thought evolved. In 
one such study Jacob Heilbrunn charts the neoconservative reaction to the Vietnam War 
and the worry of an overreaction in favour of isolation by ordinary Americans in They 
Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons. 45  In Heilbrunn’s account the 
Committee ‘served as the locus of the convergence of the traditional right and 
neoconservatives’.46 Another study Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement by 
Justin Vaïsse is the most comprehensive recent study of neoconservatism and features 
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an entire chapter dedicated to the CPD.47 Vaïsse also explains that the CPD ‘played a 
key role in the shift of allegiance by certain Democrats – Scoop Jackson Democrats – to 
the administration of Ronald Reagan … [it] also served as an incubator … and a source 
of inspiration for the neoconservatism of the third age’.48 This might well be true, but it 
is important to examine the process by which the CPD served as an incubator. The 
focus on neoconservatism tends to overstate the importance of the movement on the 
Committee. While Vaïsse concedes that ‘It is misleading to treat the Committee on the 
Present Danger as an essentially neoconservative organization’, the focus of his study 
nonetheless remains on the CPD as a neoconservative group.49 By examining how the 
group functioned in practice it is possible to establish a more comprehensive 
understanding of the shared concerns of disparate CPD board members – 
neoconservative and otherwise – over Soviet military strength. For example, Matthew 
Ridgway and Edward Rowny, two high ranking army officers who joined the CPD 
board of directors, cannot be labelled as neoconservative intellectuals yet their presence 
was essential in bolstering the Committee’s claims of national security expertise.50 
Another important study within this approach is John Ehrman’s The Rise of 
Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994. He attributes the 
success of the CPD to the fact that ‘they did not forget a fundamental truth – that the 
Soviet Union posed terrible threats to American security’. 51  Like Vaïsse, Ehrman 
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1955, most notably during the Korean War when he commanded the 8th Army. After his retirement from 
active duty, Ridgway continued to advocate for a strong military, and participated in numerous 
organisations, including the CPD, that worked towards this goal; Edward Rowny joined the CPD in 1979 
after resigning his post as the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the SALT II negotiations. Prior 
to this appointment, Rowny had commanded U.S. Army units in the Second World War, the Korean War, 
and in the Vietnam War. 
51 John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1995), 189. 
 
19 
concedes that ‘the committee was not a strictly neoconservative organization’ but also 
proceeds to examine in detail only the neoconservative members.52 When he argues that 
the ‘neoconservatives began using their rhetorical talents to attack the new 
policymakers’, he also neglects the crucial non-neoconservative element within the 
CPD – including Ridgway and Rowny – who supplied the national security credibility 
that permitted the neoconservative members' rhetorical talent to resonate.53  
Thus, important aspects of the CPD’s success have been obscured by focusing 
exclusively on neoconservatism rather than on the group itself. The bipartisan nature of 
the CPD is one of its most interesting features, which many studies, including Ehrman’s, 
do not explore. There was undoubtedly overlap between the neoconservative movement 
and the Committee's membership but to focus exclusively on the neoconservative 
element of the CPD's board members misrepresents the character of the group. 
This dissertation will address the limitations of these four approaches to 
examining the CPD and, in doing so, will offer an interpretation that stands on its own. 
This analysis will be achieved by dispassionately studying the group chronologically 
over its first four years of operation. Such an approach gives due recognition and 
importance to the evolution of the group's arguments between 1976 and 1980, which is 
crucial to understanding how the CPD was able to generate interest in its worrying 
conclusions. Most importantly a chronological approach clarifies the process by which 
board members came to assess their worst-case assessments as reflective of reality over 
this short period of time. Committee board members convinced themselves of an 
emerging crisis, which seemed to be unfolding by late 1979. The dissertation will 
therefore analyse the actions taken by the Executive Committee of the CPD and assess 
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how they contributed to the group’s alarming prediction of a conflict with the U.S.S.R. 
in the early 1980s. 
 The chronological structure allows us to demonstrate how the group's 
involvement in a number of policy debates between 1976 and 1980 meant that its 
advocacy for the estimation of Soviet military capabilities to be compiled on a worst-
case basis came to be superseded by an urgent warning that this worst-case assessment 
had already come to pass. How the CPD initially compiled its worst-case analysis and 
over the next three years came to assess the veracity of its alarming warning can best be 
argued by using a chronological approach. Only by examining the group from its initial 
argument against détente, to its insistence the SALT II handed the U.S.S.R. military 
superiority, and finally that its rival superpower was poised to expand militarily into 
Western Europe can the reasons for the group’s increasingly alarmist message be 
adequately evaluated and understood.  
Rather than assess the role of the CPD in a number of separate policy debates, as 
has too often been the case, the dissertation isolates the group and places it at the centre 
of analysis. An appreciation of the evolution of the group's assessments over the four 
years between 1976 and 1980 is critical in attempting to understand how the CPD's 
message became so alarmist, the reason for their participation in the SALT II 
ratification debate, and why Committee members themselves became ever more 
convinced of the accuracy of their assessment. The dissertation recognises the mounting 
alarmism of the Committee on the Present Danger, which by 1979 appears overwrought 
even though board members themselves considered their warning as objective, prudent, 
and logical. This is an important goal given that through its analyses the CPD, as the 
historian Bruce Schulman argues, ‘offered Ronald Reagan intellectual and political 
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legitimacy’.54 In addition, as Julian Zelizer argues, the CPD was able to portray itself as 
‘a well-prepared group that ... made it difficult for Carter to depict his opponents as 
extremists’.55 Alarmist though it might have been, the Committee did have an influential 
role in national security debates of the late 1970s.  
The dissertation ends with the inauguration of President Reagan in January 1981. 
This was a clear juncture in the organisation’s history, and the participation of over 30 
CPD board members in the Reagan Administration, including the president himself, 
emphasised the acceptance of the group’s concerns in just four years. Reagan’s election 
ushered in a new era for the CPD and its most active board members in particular. 
Committee ideas were no longer regarded as particularly controversial. Appointments in 
government presented new challenges for Committee board members, and changed the 
nature of the group. In addition, at the beginning of 1981 the views of the Committee 
and the Reagan Administration become problematic to delineate, and requires a careful 
examination of the Reagan Administration that is beyond the scope of this study. It is 
therefore with Reagan’s victory in late-1980 that the dissertation ends its analysis in 
order to draw conclusions from the CPD’s successful activities in its first years of 
operation. 
The dissertation argues that during the four years between November 1976 and 
November 1980 the CPD was able to establish itself as a respected group on national 
security issues and was influential in normalising arguments for containment. Its 
success was a function of its board members’ efforts to foster an image of impartial 
expertise, which was also assisted by President Carter's perceived inadequacies and by 
Soviet actions in the Third World. The CPD articulated rising concern for national 
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decline and was successful because alongside its warnings of Soviet military strength it 
also proposed a 'common sense' solution to the problem: higher defence spending.56 
Containment was once again established as the 'middle ground' for American Cold War 
policy. 57 The CPD's argument for a worst-case approach was accepted as the prudent 
basis for national security planning after Soviet activities seemed to corroborate the 
Committee’s longstanding message of the danger presented by America’s Cold War 
rival.  
Evidence from the CPD's papers does not support Craig and Logevall’s view 
that the Committee was one of a group of disingenuous threat inflators, motivated by 
self-interest, who used propaganda techniques to promote increased military spending 
because of a ‘need for the Cold War to continue’.58 The dissertation makes a different 
argument; self-interest was not the driving motivation for the Committee's board 
members. A more persuasive explanation is that professional dedication to the 
preservation of national security coupled with the absence of civilian government 
oversight meant that the CPD's analysis steadily grew more alarmist. Each board 
member's fears were incorporated into the CPD assessment of Soviet power, and any 
indication of Soviet aggression – actual or perceived – was taken as proof that the 
CPD's worst-case assessment was correct. In this way, the Committee's 1976 warning of 
détente's risks morphed into an analysis of impending Cold War defeat by the end of 
1979. 
The interpretation that the Committee acted as a deceitful group of 
propagandists between 1976 and 1980 is too simplistic and is not supported by the 
evidence now accessible in the CPD's papers. The CPD’s national security planners, all 
experts in their field, created an analysis that presented the Soviet Union in its worst 
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possible light. They believed that this was a prudent methodology given the malice they 
assumed of their communist adversary. These malevolent intentions of Kremlin leaders 
were taken for granted, and Soviet defence programmes were assessed in this context. 
Military capabilities were then taken as an indicator of strategic intent, and a feedback 
loop was created: Committee board members ‘prudently’ compiled evidence that further 
convinced them of the validity of their alarming warnings. By 1979, the result was an 
analysis of a Soviet strategy to win the Cold War buttressed by formidable military 
strength that the U.S. could barely hope to deter. This assessment was not imagined 
without any evidence, but because definitive evidence of Soviet intentions and 
capabilities was scarce the CPD felt justified in quantifying indicators of strength using 
the least optimistic interpretation of the available data. Over time the Committee's board 
members came to believe that their pessimistic assessment, even though it was based on 
inconclusive evidence, was entirely accurate. As the political scientist John Mueller 
argues, defence analysts of the era became 'mesmerized by their own exquisite, 
mathematized analyses of the Soviet-American arms race … [and] managed to convince 
themselves that disaster was likely’.59 This assessment accurately summarises the CPD. 
By examining the Committee's four-year opposition to détente, the dissertation 
demonstrates the process by which CPD board members convinced themselves that 
their worst-case assumptions of Soviet intentions were indeed unfolding. 
 This tendency towards alarmism among a group of national security experts was 
not new. Winston Churchill, for example, noted the same tendency among the British 
Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War: 'You may take the most gallant sailor, the 
most intrepid airman, or the most audacious soldier, put them at a table together — what 
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do you get? The sum of their fears.’60 By 1979, after over three years of fortnightly 
meetings, the co-writing of numerous pamphlets on Soviet capabilities and intentions, 
and evidence that prima facie seemed to confirm Soviet aggression in the Third World, 
the Committee's analysis of the Soviet threat had become the sum of its members’ fears.  
 The dissertation utilises the recently opened archives of the group, held at the 
Hoover Institute at Stanford University in California, to determine how the Committee’s 
analyses tended towards alarmism. These records are comprehensive, and as well as 
providing documentation of the group’s activities they allow an appreciation of how 
board members’ assessments of the military balance altered in reaction to domestic 
politics as well as Soviet actions. Of particular importance to the dissertation are 
transcripts from each of the group’s annual meetings, which capture a snapshot of CPD 
thinking in November each year between 1976 and 1980. The group’s archive also 
includes previously unseen memoranda sent to board members explaining the CPD’s 
objectives and assessments of its performance. This extensive archive has only recently 
been opened to scholars and permits a far more complete assessment of the CPD to be 
undertaken than has previously been possible. Rather than assume that the group’s 
views on national security issues were static, one can chart the evolution of the 
Committee’s thinking on these issues by making use of the abundance of documentation 
in the group’s archive. This facilitates a far more sophisticated understanding of the 
group, as researchers no longer have to rely solely on publicly released pamphlets to 
assess the CPD’s intentions – it is now possible to assess the underlying motives. 
 In addition to the organisation’s own collection, the private papers of a number 
of CPD board members are held at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., and 
have been utilised in the dissertation. In particular, Paul Nitze and Clare Boothe Luce’s 
                                                
60 Churchill quoted in Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939-1945 (London: Harper & Row, 1968), 
424. 
 
25 
private papers feature valuable material that permits some of the Committee’s activities 
to be reconsidered. 61  For example, the extent of Committee board members’ 
correspondence with Carter Administration officials has not previously been recognised, 
and records in Nitze’s private papers indicate that the CPD had direct influence on the 
Carter Administration’s SALT II negotiating position in the summer of 1978. The 
specific nature of this role has not been revealed in previous studies of the Committee. 
 A frequently neglected aspect of CPD activity has been board members’ regular 
appearances on television programming during national security debates of the late 
1970s, and during the SALT II ratification process in particular. Board members often 
appeared on news programmes and televised debates, and the dissertation has consulted 
such material from the Vanderbilt University Television Archive in Tennessee. These 
television appearances indicate a wider national audience than many studies assume and 
also contribute to our understanding of the Committee’s influence on shaping the 
discussion of national security issues in media coverage. 
 By consulting the CPD’s own archival material – its published pamphlets, 
internal memoranda, and annual meeting transcripts – alongside board members’ 
televised appearances and private correspondence between CPD board members, the 
dissertation attempts to analyse the group comprehensively and free of political or 
ideological agenda. Assessing the Committee’s campaign in this way ensures that the 
group’s activities can be accurately assessed rather than assumed. As the literature 
review has demonstrated, the tendency to place the Committee within certain 
ideological perspectives or long-term analyses of national security politics has 
frequently led to a mischaracterisation of the group. This dissertation avoids this 
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problem by not seeking to place the group within a particular ideological grouping or in 
the lineage of threat politics at the outset of the study. This deliberate focus on the 
Committee, its board members, and its activities permits the dissertation to analyse the 
group without political agenda. Given the group’s influence in national security debates 
of the era and in re-establishing the credibility of containment in particular, this is an 
important objective especially that the group’s archives are now available to scholars. In 
effect, the dissertation treats the CPD as a case study of a group suspected of threat 
inflation; its influence in national security debates in the late 1970s warrants such close 
analysis, and access to the group’s archive now makes a study of this nature possible. 
 The dissertation has seven chapters: an introductory chapter, a chapter analysing 
each year from 1976 to 1980, and a concluding chapter. Together, they argue that the 
CPD formulated its analysis through worst-case estimations, not deceptive propaganda, 
and that its board members came to view this assessment as an accurate representation 
of the threat presented by the Soviet Union.  
 Chapter One, an introductory chapter, explores the context for the establishment 
of the CPD. It challenges a number of scholars who suggest that Committee members 
were motivated by careerist goals to embark on a threat inflation campaign. Instead, the 
chapter argues that the CPD was sincerely concerned with highlighting adverse trends 
in the U.S.-Soviet military balance, which they believed was a consequence of détente. 
The chapter also analyses the efforts of the most influential members of the CPD prior 
to joining the group and demonstrates a long-standing concern with the deterioration of 
American military strength. 
 Chapter Two examines the creation of the Committee over 1976, as well as the 
initial objectives of its Executive Committee. It argues that the CPD, contrary to a 
number of scholarly accounts, was not founded specifically to oppose the new Carter 
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Administration. The chapter traces the treatment of détente in the 1976 presidential 
election campaign and also the Committee's contact with the Ford and Carter campaigns. 
The chapter also examines the reception of the Committee's public launch in November 
1976, and concludes that in 1976 Committee had little expectation of success but 
nevertheless felt duty-bound to attempt to influence the discussion of national security 
issues. 
 Chapter Three explains how the CPD was able to establish credibility for itself 
and its message over 1977. It argues that by deliberately focusing on acquiring a 
bipartisan membership of notable public figures its message was not dismissed as the 
work of Cold War hawks as the group's board included a number of liberal Democrats 
unaffiliated with the Military-Industrial complex. The chapter also examines the nature 
of Committee projects in order to demonstrate that the group intended for its 
publications to be regarded as works of scholarship worthy of careful and considered 
critique rather than dismissed as pressure group propaganda. The chapter also examines 
the CPD's relationship with the Carter Administration showing that although both the 
administration and the Committee intended to establish a working relationship in good 
faith it became apparent that their approaches to U.S.-Soviet relations were 
incompatible. 
 Chapter Four analyses how the CPD presented its case against détente and for 
renewed confrontation through its participation in the SALT II ratification process in 
1978. The chapter argues that Paul Nitze, the CPD's Director of Policy Studies, 
attempted to quantify the risks associated with treaty ratification, which seemed to add 
credibility to the Committee's analysis of Soviet strength. The chapter also contrasts the 
CPD's activities with those of its principal opponent, the American Committee for East-
West Accord (ACEWA). The chapter concludes that the CPD's quantification of risk 
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seemed more a credible and persuasive argument than ACEWA's appeal for trust in 
Kremlin leaders' sincerity over détente. 
 Chapter Five argues that by 1979 the CPD believed that there was irrefutable 
proof that the U.S.S.R. was pursuing a victory strategy after a series of crises that the 
Executive Committee assumed were orchestrated from the Kremlin. The chapter also 
examines the CPD's view that Carter's determination to ratify SALT II was dangerous in 
this context of apparent Soviet expansion. Committee pamphlets charged that American 
forces were demonstrably not deterring Kremlin leaders' expansion plans, and the 
chapter concludes that by the end of 1979 Committee board members considered their 
worst-case assessments were in fact accurate; the Soviet Union was taking advantage of 
its comparative military strength to extend its influence. For CPD board members, Cold 
War defeat had become an imminent prospect. 
 Chapter Six examines the CPD's approach to the election year of 1980 in the 
context of its assessment of imminent and potentially decisive Soviet expansion. The 
Executive Committee deemed President Carter’s response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan as dangerously inadequate. The chapter argues that CPD board members 
were determined to defeat Carter and replace him with a leader who would take the 
Soviet threat seriously. Their support of Reagan was based on the fact that he alone 
sufficiently acknowledged the significance of recent Soviet military expansion; the 
Committee had become single-issue advocates on the need to restore American 
deterrent capabilities. The chapter concludes that the Committee, still assessing 
imminent Soviet activity in Western Europe, were not mollified after Reagan's victory, 
but considered it of the utmost importance to continue their campaign in order to ensure 
lasting public support for the confrontation of Soviet expansion. 
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 The final, concluding chapter summarises the significance and legacy of the 
CPD. Committee members were convinced of the accuracy of their assessment of 
Soviet strength and intentions by 1980. As a result, the CPD opted to continue its efforts 
despite so many of its board members joining the Reagan Administration. The 
Executive Committee were convinced that while the Soviet Union remained in 
existence there would remain a threat, and therefore CPD would continue to warn of the 
danger. The chapter argues that the threat that the CPD perceived grew exponentially 
between 1976 and 1980 by piecemeal incorporation of all the security fears of board 
members. As military planners, the Committee's leaders believed they were sensibly 
using the logic of military assessment and prudent planning. However, rather than an 
accurate analysis of a present danger, as CPD board members were convinced that they 
offered, the Committee in fact presented worst-case estimations that supported their 
unnecessarily fearful hypothesis of Soviet expansion. 
The Committee on the Present Danger established itself as an important voice in 
national security debates in the second half of the 1970s. Its opposition to détente and 
warning of a Soviet expansion strategy seemed to many Americans a valid explanation 
for their country’s apparent setbacks on the international stage. However, despite the 
CPD’s influence, there has not yet been a study of how the group became so influential 
or how its alarmist hypothesis evolved that utilises the archival material of the group 
now available to scholars. These recently accessible sources suggest that too many 
studies mischaracterise precisely what the group argued and how this changed over time. 
Conclusions that board members made deliberately disingenuous claims and that 
insinuate ulterior motives for the CPD’s campaign cannot be supported by this recently 
accessible archival material, nor does it support the notion that the group should be 
primarily assessed as a neoconservative group. 
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 This dissertation seeks to analyse the group objectively and without a 
predetermined designation. Given the group’s influence and legacy, an impartial 
assessment is essential. The CPD directly influenced a number of national security 
debates during the single term of President Carter and many Executive Committee 
members would later receive appointments in the Reagan Administration. A 
comprehensive and careful analysis of the Committee’s activities, private 
correspondence, and interactions with the executive and legislative branches of 
government supports an argument that the group’s alarmist message was sincerely made. 
The Committee’s national security experts became genuinely concerned of a Soviet 
military invasion of Western Europe in the early 1980s, a striking progression from the 
group’s warnings of détente’s limitations when the group formed in 1976. This 
substantial four-year shift requires explanation, and this is the objective of the 
dissertation.   
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The Dangers of Détente 
'If … we allow ourselves to be deceived by a myth of detente, reduce our military 
strength, and permit our alliances to erode, we may well suffer irreversible defeats, 
which could imperil the safety of democracy in America.'62 
 
 The Committee on the Present Danger’s board members believed that détente 
was a dangerous strategy that put 'national survival itself … in peril'.63 A number of 
historians have asserted that this was an attitude motivated by self-interest and 
represents another instance of actors within the military-industrial complex distorting 
domestic politics. The historian Derek Leebaert, for example, asserts that the CPD 
represented ‘the usual Cold War nature of self-interest, habit, and experience’.64 Fredrik 
Logevall similarly dismisses the Committee’s campaign as simply ‘echoing the missile 
gap alarmism’. 65  In his view, the CPD was merely another example of ambitious 
officials crying wolf and claiming a ‘ridiculous’ threat in order to advance their own 
‘careerist goals’.66 Such an interpretation suggests that the Committee's board members 
were insincere and perhaps even devious in their appraisal of U.S.-Soviet relations, 
what another historian, Sheldon Ungar, calls ‘a concerted propaganda effort’.67 
This opening chapter will challenge this suspicious view of the Committee’s 
intentions. It demonstrates that the efforts of the CPD were not aimed at invoking a 
‘moral panic’ based on fabricated, fictitious assessments, but instead argues that the 
CPD’s Executive Committee members were sincerely anxious about America’s 
prospects in the Cold War.68 For those who would become CPD board members, the 
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strategy of containment was an axiom of sound U.S. Cold War conduct, a belief based 
on decades of government or military experience (and sometimes both). Without the 
guiding principle of containment as well as sufficient military capabilities to enforce the 
policy, these national security experts were certain, the Soviet Union would be able to 
expand its global influence unmolested. The chapter suggests that the Committee was 
formed not as an effort to manipulate or to deceive, but as an act of duty to alert 
Americans to a genuine concern that détente undermined national security. 
The first section will demonstrate how containment strategy had become 
axiomatic for many national security experts who would join the Committee as board 
members. They viewed containment as the only realistic approach to national security 
policy that would prevent the erosion, and eventual capitulation, of American global 
influence in the face of an aggressive and determined U.S.S.R. The second section 
introduces the earlier efforts of the Committee’s founding board members to argue 
against détente, and makes clear that their assessment of a present danger in 1976 was 
not fabricated as a pretext to form an alarmist group. A sense of emerging vulnerability 
had deeply worried the group’s founding members since the end of the Vietnam War. 
Their efforts on behalf of the newly formed CPD were regarded as necessary out of a 
sense of duty, not careerism. The Committee’s most prominent members had previously 
held government posts, and in a number of cases resigned from government service in 
order to speak freely on national security issues. A final section examines the role of the 
Team B competitive intelligence exercise in the formation of the Committee. The 
chapter concludes that the background of its founding members does not indicate that 
the CPD operated on the basis of its members’ self-interest, but on a shared, sincere 
alarm that the Cold War was heading towards defeat. 
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Cold War Strategists and Containment 
 
 The CPD’s two principal founders, Paul Nitze and Eugene Rostow, regarded the 
Cold War as primarily a military and not an ideological struggle.69 Military capabilities 
would decide the victor, and, to Nitze and Rostow, American capabilities increasingly 
seemed unable to match those of its Soviet adversary. By the mid-1970s they perceived 
that military setbacks were possible as there seemed little prospect of the imbalance 
being addressed promptly while Nixon (and later Ford) 'claimed too much [of détente] 
in explaining the state of Soviet-American relations' and in doing so weakened 'the 
responsible bipartisan consensus without which a strong and effective American foreign 
policy [was impossible]’.70 Nitze and Rostow deliberated the group’s formation for over 
six months between December 1975 and April 1976.71 They introduced the Committee 
to the public in November 1976 after a number of planning meetings over the summer. 
Individuals who joined Rostow and Nitze included Elmo Zumwalt, Edward Rowny, and 
Matthew Ridgway. They had attained high military rank and by nature of their military 
training also perceived the Cold War as primarily an issue of comparative American and 
Soviet military strength, which they also believed was deteriorating through the pursuit 
of détente.  
 All of the CPD’s founding board members expressed concern at the lack of 
military investment following the Vietnam War and noted the concurrent strengthening 
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of Soviet forces.72 In their view, a dangerous disparity in military strength was emerging 
and efforts to contain or deter Soviet actions were losing credibility. According to this 
analysis, America was unprepared for conflict thus preventing the application of 
containment strategy that had guided Cold War policy since the early 1950s. The CPD 
would attract those who shared the view that détente was an affront to the long-standing 
verities of a successful Cold War strategy. Détente represented what Rostow frequently 
labelled ‘wishful thinking’ because it suggested that Cold War tensions had been 
alleviated even though Soviet military capabilities had steadily improved.73 Increasing 
Soviet strength and the threat to American national interests that this characterised 
obligated Rostow to pursue extensive public coverage and discussion of the issue in 
order to facilitate support for the necessary corrective defence programmes. 
The fears of the CPD's founders were not intended to generate a 'moral panic', as 
Ungar argues. 74  It is important to recognise that the CPD’s Executive Committee 
members were not ardent anti-communists, adopting an alarmist position on Soviet 
relations and American fortunes in the Cold War by nature of their ideological 
conviction. In fact, the Committee’s leaders were not particularly concerned at all with 
the ideological component of the struggle with the Soviet Union, and were instead 
fixated on the military balance between the superpowers. They were professional arms 
control negotiators, military planners, and nuclear strategists who had extensive 
experience administering America’s Cold War campaign. They had agonised over 
current and future capabilities of both American and Soviet nuclear and conventional 
forces; between them, members of the CPD's board had served in seven previous 
administrations. Their concerns over the state of America’s Cold War campaign were 
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based on long running professional assessments of its armed forces and nuclear arsenal, 
a commitment to containment, and a belief that the effect of détente was to veil 
dangerously the harsh realities of the Cold War from the American public.   
 For these planners, the Cold War was experienced through the lens of military 
strategy. ‘There is a partial analogy between strategy and chess’, Nitze noted in 1980, 
highlighting his own role as a gamesman.75 As national security professionals it was the 
planners’ job to consider the threat posed by Moscow and the military capabilities – in 
Nitze’s analogy, American chess pieces – necessary to deter the danger. As officials 
within the State Department, both Rostow and Nitze had helped plan and implement 
containment strategy as America’s Cold War grand strategy. This experience had 
convinced them that without the rigorous application of the strategy to contain the 
Soviet Union, America would lose the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, State 
Department and Pentagon planners weighed American and Soviet military capabilities 
and intentions when recommending strategy and the requisite defence programmes.76 
Their function was to determine long-term strategy to ensure the national security 
requirements of the U.S. were taken into account. Tensions with the U.S.S.R. might rise 
and fall but the military threat was constant. The CPD's first statement specified board 
members' assumption that 'The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a 
world dominated from a single center – Moscow.'77 For this reason Rostow and Nitze 
considered that the strategy of containment should not be abandoned but reaffirmed. 
By the mid-1970s a combination of defence analyst experience in government, 
academia, and the military led this elite group of strategic planners to sense a pivotal 
moment in the Cold War. Without urgent remedial action the Soviet Union would be 
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handed an opportunity to attain unassailable military superiority and win the Cold War. 
They believed that a reinstatement of the principles of containment – articulated by 
George Kennan in 1946, codified into a strategy by Nitze in 1949 – were urgently 
necessary to avoid Cold War defeat.78 
 It was George Kennan who first put this concept of ‘containment’ in written 
form when he authored a letter to Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym ‘X’ in 1947.79 
He argued that the Soviet Union represented a political threat that necessitated a 
political response.80 In the following decades, his letter provided a universal claim for 
resisting the U.S.S.R. across the globe. Kennan lamented that his concentration on a 
political response turned into a concentration on a predominately military response, 
which he considered a distortion of his recommendation. This concern would fuel 
Kennan’s opposition to the CPD in 1978, and will be discussed in a later chapter. 
National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), issued on 14 April 1950, was a 
'foundational statement' of American Cold War strategy. 81  President Truman had 
commissioned the report to assess the impact on U.S. strategic planning of the Soviet 
atomic bomb development in 1949. The purpose of NSC-68, for its primary authors 
Nitze and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, was to make abundantly clear to the 
president and to Congress the threat posed by the Soviet Union to American global 
interests. Acheson wrote in his memoirs that ‘the purpose of NSC-68 was to so 
bludgeon the mass mind of “top government” that not only could the President make a 
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decision but that the decision could be carried out’. 82  He further explained that 
‘qualification must give way to simplicity of statement, nicety and nuance to bluntness, 
almost brutality, in carrying home a point … we made our points clearer than truth’.83 
The threat from the Soviet Union should not be explained in hedged diplomatic 
terminology, the NSC-68 report concluded, or else ordinary Americans would not 
appreciate the magnitude of the danger they faced. 
The document argued that higher military spending and confronting Soviet 
activity across the globe was critical to prevent Soviet control of the vital centres of the 
world. ‘It is clear’, Nitze reported, that ‘a substantial and rapid building up of strength 
in the free world [is necessary] … to support a firm policy intended to check and roll 
back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination’.84 After highlighting the threat posed by 
the Soviets, the report delivered its recommendations: ‘it appears to be imperative to 
increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea strength and that of our 
allies to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons’.85 
The doctrine of military containment was established, calling for the pursuit of all 
methods apart from open conflict to curtail Soviet attempts to extend its global 
influence: 
As for the policy of “containment,” it is one which seeks by all 
possible means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet 
power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a 
retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence and (4) in general, so 
foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the 
Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behaviour to 
conform to generally accepted international standards.86 
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Nitze’s vision in NSC-68 was to maintain military pressure on the Kremlin to prevent 
further expansion of its influence. In doing so, the frailties of the Soviet system would 
be exposed and, over time, would ensure integration into the American led international 
community. In short, America should play a waiting game: stand up to the Soviets, 
avoid war, and eventually they would capitulate.  
The Soviet Union, in Nitze’s analysis, responded only to military power yet, in 
1949, American military capabilities remained in post-Second World War decline. 
Containment logic required that America possess the military strength to enforce its 
own political claims vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, rather than to fight for them in a direct 
conflict. Military strength was an essential component of the defence against the 
U.S.S.R.: 
The frustration of the Kremlin design requires the free world to 
develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and 
a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, 
require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is 
necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet 
expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-
directed actions of a limited or total character.87 
 
For Nitze, an adequate ‘military shield’ was to be a necessary and permanent feature of 
American strategy to prevent Soviet expansion. Threats to national security, Nitze noted, 
would result from a lack of commitment to containment and insufficient maintenance of 
the ‘military shield’. ‘Our fundamental purpose’, Nitze argued, ‘is more likely to be 
defeated from lack of the will to maintain it, than from any mistakes we may make or 
assault we may undergo because of asserting that will.’88 Maintaining popular support 
for the ‘military shield’ would be key to sustaining containment. 
Nitze’s report and its policy recommendations hinged on an acceptance of the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. Could ordinary Americans be convinced that the 
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Soviets were indeed driving for world domination that necessitated a large increase in 
defence expenditure? If they could not then the Cold War would perhaps be lost, not in 
a decisive battle, but in a series of small, limited confrontations that would erode 
American power. Nitze assessed that Kremlin leaders could remain committed to their 
strategy of expansion, but as a democracy the U.S. was obligated to maintain public 
support for its own strategy. The key problem for State Department planners in 1949 
was how to generate and then maintain a broad base of support for containment. 
 The NSC-68 report was successful in mobilising America for the Cold War in 
the 1950s, not because the document itself successfully persuaded Americans, but 
because Soviet actions seemed to validate its conclusion of Kremlin expansionist intent. 
On 25 June 1950, Kim Il-Sung, with Stalin’s permission, ordered the Korean People’s 
Army to attack South Korea.89 President Truman had initially returned NSC-68, which 
reached him in April 1950, to the State Department for more detailed cost assessment, 
but following the June invasion Nitze’s recommendations were readily accepted. As one 
State Department official stated: ‘We were sweating it, and then – with regard to NSC-
68 – thank God Korea came along.’90 Military expenditures jumped, rising from 5 per 
cent of GDP in 1950 to 14.2 per cent of GDP in 1953.91 The allocation of GDP to 
defence would not again decline to 5 per cent per year until the mid-1970s. 
In the following decades containment seemed to provide an effective strategy for 
America’s struggle with the Soviet Union. In critical confrontations, the Berlin Crisis in 
1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the superior military capabilities of the 
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United States were initially perceived to have forced the Soviet Union to back down.92 
The Titan and Jupiter strategic missile forces that seemed to threaten and deter the 
U.S.S.R. in 1962 were a direct result of the increased defence spending that NSC-68 
had recommended in 1950 and, at the time, appeared the reason for Khrushchev’s 
retreat during the Cuban Crisis. Nitze’s conception of military containment appeared 
vindicated. American military strength, he assumed, demonstrably deterred Soviet 
expansion.93 
By the early 1970s, however, support for military containment had eroded. 
Nitze’s strategy was increasingly interpreted as having provided the misguided 
intellectual framework for American involvement in the Vietnam War.94 To a number 
of defence planners Vietnam seemed a Soviet attempt at expansion that, as the strategy 
of containment prescribed, should be blocked. The application of containment meant 
that the U.S. resisted Soviet-backed North Vietnam and supported its South Vietnamese 
ally in order to demonstrate resolute adherence to its military commitments. As NSC-68 
had outlined, the United States would not permit the expansion of Soviet influence in 
vital areas. President Johnson expressed commitment to containment: 'the battle against 
communism … must be joined … with strength and determination.'95 The result was 
just under 60,000 total American casualties, a total of 2.7 million veterans, and a 
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fractured society at home.96 To many Americans this seemed much less a successful 
application of containment than a disastrous mistake.97 
The Vietnam War was a traumatic episode and involvement prompted intense 
scrutiny of America's global role in general and military containment in particular, a 
process that Thomas Borstelmann has called 'a national identity crisis'.98 Nitze himself 
prevaricated in his opinion of the war. He was worried that the war was ‘taking our eye 
off the ball … [from] the overall strategic problem’.99 In the aftermath of defeat, it was 
unclear if military containment was a liability to American interests and required 
replacement, or whether Nitze’s strategy had been misapplied and was in need of 
reinforcement. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in the 
Nixon Administration, explored different foundations for American foreign policy. To 
him, the limits of containment were revealed in Vietnam: American voters were 
unwilling to support the deployment of Nitze’s military shield in areas that did not 
directly threaten U.S. interests.100 Kissinger concluded that a new Cold War strategy 
was required as 'There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union 
and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and they use their enormous 
power for the benefit of mankind.'101 
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Détente and its Discontents 
 Détente emerged under President Nixon, who had used his impeccable anti-
communist credentials to gain support for a range of arms control negotiations with the 
Soviet Union.102 He and Kissinger hoped to pursue more harmonious relations in order 
to limit the arms race and reduce the burden of military expenditures on the American 
economy; in addition to creating a ‘structure of peace', this would usher in a new era of 
the Cold War.103 When the Soviet Soyuz spacecraft linked with the American Apollo 
spacecraft in 1974 as part of a joint space programme during the Ford Administration, 
relations with the Soviet Union seemed to have reached a literal high point. Yet even as 
good relations seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear war, support for détente began to 
unravel.104 By 1974, there was a clear division over Soviet relations among foreign 
policymakers. Should détente go further or had it already gone too far? There was no 
clear answer and no simple alternatives. 
Even without the defeat in Vietnam, as Kissinger later suggested, ‘a major 
reassessment of American foreign policy would have been in order, for the age of 
America’s nearly total dominance of the world stage was drawing to a close’.105 Soviet 
military capabilities appeared to be approaching parity with those of the U.S.. No one 
could be sure whether the Soviet Union would continue the development of its military 
forces and thus attain a position of superiority. Kissinger’s response to this emerging 
security dilemma had been to limit superpower confrontation as much as possible 
through détente. The experience of Vietnam suggested to him that Americans would not 
support expensive wars in distant countries: he told Ford in 1976 that ‘the American 
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people want tough talk about the Soviets, but they don’t want to do anything about 
it’.106 
In Kissinger’s interpretation, with ongoing economic problems including the 
OPEC coordinated Oil Embargo in 1974, American global influence was diminishing. 
‘Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the central fact of our diplomacy’, the 
Secretary of State stated in 1975.107 His pursuit of détente as an attempt to ‘manage’ 
rather than overcome the erosion of American global dominance was deeply troubling 
for many, especially those who thought that containment should be strengthened and not 
abandoned.108 Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations between 1970 and 1974, 
claimed that Kissinger confided to him that ‘The US has passed its historic high-point, 
like so many other civilizations, and cannot be roused to the political challenge. We 
must persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get.’109 To Zumwalt this 
attitude seemed not only to renounce containment strategy but was tantamount to an 
admission of Cold War defeat. 
To those contemplating the formation of the CPD, and Zumwalt in particular, 
Kissinger was fundamentally mistaken. Zumwalt was certain that Americans were not 
inclined to give up and accept Soviet superiority. Apathy was a symptom of détente, 
which suggested to Americans that the Cold War had subsided. It appeared to Zumwalt 
and many others in the foreign policy elite that the Soviet Union was nearing military 
parity and, with involvement in Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, 
was expanding its global commitments just as the U.S. seemed to be withdrawing from 
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its own.110 The Soviet Union, in the analysis of Zumwalt, Nitze, and Rostow, had taken 
advantage of American ‘wishful thinking’ of détente.111 Ordinary Americans, Rostow 
told Kissinger in 1974, had not been made aware of this Soviet military growth and 
adventurism: 
Certainly we do not want a foreign policy of ideological crusade … Of 
course we strongly favor any and all relaxations of tensions between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. But we deny that any 
relaxation of tensions between the two countries has in fact occurred. 
And we think it is not only wrong, but dangerous to lull Western 
public opinion by proclaiming an end of the Cold War, a substitution 
of negotiation for confrontation, and a generation of peace.112 
 
For the sake of good relations with Moscow, Rostow contended, the American public 
remained uninformed of Soviet acts of aggression, and public support of a strong 
defence posture had suffered accordingly. A 1974 poll revealed that only one in eight 
respondents thought defence spending was too little with 32 per cent thinking the 
amount was ‘about right’.113 This alarmed opponents of détente because as the Soviet 
Union was increasing its own military strength, Americans were unwilling to support 
additional spending to ensure parity. For Rostow, this attitude was not because 
Americans had ‘given up’ the Cold War as Kissinger concluded, but because, in the 
spirit of goodwill, the Secretary of State had failed to inform the public of Soviet 
military growth and its involvement in Africa and the Middle East. 
Nitze's warning in NSC-68 of the necessity to maintain ‘national will’ now 
seemed prescient. Yet this was not because the American public were themselves weary 
of the Cold War struggle as Nitze had cautioned, but because their national leaders had 
not made clear that the Soviet Union remained a threat. ‘[If] we allow ourselves to be 
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deceived by a myth of détente’, Rostow argued, America risked ‘irreversible defeats’ 
amounting to Cold War defeat.114 Détente needed to cease in order for containment to 
be restored. In December 1975, Nitze wrote to Robert Joyce, a former State Department 
colleague, that in order to prevent ‘Soviet world hegemony’ the U.S. needed ‘first to put 
our own house in better order … [and] get rid of Nixon and his gang. We haven't yet 
completed this process.’115 A number of experts who favoured a return to the principles 
of containment, including Nitze, Rostow, and Zumwalt, decided to speak out against 
détente. 
 The historian Vaïsse argues that ‘many who joined the CDM [Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority] and CPD had been “converted” or at any rate alerted’ by the CPD 
leadership of Zumwalt, Rostow, or Nitze.116 But this is only partially true as the CPD 
attracted members that had long been concerned by the U.S.-Soviet military balance. 
Most of the CPD’s members did not require ‘conversion’ because it was self-evident to 
them that under détente Kissinger had permitted the Soviets to erode American strategic 
superiority.  
 Rostow resolved to establish the CPD in December 1975 but the determination 
to end détente was not new. In fact, a number of the Committee's founding members 
participated in similar organisations that campaigned to end détente and revive 
containment. Rostow, for example, had chaired the Coalition for a Democratic Majority 
Foreign Policy Task Force. Nitze had co-founded the Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense in 1969 with Dean Rusk.117 Charles Tyroler, who would become the CPD’s 
Executive Director, had held the same position with the Committee for Peace with 
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Freedom in Vietnam (CPWFV).118 These efforts had not been particularly successful in 
re-establishing containment, but the experience of participating in these organisations 
directly influenced how the CPD would operate. 
Tyroler joined Rostow’s group as director in April 1976 and established the 
CPD’s organisational structure. Similar to a number of the CPD’s founding members, 
Tyroler had worked in the Department of Defense during the early 1950s. He had also 
acted as the CPWFV director, which formed in 1967 and attempted to maintain support 
for the Vietnam War. The CPWFV had attracted an impressive bipartisan membership, 
including two former presidents, Truman and Eisenhower, two former Secretaries of 
State, Dean Acheson and James Byrnes, as well as labour leaders, businessmen, and 
academics.119 ‘Our objective’, the group announced, ‘is to make sure that the majority 
voice of America is heard – loud and clear – so that Peking and Hanoi will not mistake 
the strident voices of some dissenters for American discouragement and a weakening of 
will.’ 120 The principles of containment were clearly restated in the CPWFV manifesto, 
and the CPD would operate similarly under Tyroler’s direction. Taking direction from 
the CPWFV in its opposition to détente, the CPD would seek to recruit important 
national figures, vocally support the need for a strong defence policy, and advocate the 
principles of containment. 
Nitze regarded the CPD as an extension of his own efforts in the Committee to 
Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy (CMPDP), which he had organised with Dean Rusk 
in 1969 to support the funding of the ‘Safeguard’ anti-ballistic missile system. 121 
Consistent with his views on containment – that Kremlin leaders responded only to 
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strength – Nitze hoped funding the system would ensure a better negotiating position. A 
limited deployment of Safeguard passed a Senate vote on 6 August 1969 ahead of ABM 
treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union in November. (An ABM Treaty was 
eventually signed in May 1972.) Foreshadowing the CPD’s efforts seven years later, 
Nitze intended for the efforts of his CMPDP to create a ‘balanced debate’ by 
undertaking the ‘necessary nitty-gritty of drafting papers to combat the arrant nonsense’ 
of opponents to the ABM system. 122 The pattern of Nitze’s involvement in the CPD 
was based on his efforts with the CMPDP.  
Cass Canfield, editor in chief of the publishing firm Harper Row, organised 
opposition to the ABM programme by collating analyses that demonstrated its 
inadequacies. Nitze explains in his memoirs that he regarded this opposition a result of 
unease ‘with defense policy in general and Vietnam in particular’, in short, opposition 
to the principles of containment.123 Nitze believed his CMPDP papers, 
ran rings around the misinformed and illogical papers produced by 
Cass's polemical and pompous scientists… our committee [to Maintain 
a Prudent Defense] became the principal source of witnesses before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee on behalf of the [Safeguard] 
authorisation bill.124 
 
Nitze's efforts were successful as the Senate approved the Safeguard bill. He realised 
that his own analyses were a potent weapon in challenging the findings of his opponents 
and in advocating containment. This was true not only within classified State 
Department Policy Planning reports but also when addressing public debates in Senate 
testimony. 
Rostow headed the Coalition for a Democratic Majority Foreign Policy Task 
Group (CDM), which had been formed in 1972 to ‘fight this battle for the soul of the 
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Democratic Party’ and confront the party’s liberal ‘McGovern wing’.125 The fact that 
George McGovern had represented the Democratic Party in the 1972 presidential 
election greatly alarmed CDM members. The CDM issued reports on foreign policy to 
counter the influence of the ‘McGovern approach’ that advocated an abandonment of 
the Cold War. The group, however, did not attract widespread attention outside the 
Democratic Party.126 While Rostow was content with the membership and message of 
the task force, by 1975 he was determined to start a nonpartisan group to influence 
national political issues.127 
Clearly, the CPD’s efforts were grounded in previous attempts by its leading 
members to achieve similar goals in the late-1960s and early-1970s. Vaïsse argues that 
‘the most important precursor of the CPD was the CDM: it was because the CDM’s 
foreign policy task force (1973-1976) was not sufficiently effective in combatting 
détente and alerting America to the growing Soviet threat that Gene Rostow decided to 
found the CPD’.128 However, a number of groups, and not just the CDM, influenced the 
CPD’s founding members. The CPD represented the culmination of its members’ 
experience in maintaining containment principles. These efforts prior to 1976 had 
limited success in their attempts to reassert containment, but Rostow’s proposed group 
seemed an important opportunity to bring together likeminded experts, draw on their 
professional experience, and revitalise containment before Soviet military strength 
attained superiority. 
In this way the CPD should be seen as an application of experiences within the 
CDM, the CPWFV, and the CMPDP. The limited success of these groups in 
challenging détente inspired the creation of the CPD, which would be a collaborative 
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effort to influence national security policy debates. By the end of 1975, the CPD was 
regarded by its founders as a last ditch effort. Rostow wrote to James Schlesinger on 24 
June 1976 asking whether he had ‘any real alternatives [to starting the CPD] … 
Viewing the problems as we do, can we really leave them alone?’ Rostow told 
Schlesinger that he felt the responsibility of governance, which he regarded as ‘an 
obligation, a burden, not just a passage in our lives’ 129  Similar to Rostow’s 
establishment of the CPD, Nitze’s CMPD, and Tyroler’s CPWFV were efforts by 
national security bureaucrats who felt duty-bound to act and restore containment. This 
was a sincere, even impassioned, concern towards a growing national security danger. 
 The sustained upward trend of Soviet defence spending genuinely troubled the 
CPD’s founders. The ‘momentum’ of this build-up became an important concept, even 
within the Ford Administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reported to the 
president that ‘It is clear that the Soviets now have a great momentum in defence 
spending. In contrast our momentum has been to take $33 billion out of the President’s 
budget requests.’130 Did this momentum provide an indicator of Soviet intentions? If so, 
then the Soviet Union might soon achieve military superiority. 
Disagreement over the future ‘trend lines’ of Soviet forces would remain at the 
core of the CPD’s concerns for the rest of the decade. Its founding members argued that 
doubt over whether the Soviets were seeking superiority meant the U.S. should plan its 
defence programmes on the basis that attaining military superiority was the Kremlin’s 
goal. If American military capabilities did not match this increase and the Kremlin 
reached unambiguous superiority it would be too late. Containment would fail, as the 
military shield would be insufficient to deter Soviet expansion. 
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 This debate over defence spending merged with the evolution of nuclear strategy. 
Until the early 1970s, the superior American nuclear arsenal had acted as a 
counterbalance to Soviet conventional superiority: U.S. nuclear weapons offset larger 
Soviet conventional forces.131  Kissinger, however, questioned the continuing value of 
strategic superiority: ‘what do you do with it?’, he asked.132 Yet this did not convince 
his critics. Richard Pipes, a founding Committee board member, accused Kissinger of 
‘mirror-imaging’.133 Pipes argued that military planners in the Kremlin might find uses 
for strategic superiority even if Kissinger could not. The CPD's fear, as Strobe Talbott 
aptly summarises, was that ‘the Russian Bear armed with the Bomb posed a special 
threat not so much because of the nature of the Bomb as because of the nature of the 
Bear’.134  
 For Pipes, permitting Soviet strategic superiority and trusting the deterrent 
strength of U.S. nuclear forces was tempting 'very detrimental effects on U.S. 
security'.135 If a Soviet first strike could destroy American Minuteman missiles in their 
silos it was unlikely that a president would react. The remaining U.S. strategic force 
could target Soviet cities in retaliation, yet this would invite a Soviet ‘second strike’ 
against U.S. cities. This second strike scenario suggested that until the Minuteman 
missile force could be better protected, America’s ability to deter Soviet expansion and 
maintain an adequate military shield was limited. 136  Ensuring strategic parity was 
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therefore crucial to Kissinger's critics. If current trends of military spending continued, 
then the Soviet Union would attain superiority before America could address its own 
military weaknesses. As a result, containment would no longer be credible and Soviet 
expansion could not be resisted: The Cold War would be lost. 
Team B and the CPD 
 In the spring of 1976, an opportunity arose for a number of CPD board members 
to begin their campaign to alert Americans to the dangers of détente. The Team B 
exercise was a competitive intelligence assessment recommended by the President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and was commissioned in 1976 by CIA 
Director George Bush. The panel was commissioned because of questions over CIA 
competence.137 First, the emergence of the ‘Family Jewels’ in late 1974 had shaken faith 
in America’s intelligence agency.138 The New York Times revealed ‘a massive, illegal 
domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration’, prompting fury 
among the public and in Congress.139 In January a ‘Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operation with Respect to Intelligence Activities’ was established.140 
Then, in May 1976, the CIA announced what historians Firth and Noren have labelled 
‘the bombshell’. 141  An agency report announced 'an unusually large body of new 
information' that gave the impression of an upward revision of Soviet defence 
spending.142 The Soviet Union, on first reading, had spent much more on defence than 
had previously been estimated, and confidence in the CIA’s competence was further 
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shaken.143 As a result, questions over the CIA’s proficiency in compiling the National 
Intelligence Estimates put President Ford under pressure to investigate claims of 
systemic underestimation of Soviet military capabilities.144 Ford’s PFIAB recommended 
that independent experts examine the same material as CIA experts and determine the 
accuracy of CIA estimates.  
 Richard Pipes was chosen to select the ‘B’ Team, and invited a number of like-
minded experts to join the B panel. Pipes included Nitze on the advisory panel and 
Nitze returned the favour, inviting Pipes onto the CPD’s Executive Committee on 22 
October 1976.145 Pipes intended to overturn the CIA’s optimistic ‘most likely’ method 
for generating the National Intelligence Estimates. He argued that 
there is no point in another, what you might call, optimistic view. In 
general there has been a disposition in Washington to underestimate 
the Soviet drive. The moderately optimistic line has prevailed … we 
have imposed very severe limitations on ourselves. The hope has been 
that all these steps would lead the Russians to slow down. They 
haven’t.146 
 
Pipes regarded the Team B exercise as an opportunity to challenge the methodology of 
assessing the Soviet threat. In presenting ‘optimistic’ judgments of Soviet military 
capabilities the president was then limited in requesting funding from Congress for what 
Pipes regarded as a more prudent defence budget. In short, Pipes charged that the CIA’s 
optimistic methodology was hampering the ability to maintain the military shield 
necessary for containment. 
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The Deputy for National Intelligence, George Carver, defended the CIA’s 
methodology in a memorandum to President Ford. Carver identified the methodological 
shift that would result after the Team B exercise. He warned prior to the exercise that, 
under the approach the [PFIAB] Board is recommending, the 
President and his senior policy advisors will simply have this range of 
possibilities laid before them, hence, powerful arguments could be 
advanced that the only course to follow to protect the nation’s 
interests would be to hedge against the worst case threats, and NIEs 
developed through the recommended procedure would serve as 
ammunition supporting such a pitch … This procedure would leave 
the decision maker at the mercy of technical shamans with no basis for 
ascertaining which of these shamans’ analyses or predictions were 
more credible than their competitors.147 
 
Yet, despite being labelled as ‘shamans’, Pipes’ and the B Team’s rationale for 
overturning the methodology behind compiling intelligence estimates could not be 
entirely dismissed. The exercise represented a difference of opinion among national 
security experts over how the president should be presented with intelligence. Pipes' B 
Team, and Nitze in particular, disapproved of Kissinger's handling of American foreign 
policy based on 'political posturing' and back-channel negotiation that Nitze regarded as 
'unseemly', his grandson and biographer argues. 148  This, alongside allegations of 
systemic CIA underreporting, was the reason behind Pipes’ insistence to include 
differences of opinion in intelligence estimates. Nitze concurred, reflecting that at the 
CIA it had been decided that 
the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates] should not forecast future 
Soviet arms developments or deployments … unless there was 
positive and unambiguous evidence of those developments and 
deployments. In case of doubt, reassuring rather than worrying 
statements were in order.149 
 
Worst-case estimation as a basis for intelligence was not simply an academic exercise, 
however. In retrospect it is clear that a number of the B Team estimates were wrong, yet 
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we cannot entirely dismiss the sense of alarm that informed the exercise’s findings. The 
Soviet military build-up over the early 1970s was real and had significantly improved 
its military capabilities, a consequence of what the historian Vladislav Zubok has 
termed ‘Cuban missile syndrome’, the desire never again to be outgunned by the U.S. 
following the 1962 crisis.150  The SS-20 ‘Pioneer’ MIRVed (multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicle) ICBM was introduced in 1976, as well as the SS-18 ‘Satan’ 
ICBM, first deployed in 1975.151 Additional warhead delivery systems developed in the 
1970s included the TU-22M ‘Backfire’ strategic bomber and the ‘Typhoon’ ballistic 
missile submarine. The Soviet Navy, under Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, also 
received substantial investment, expanding its number of cruisers, destroyers, and 
submarines. In addition, alarmingly for American military planners, the Soviet Navy 
commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Kiev, in late 1975.152 
Why were these programmes necessary? The Team B report – echoing NSC-68 
– stressed the importance the Kremlin placed on military capabilities to capitalise on 
opportunities to extend its global influence: 
the Soviet leadership places unusual reliance on coercion as a regular 
instrument of policy at home as well as abroad. It likes to have a great 
deal of coercive capability at its disposal at all times, and it likes for it 
to come in a rich mix so that it can be optimally structured for any 
contingency that may arise.153 
 
The Team B report argued that Soviet strategy was not defensive and did not recognise 
a strategic stalemate. Instead, Kremlin leaders were ‘under positive obligation … to 
realize and nail down potential gains’ as a result of socialist doctrine.154 In this view, 
Soviet forces were not simply to act as a deterrent to American strategic forces but were 
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intended to exploit situations where they enjoyed local military superiority to advance 
socialism. The Team B report charged the CIA with ‘mirror-imaging’; just because the 
U.S. had adopted the doctrine of deterrence the CIA should not assume the same of 
Kremlin strategy. Team B argued that intelligence reports needed to reflect these 
growing capabilities when determining Soviet intentions. By 1976, it was clear the 
Kremlin was intent on modernising its forces – new weapon systems had been observed 
entering service – and there was no indication that this modernisation effort would cease. 
Détente, the report maintained, had blinded the CIA to the purpose of the Soviet 
build-up: ‘[T]he drafters of NIE display an evident inclination to minimize the Soviet 
strategic buildup because of its implications for detente.’155 The suggestion was that 
CIA analysts did not want to undermine détente and therefore presented an optimistic 
view of Soviet military capabilities to avoid upsetting their political masters. But the 
crucial point for the B Team was that détente did not mean that the Cold War had 
subsided. The Soviet Union continued to foster socialist revolutions globally as a matter 
of doctrine, and détente did not change that fact. 
‘[B]oth detente and SALT’, the B Team report argued, ‘are seen by Soviet 
leaders not as cooperative efforts to ensure global peace, but as means more effectively 
to compete with the United States.’156 If Soviet expansionist intentions and growth in 
military capabilities were not reflected in intelligence estimates then American military 
forces would be unable, as NSC-68 had pointed out in 1949, to ‘block further expansion 
of Soviet power’.157 For Team B, the pursuit of détente meant that the principles of 
containment had been jettisoned; optimistic intelligence estimates were undermining the 
ability of the U.S. to match Soviet military power, which could soon lead to strategic 
disaster. American forces would no longer act as a deterrent and the Soviet Union 
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would be permitted a free hand to expand its global influence. The Team B report was 
leaked in October and a number of panel members joined Nitze, Rostow, and Zumwalt 
in the CPD. 
When the CPD announced its launch in November 1976 its board membership 
numbered 144. 158  ‘Board Members’ are best understood as supporters of the 
Committee’s mission, appointed for their ‘level and tone and distinction’, but were not 
the primary authors of CPD statements.159 It was predominately the CPD's Executive 
Committee who actively engaged in the planning, drafting, and delivery of statements. 
This section will introduce the Executive Committee members who formulated and 
presented the campaign to highlight the ‘present danger’. 
The composition of the Executive Committee was relatively constant and this 
section will introduce its members as of the summer of 1979 as the Committee opposed 
the SALT II treaty, the group's highest profile effort. Tyroler, the Committee’s director, 
recorded the activities of eight members who conducted the overwhelming proportion 
of Committee activities from November 1978 to November 1979.160 In fact, seven of 
these eight members were Executive Committee members throughout the four-year 
period of this study. When referring to the activities of the ‘Committee on the Present 
Danger’ it is the efforts of these eight members that are most significant. 
Tyroler identified Eugene Rostow, Paul Nitze, Charles Burton Marshall161, Elmo 
Zumwalt, Edward Rowny, Richard Pipes, William Van Cleave, 162  and Charles 
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Kupperman163 as the most active Executive Committee members. Executive Committee 
meeting attendance records show that less active members in CPD campaigning but 
regular contributors to written statements over the 1976 to 1980 period included 
Richard Allen, Colin Gray, Dick Whalen, Rita Hauser, Max Kampelman, Charls 
Walker, Richard Stilwell, Dean Rusk, John Roche, Edmund Gullion, and Frank Hoeber. 
Executive Committee participants were former government officials, tenured 
academics, and retired military figures. A number of them had in fact declined 
opportunities to enter government posts in order to participate in the CPD, which 
operated as an independent and all-volunteer organisation. This makes it difficult to 
argue, as do Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, that the Committee’s members were 
‘careerist’ and motivated predominately by personal ambition.164 Self-interest prompted 
the Committee's formation, they argue, as Cold War hardliners had been side-lined and 
wished to reassert control over the administration of national security policy. Their 
argument stresses the efficacy of the military-industrial complex in propelling the CPD 
to its high-profile status in such a short time. However, the formation and early 
successes of the CPD are not best explained as a result of personal ambition augmented 
by financing from organisations within the military-industrial complex. 
Rostow, Nitze, and Marshall in particular had a long record of involvement in 
developing and implementing America's Cold War strategy. Neither Rostow nor Nitze, 
the Committee’s co-founders, had any need aside from their sense of duty to pursue the 
substantial effort of forming a new organisation. Nitze’s government role ended after he 
quit the SALT II negotiating team in 1974 in order to ‘be freer to support the strong 
domestic, foreign, and defense policies that present circumstances appear to me to 
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require’. 165  Rostow was tenured as Dean at Yale Law School. Alistair Cooke, the 
BBC’s American correspondent, was a friend of Rostow and later recalled his ‘intellect, 
his tolerance of opponents, most of all his having a genuinely judicial temperament’.166 
It does not seem credible to dismiss their founding of the CPD as motivated primarily 
by careerist ambition. 
Pipes, who Nitze invited to join the Executive Committee after their joint effort 
on the Team B panel, suggests that his ‘modest political career was unsought and came 
unasked’ after delivering an address to the American Historical Association in 1969.167 
He was subsequently asked to testify at the SALT I hearings by Senator Henry Jackson. 
Pipes intended to emphasise the importance of considering Russian history and culture 
when compiling threat assessments, which he demonstrated during his Team B 
efforts.168 Pipes – a Polish émigré – stressed the character of Kremlin leaders when 
contemplating the threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
William Van Cleave, like Pipes, regarded the Soviet build-up as ominous.169 He 
eventually worked on contract for the CPD, though Tyroler noted his fees in 1979 as ‘a 
gross undercharge … [that] equals a significant financial contribution’. 170  Charles 
Kupperman, hired in February 1978 as the CPD’s ‘Defense Analyst and Research 
Associate’, was the only other paid member of the Executive Committee.171 
After completing a rotation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1974 Zumwalt refused 
an offer to be Director of the Veterans Administration or the equivalent of a 4-star 
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admiral posting, and retired. He 'wanted to be free to say how perilous I thought the 
course was that Henry Kissinger had set for America’.172 Edward Rowny, a Lieutenant 
General in the army, joined the CPD in similar circumstances in 1979 after resigning 
from the SALT II negotiating team in Geneva. ‘[W]hen the SALT II Treaty limiting 
strategic weapons was initialled’, Rowny recalled, ‘I resigned in protest from my post as 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the U.S. negotiating team. I was convinced 
that the SALT II Treaty would be detrimental to the security of the United States.'173 He 
immediately began campaigning with the CPD to oppose Senate ratification of the 
treaty. Rowny and Zumwalt clearly felt obligated to act on their concerns over policy 
having both retired from the military in order to criticise freely government policy and 
advocate a return to military containment. 
It is problematic to suggest that the motivation for participation in the 
Committee was solely self-interest. Edward Rowny resigned in 1979 and Paul Nitze had 
similarly resigned as a SALT negotiator in 1975. Elmo Zumwalt had chosen retirement 
despite offers of government employment. The sense of ‘duty’ among the Committee’s 
most influential members is clear and should not be readily dismissed. Nor should we 
ignore the commitment required of the CPD's Executive Committee. While ‘ordinary’ 
CPD members were expected to attend an annual meeting just once a year, the demands 
on Executive Committee members were much more significant. They usually met once 
a month in addition to ‘working group’ meetings to draft CPD statements. From 1976 to 
1980, sixteen Committee statements were written though several more publications 
including SALT II negotiation updates, responses to administration policies, and 
summaries of CPD positions were also printed.174 Executive Committee members also 
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attended hundreds of community and televised debates on a voluntary basis to promote 
the Committee’s concerns. Genuine concern with the direction of national security 
policy prompted this level of involvement; it was not merely personal ambition for a 
government appointment or financial gain. 
Clearly Executive Committee members felt duty-bound to undertake their 
mission with the CPD. They perceived themselves as public servants who by nature of 
their professional training understood the dangers facing the United States, which, as a 
result of détente, were being ignored by American leaders. To end détente and restore 
containment, the CPD was established as an organisation for and by those individuals 
who intended to continue public service outside of government and warn of the 
potential dangers of Soviet military expansion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Committee’s main participants cannot be regarded simply as threat inflators 
motivated by ‘self-interest’. 175  Their argument that America needed to increase its 
military strength was a function of genuine concern and the Committee’s campaign was 
devised to express this trepidation publicly. Its Executive Committee members had 
extensive experience of planning America’s Cold War strategy and forecast defeat if 
Kissinger’s concept of détente endured. Containment strategy, which Paul Nitze had 
conceptualised in the 1950s as Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, 
seemed at risk of abandonment under détente. To the Committee, Kissinger seemed to 
lack the faith that ordinary Americans would support the maintenance of an adequate 
military shield in the face of growing Soviet military strength. A number of respected 
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government, academic, and military figures who rejected what they perceived as 
Kissinger’s pessimism resolved to take action and therefore joined the CPD. 
 The Committee was not, however, a panicked and hastily constituted response to 
détente. Prior to the creation of the CPD a number of founding members had been 
involved in similar efforts to bolster popular and government support of containment. 
The CDM, CMPDP, and the CPFV were important predecessor groups to the CPD itself, 
and the experiences of these groups greatly influenced how the CPD would operate. 
 The Team B exercise was particularly influential in the development of the CPD. 
It permitted the national security experts who opposed what they judged as an optimistic 
approach to threat assessment the opportunity to articulate the case for worst-case 
planning in its place. Richard Pipes invited Nitze onto the B Team, who in turn invited 
Pipes onto the CPD's Executive Committee. The structure of the CPD warning of the 
Soviet threat was set. Concern over détente, and the rejection of containment that the 
policy seemed to represent, remained a sincere concern of Committee members for the 
next four years. 
 There was genuine and considerable concern from a substantial section of the 
foreign policy elite that Kissinger’s pursuit of détente was dangerous. Over the early 
1970s, a number of these experts grew so alarmed at the potential risks of the policy that 
they took independent action. When their efforts largely failed, these increasingly 
agitated national security specialists joined the Committee on the Present Danger. 
  
 
62 
1976 – An Election Year Launch 
‘I [Eugene Rostow] told Paul [Nitze] that if it [the Committee] worked at all, it would 
be the most important thing either of us ever did.’176 
 
 Eugene Rostow, struck by ‘inspiration after a Bloody Mary on Thanksgiving’ in 
1975, resolved to organise a group to sound the alarm over the deteriorating state of 
America’s Cold War campaign.177 The formation of the group was not prompted by the 
accession of the Carter Administration in November 1976, but was a result of the 
Committee’s founding members’ determination to revitalise containment. Rostow and 
Nitze had been discussing the group for over a year, before Rostow, fortified by his 
drink, asked Charls Walker and Nitze ‘why don’t we just do it?’178 Containment had 
suffered a loss of prestige following the Vietnam War and was further undermined by 
the pursuit of détente. This drift away from confrontation, for Rostow, necessitated a 
group dedicated to rehabilitate the strategy. This chapter argues that this was a long-
term dissatisfaction with détente and was not simply a reaction to the presidential 
election, or merely an offshoot of the Team B episode in 1976.  
It was not Ford, the Republican and self-professed ‘hawk on defense’, but the 
prospect of a new Carter Administration that seemed to provide a better opportunity to 
facilitate a return to containment. 179  Ford, despite his self-assessment as a hawk, 
remained wedded to détente. Given that CPD members diagnosed détente as the cause 
of America’s deteriorating military status it is unsurprising that Carter was the more 
attractive prospect in the 1976 presidential election. To the CPD's founding members, 
the U.S.S.R. had increased its military strength while first Nixon and then Ford 
doggedly pursued improved relations to the detriment of American national security 
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interests. Compared with Ford’s dedication to détente, Carter’s emphasis on human 
rights offered the prospect of a new, more realistic approach to Soviet relations. 
This chapter argues that the formation of the Committee was not a reaction to 
Carter’s victory. Ford’s re-election campaign, despite calling for increased defence 
spending, did not signal a shift away from détente, which alarmed the Committee. In 
Rostow’s view the Committee was necessary regardless of the election’s outcome: in 
the event of a second term for Ford the Committee would criticise the administration’s 
policies, and in the event of a Carter victory the Committee would support the new 
administration's policies that conformed to the principles of containment. A first section 
concludes that by the autumn of 1976, Ford’s continuing commitment to détente was far 
more distressing to the Committee than Carter’s focus on morality and human rights. 
Ultimately, election year presidential politics do not explain why the CPD's 
founding board members moved ahead with their project. The chapter's final section 
discusses the Committee’s intention to start a national debate not only by lobbying the 
president but also by issuing studies, meeting with politicians, and addressing 
community leaders. CPD members hoped that by discussing the national security issues 
that Nixon and Ford had ignored as a result of their pursuit of détente, containment 
would once again form the basis of U.S.-Soviet relations. The challenges of this mission, 
however, were exposed at the Committee’s first press conference on 11 November. The 
media greeted the CPD’s mission with scepticism, demonstrating to the Executive 
Committee that their objective would not be attained easily. A long-term effort was 
necessary to overcome distrust at what appeared to many journalists as a hawkish 
political group. By the end of 1976, as the Committee's initial reception indicated, there 
was little to suggest that the group would be able to influence the discourse of national 
security issues and restore containment. 
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Détente in the 1976 Election 
 
 This section argues that the Committee’s election year launch was coincidental, 
and was not a factor in Rostow's decision to start the group. In fact, election year 
politics seemed a distraction to the CPD's founding board members as the state of U.S.-
Soviet military balance was an issue too important to be subsumed in campaign rhetoric. 
Re-establishing containment, Rostow recognised, would be a long-term project that 
would outlast election year politics so the Committee’s launch was delayed until after 
the campaign to ensure that its message would not be dropped immediately after the 
election. Rostow explained the CPD’s nonpartisan approach in the election to a 
supporter early in 1977: 
It was always clear — to us, at least — that the Committee would be 
useful, if it got off the ground at all, whoever was elected. The basic 
problem is to bring public opinion back to reality after the shock of 
Vietnam, Watergate, and Kissinger's cynical pretense of "detente." If 
we elected a President who wanted to lead that kind of an effort, in 
Truman's mantle, the Committee would face one set of problems: how 
to help? If, on the other hand, we elected a President who wanted to 
continue deceiving us about the state of the world, a la Nixon, 
Kissinger, and Ford, the Committee's job would obviously be different. 
In any event, a citizens' committee would be needed because so few of 
the pundits of public opinion — Congressmen, Senators, media heroes, 
professors, and so on – were addressing the problem – on the contrary, 
they were running like rabbits.180 
 
The election was an interference at the start of the CPD’s effort to ‘address the problem’. 
Its campaign intended to encourage officials and ‘media heroes’ to end the deception of 
détente, and not to ensure the election of one presidential candidate over the other. In 
this way, rather than serving as an inspiration for the CPD’s foundation, the election 
should instead be regarded as an unwelcome distraction during the Committee’s launch. 
The assumption of political scientist Adam Fuller that CPD members ‘were 
mostly Republican’ and created their group ‘in response to Carter’s liberal foreign 
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policy’ is unfounded.181 This is not only because the majority of its founding members 
were in fact Democrats, but more significantly because the Ford campaign’s rhetoric 
concerned them considerably more than did Carter’s. Ford remained staunchly 
committed to détente, which was precisely what the Committee perceived as the chief 
impediment to revitalising containment. The CPD was concerned with national security 
policy in general rather than opposing individual politicians in 1976, and was much 
more interested in bringing discussion of foreign policy ‘back to reality’, as Rostow told 
CPD honorary chairman Lane Kirkland, than with supporting any particular 
candidate.182 The management of America’s Cold War strategy was too important for 
the Committee to attach its fortunes to any one political figure or even party: for the 
Committee in 1976, politics did indeed end at the water’s edge. 
In any case, foreign policy was not to be a pivotal issue in the 1976 elections 
even if it did feature prominently in the Republican primaries. Polling data indicated 
that election concerns were mostly domestic issues. ‘Listen to the people more’ and 
‘Show trust in the people more’ were statements that, respectively, 83 and 79 percent of 
respondents to one poll agreed were top priorities for a new administration.183 
 President Ford was fully committed to continuing détente and, despite criticism 
during the primary campaign, was unwilling to abandon the approach to Soviet relations. 
At the beginning of his campaign the president believed his foreign policy to be popular 
among ordinary Americans, and that his record on U.S.-Soviet relations would be a 
strength in the 1976 election campaign.184 After taking an oath of office on 9 August 
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1974, Ford had largely sustained Nixon’s foreign policy, retaining Henry Kissinger as 
his Secretary of State and maintaining détente. He was proud of successful negotiations 
with Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok in December 1974, which resulted in an interim 
agreement on arms control, and also in Helsinki over the summer of 1975, where the 
Helsinki Accords were signed.185 Supplementing improving U.S.-Soviet relations with a 
strong defence policy; the Ford Administration submitted the highest peacetime defence 
budget in U.S. history. It was Ford who first used the term ‘peace through strength’ to 
describe his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.186 With détente as a cornerstone of his 
administration’s foreign policy, Ford assumed his re-election campaign was on steady 
ground. 
To Ford’s surprise, however, détente was heavily criticised during the 
Republican primary campaign. The Ford Administration’s press officer, Robert 
Goldwin, wrote a memorandum in July 1974, summarising the difficulties explaining 
détente: 
Detente suggests that we are not in danger from the Soviets, the need 
for defense efforts suggests that we are in danger from them – and the 
seeming contradiction is more than most people can cope with … 
What is needed, therefore, it [sic] a clear and persistently repeated 
explanation of US policy in which detente and defense are presented 
as two elements of one consistent whole.187 
 
Goldwin recognised that détente was not an easily explained policy, but stressed that the 
administration ‘should not shun complexity’. 188  In its FY1976 Annual Defense 
Department Report the Ford Administration acknowledged the growth in Soviet 
military power and advocated a higher defence budget to ensure that the Soviet Union 
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would not attain strategic superiority.189 Expansion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal was 
seen as compatible with détente, but, as Goldwin predicted, détente’s critics seized upon 
this growth in Soviet military power. If relations were improving, Rostow asked, why 
were the Soviets expanding their military capabilities?190  This contradiction proved 
difficult for the Ford Administration to explain. 
The inconsistency especially frustrated those would imminently join the CPD’s 
Executive Committee. Ford seemed to acknowledge the military danger posed by the 
Soviet Union’s growing capabilities, reflected in his request for additional defence 
spending, yet he would not express these concerns in simple terms to the American 
public. Privately, for example, Ford perceived that Soviet involvement in the Horn of 
Africa constituted a significant threat to American interests, and even drew a 
comparison to the prelude to the Second World War. In February 1976, he confided to 
Clare Boothe Luce, a PFIAB member and early CPD board member, ‘I think we have to 
show historically that we may be going through the 30's again. If Britain and France had 
kept Italy out of Ethiopia in 1935, there might have been no World War II. Angola 
might be a latter day Ethiopia.’191 Such a statement made publicly would have been 
wholeheartedly welcomed by the nascent CPD, but Ford refused to use such language in 
public as he did not want to sour Soviet relations.  
This contradiction, on the one hand recognising threat, on the other desiring 
continued cordial relations, deeply troubled the CPD’s founding members. For Rostow, 
withholding these alarming interpretations of Soviet behaviour from the public was 
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tantamount to ‘deceiving us about the state of the world’.192 The Ford Administration’s 
emphasis on good relations often resulted in the awkward position of defending their 
Soviet adversaries and justifying the actions of Soviet leaders. Kissinger, in a 
memorandum dated 18 March 1976, explained ‘I think we are undermining detente. 
Except for Angola, I think the Soviets are getting a bum rap. I don’t believe they have 
massively increased their forces. It is a gradual trend and will continue no matter what. 
They have been quiet in the Middle East. Only Angola was out of bounds.’ 193 
Kissinger’s attitude astounded Committee members. It seemed representative of the 
illusion of détente that they believed had gripped the Ford Administration. Kissinger 
suggested that a relaxation of tensions had occurred even while the Soviets continued 
the Cold War confrontation in the Horn of Africa. 
Recognising this uncomfortable situation, Rostow attempted to encourage Ford 
to discuss Soviet relations more soberly with the American people. He wrote to the 
president on 25 August 1976 imploring him ‘to follow the line of our Committee 
manifesto during the campaign … It seems to be far more naturally your own view of 
things than the ambiguous and overly optimistic approach you and the Secretary of 
State have been presenting to the people.’194 The fact that Ford had raised defence 
spending was insufficient for Rostow. Not explaining to Americans why the rise was 
necessary hampered the long-term viability of containment. If the administration gave 
the impression that the Cold War had ended, and had been superseded by an era of 
peaceful coexistence, then Americans would not understand why the burden of 
additional defence spending was necessary. Committee members believed that 
Americans deserved to be told by their national leaders about Soviet activities, and that 
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the true nature of the Soviet threat should not be withheld merely for the sake of good 
relations. 
Ford assumed that higher defence spending would assuage détente critics such 
as Rostow, and that continued emphasis on cordial relations would satisfy détente 
supporters, but the approach pleased no one. He underestimated the growing antipathy 
towards détente, informing Brezhnev at Helsinki in August 1975 that ‘the criticism at 
home has come from elements in America that can be, as I said, brushed aside’.195 
Months later his dismissal of détente’s opponents was less confident. Ford revealed his 
frustrations with the Republican party primary campaign to West German politician 
Helmut Kohl on 4 May 1976: ‘I have always been a hawk on defense, yet Reagan is 
trying to portray me [as] just the opposite. It is really ridiculous.’196 Ford did not share 
the view of Reagan and of the CPD that it was dangerous to acknowledge the growing 
Soviet threat and yet sill support détente. 
Reagan’s challenge in the Republican Primaries in the spring of 1976 publicised 
the inconsistencies of the Ford Administration’s national security policy. Appearing on 
an NBC’s Meet the Press in March, Reagan declared détente ‘has been a one-way street. 
We are making the concessions, we are giving them [the Soviet Union] the things they 
want; we ask nothing in return. In fact, we give them things before we ask for the 
return.’197 Reagan’s allegations of Soviet manipulation and U.S. acquiescence proved 
difficult to dismiss, and greatly concerned the Ford campaign. Campaign officials hoped 
to portray Reagan as dangerous and unelectable in response. ‘[W]e must go for the 
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jugular and eliminate the credibility of the Reagan campaign’, Rogers Morton, chairman 
of the President Ford Committee, was told by a campaign advisor on 7 April.198  
Yet Reagan’s arguments reflected the concerns of an increasing number of 
Americans as polls indicated mounting unease with détente. Between December 1975 
and March 1976 Harris poll respondents expressing opposition to détente rose from 15 
per cent to 23 per cent, a small but notable shift. 199  Reagan’s primary challenge 
ultimately failed but did succeed in pushing the administration to the right in style if not 
in substance.200 As a result of Reagan’s attacks, Ford stopped using the word ‘détente’ 
in his campaign in February 1976.201 However, despite announcing ‘we are going to 
forget the use of the word detente’, there was little doubt that Ford remained committed 
to the spirit of the policy.202 Ford had told Brezhnev in 1975 that ‘very forcefully I am 
committed to detente … my aim, objective and total effort on my part will be to narrow 
our differences and achieve the benefits for your people, for our people, and I believe 
for the world as a whole’.203 Ford was a passionate advocate of the policy, and there 
was little doubt that his victory would have resulted in a continuation of détente. 
In summary, the Ford campaign deeply frustrated the Committee. He proposed 
an increased defence budget to ensure military parity, indicating that his administration 
had the substance of a platform consistent with containment. However, the necessity of 
new and expensive defence programmes remained unclear to ordinary Americans 
without explaining why the Soviet Union still remained a threat. Following his election 
                                                
198 “Memorandum from Bruce Wagner to Rogers Morton, Subject: Ronald Reagan”, 7 April, 1976, 
Folder: Reagan, Ronald, Box B2, Ford Committee Records, Ford Library, 2. 
199 Louis Harris, “Reagan’s Big Mistake”, ABC News-Harris Survey, 19 April, 1976, 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-REAGANS-BIG-MISTAKE-
1976-04.pdf (accessed 28/01/2014). 
200 At the Republican National Convention in Kansas City Ford secured nomination by a small margin, 
1,187 delegates to 1,070. 
201 Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon–Ford Years, 1969–1976”, 391. 
202 Ford quoted in Kalman, Right Star Rising, 131. 
203 Ford in “Brezhnev Memcoms, Helsinki 1975”, Folder: July 30 - August 2, 1975 - Ford/Brezhnev 
Meetings in Helsinki, Box 1, NSA Memcoms, Ford Library, 3. 
 
71 
defeat, Ford wrote to Rostow to defend his failed campaign. Referring to his defence 
spending plans he maintained that ‘actions speak louder than words', yet without 
hearing the words to explain the actions from their president Rostow was concerned that 
Americans would not support his defence policy.204 This was the CPD’s fundamental 
grievance with détente. Ford’s intention to maintain the policy meant that the aggressive 
activities of the Soviet Union were downplayed to Americans and the rationale for 
containment was therefore obscured. This reluctance to explain the Soviet threat 
constituted the bad leadership of Nixon and Ford that particularly frustrated a number of 
national security experts who would become Committee board members over 1976.205 
 
For these CPD early board members, as for most of the country outside Georgia, 
Jimmy Carter was an unknown political figure at the outset of his presidential 
campaign.206 It was unclear what kind of policies he would pursue in office, and of 
particular concern to the CPD, what his approach would be to national security and 
Soviet relations. Carter had carefully positioned himself as the Washington outsider in 
the Democratic primary campaign, which proved popular following the Vietnam War, 
the Watergate Scandal, Nixon’s impeachment, and Ford’s pardon of the disgraced 
former president.207 In contrast to Nixon, Carter seemed to many Americans as ‘a man 
of high integrity’ and ‘the kind of new, fresh face that is needed in the White House’.208 
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The historian Gaddis Smith argues that Carter ‘offered a morally responsible and 
farsighted vision’, which proved popular in 1976 as Carter, ‘like a surfer’, caught ‘the 
one wave of the day’ that led to success.209 As part of his campaign as an outsider, 
Carter promised the application of morality in foreign policy, offering an approach ‘that 
reflects the decency and generosity and common sense of our own people’.210  
This promise appealed to the CPD’s Executive Committee as it suggested 
ordinary Americans would be informed of national security decision-making, unlike 
Kissinger’s ‘back channel’ approach within the Ford Administration, which relied on 
secret negotiations.211 Rostow was certain, he later announced, that 'If our people are 
told the truth, they will respond today, as they have always responded in the past’, and 
support a return to containment.212  As a result, Carter seemed the more promising 
candidate for advancing the Committee’s agenda because, as they did, he promised to 
trust the American people.  
Precise policy initiatives, however, were vague. While Carter promised to lower 
defence spending by six per cent, CPD board members considered that perhaps his 
focus on morality could signify a return to containment. At the very least, challenging 
the Kremlin’s human rights record seemed preferable to maintaining ‘illusory’ good 
relations through détente. As Rostow told the gathered press at the CPD’s initial press 
conference in November, ‘[t]here’s nothing incompatible … [with] the pledge of 
President Carter’.213 A new Democratic president inexperienced in national security 
issues seemed a better prospect for change than another term for Ford, clearly 
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committed to détente. Rather than hope that Ford would change his entire approach to 
Soviet relations, Executive Committee members were enthusiastic to try their luck with 
the unknown candidate. 
Joining the Carter Administration and pursuing a return to containment strategy 
from within the White House was a distinct possibility for Nitze and James Schlesinger, 
two influential founding CPD members. Schlesinger had been a prominent figure in the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations until President Ford removed him as Secretary of 
Defense in November 1975. Like Nitze, Schlesinger was a vocal advocate of increased 
defence spending and a more confrontational relationship with the Soviet Union, and 
these views had led Rostow to include him in CPD planning.214 In May 1976, however, 
Schlesinger hesitated over his involvement in the Committee, and opted to influence 
policy from within the Carter campaign instead. Having fostered a good working 
relationship with the presidential candidate, Schlesinger felt that Carter would be 
receptive to his advice, especially as a newcomer to Washington politics with limited 
foreign policy experience. 215  Following Carter’s win, however, Schlesinger later 
admitted that their relationship ‘deteriorated reasonably rapidly’, limiting his influence 
on administration national security policy.216 He perceived that his involvement in the 
administration was a ‘way of generating political support’ rather than Carter attempting 
to access his advice and counsel. 217  As Energy Secretary, Schlesinger would have 
limited opportunities to raise his concerns over national security policy from within the 
administration. 
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Nitze’s opportunity to join the Carter campaign came in the form of an invitation 
to participate in an advisory meeting in April 1976 at Carter’s ranch in Plains, 
Georgia.218 'If I could make a constructive contribution’, Nitze recalled, ‘I was anxious 
to help'.219 But during the meeting he refused to emulate ‘the rosy picture’ of Soviet 
relations presented by the other advisors. 220  As a result, Carter perceived Nitze as 
‘arrogant and inflexible … and he had a doomsday approach’.221 Nitze was not offered a 
position in the administration and was the only participant at the Plains meeting who did 
not join Carter’s staff. Schlesinger and Nitze, both noted advocates of increased military 
strength, took different paths in their efforts to reorient policy back towards containment. 
In summary, Schlesinger and Nitze’s initial willingness to participate in the 
Carter Administration demonstrates that the candidate’s platform of morality did not 
necessarily alienate advocates of containment in 1976. On the contrary, a focus on 
human rights perhaps signalled that the new administration might confront the Soviet 
Union with new vigour. With Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Polish émigré and noted hardliner, 
as the new administration’s National Security Advisor there seemed a better chance of 
eschewing détente than under a re-elected Ford Administration. 
 
The Committee’s Objectives 
 
 The first full meeting of the CPD’s Executive Committee was held on 19 
October 1976. 222  The meeting was intended to determine what exactly the CPD 
intended to accomplish in its first year. It was decided that a primary focus of ‘shaping 
leadership opinion’ would be achieved by expanding the Committee’s membership base, 
seeking additional funding, and, most importantly, by regularly releasing statements on 
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issues affecting the U.S.-Soviet military balance.223 The result of this gathering was the 
CPD’s first statement How the Committee on the Present Danger Will Operate. The 
statement explained that the Committee’s publications were to be based on a ‘full, fair 
and objective factual foundation’ and would involve ‘as many sectors of society as our 
resources permit’.224 The statement also identified the objective of the Committee as ‘to 
facilitate a national discussion’ of national security policy to ensure ‘a secure peace with 
freedom’.225  It argued the need to ‘build a fresh consensus’ behind containment in 
American foreign policy was necessary to achieve this goal. 226  The Committee 
recognised it had ‘set a big task for itself [and was] aware how difficult it will be to 
accomplish’.227 
Nitze believed that the Committee’s activities would fill an important but 
neglected role. He later recalled that the CPD programme had been necessary as 
None of the existing think tanks or other similar institutions was doing 
the objective analyses and presentations needed to stimulate public 
awareness … What was missing, I decided, was an effective vehicle 
that could bring these questions [of strategic disadvantage] to the 
public's attention.228  
 
The CPD would take on this task. 
In Nitze’s vision the Committee was not a lobbying group but an educational 
group. Authoring research articles, giving congressional testimony, and participating in 
debates were not activities considered to be lobbying, and meant the group could 
receive tax free donations. The Inland Revenue Service agreed, assessing the 
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Committee’s activities as educational – not lobbying – and granted non-profit status.229 
To educate on national security issues, Nitze, as the CPD’s Director of Policy Studies, 
would select national security issues and run a series of ‘computations’ to generate 
statistics that would form the basis of a CPD report. A Committee working group would 
then draft a report to be circulated around the Executive Committee. After a 
collaborative redrafting effort, a laborious process that lasted hours, the statements were 
finalised and distributed to the Committee’s mailing list. 
In this important respect, the CPD campaign was not intended to replicate the 
‘clearer than truth’ style of the NSC-68 report that had first established containment in 
the early 1950s.230 A subtler approach was required to build support for containment in 
the post-Vietnam War era. The Committee would not stoke fear by presenting startling 
images of the threat of a Soviet initiated nuclear war, but would instead appeal to 
Americans’ desire to match the military strength of their communist rivals by logically 
demonstrating Soviet superiority with statistics and graphs. The campaign to re-
establish containment would be advanced through relatively uncontroversial topics of 
analysis including ‘the nature and purposes of Soviet foreign policy … the state of the 
arms race … [and] the problem of restoring a viable world economy’.231 The CPD’s 
analyses would address ‘broad principles’ and avoid ‘day to day, tactical issues’.232 This 
approach meant that the Committee could present its analysis in a disinterested style 
that would be better received in the more sceptical 1970s. 
The broad principles the Committee would tackle could in fact be reduced to just 
a single principle: one had to assume that the Soviet Union, like Rome or the Mongols, 
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was dangerous because it was inherently expansionist. 233  This assumption was 
axiomatic to CPD board members and was the basis for all the Committee’s analyses. 
The notion would never be challenged as it was the main point of agreement between 
the group’s disparate membership, and this meant that every Soviet action that 
conceivably supported this hypothesis was taken as incontrovertible proof that the 
hypothesis was accurate. If one agreed with the premise of the CPD’s analysis, then the 
logic that underpinned its alarming message was rational. What evidence did the group 
provide to justify its assumption of inherent expansionism? Pipes’ reading of Russian 
history supposedly gave substantiation to the view of a civilisation obsessed with 
military power and territorial gain.234 This insight fuelled both the Committee’s urgency 
and the conviction that its assessments of future malevolent Soviet conduct were 
accurate. 
The CPD’s axiomatic assumption of Soviet expansionism would be presented in 
publications in a disinterested, analytical style. This effort was bolstered by the 
Committee’s focus on recruiting an elite membership. The Executive Committee 
members attending the first October meeting were well-connected and influential 
members of the Washington political elite. These CPD leaders had the political stature 
to be granted access to senators, congressman, and White House officials to discuss 
concerns over national security policy. The Committee’s First Year Program prioritised 
meeting key congressional personnel ‘in the informal surroundings of clubs or private 
homes in order to promote one-on-one exchange’.235 The Executive Committee was 
concerned about the status and influence of those it reached rather than their quantity, 
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and its programme was to be 'directed primarily toward shaping leadership opinion in 
the Congress, the media and the community’.236 It is clear that the Committee did not 
seek to create a mass movement, but sought to generate support among ‘opinion leaders’ 
for the policies that would permit a return to containment.237 As Rostow told CPD board 
members in December 1976, ‘We can generate an effective public opinion only if each 
of you helps, locally and nationally, to multiply the impact of the Committee’s 
output.’238 In addition to releasing statements to supporters, the First Year Program 
included plans to conduct conferences and seminars, for which the CPD would supply 
speakers and written materials and to ‘secure local and regional media attention’ for the 
CPD’s statements.239  
This focus on ‘national leaders’ was also a matter of funding; the Committee had 
very limited financial resources in 1976 and speaking events – where event organisers 
often paid expenses – kept expenditures low. It was far beyond the CPD’s resources to 
print the large numbers of pamphlets necessary for a meaningful mailing campaign on 
the same scale as the groups such as the Conservative Caucus or the American 
Conservative Union, which could send millions of direct mailings as part of their well-
funded campaigns.240 Funds were better spent, the Executive Committee reasoned, on 
directing efforts towards those with immediate political influence. In relying on 
volunteer efforts and personal contacts with noted public figures it could spread its 
message among an influential audience despite such limited resources. 
The Committee did not receive substantial financial backing to start its effort. It 
is only partially true, as the historian Bodenheimer has suggested, that the ‘CPD 
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received its start-up grant from David Packard’. 241  To maintain impartiality the 
Executive Committee imposed strict financing rules that prevented any individual 
giving more than $10,000 each year, and refused donations from any organisation 
receiving 15 per cent of its revenues from the defence industry.242 These provisions 
proved restrictive and rather than attracting funds from the defence industry, as is often 
argued, the Committee was in fact predominately funded by its own members. David 
Packard, Paul Nitze, Henry Fowler, and C. Douglas Dillon each donated between 
$5,000 and $10,000 of seed funding. Charls Walker, the CPD’s treasurer, arranged an 
event for a group of Houston businessmen on 4 August 1976 where four bankers 
donated a total of $27,500.243 On 10 November 1976, the day before its public launch, 
the Committee had just $36,602.75 in its bank account. 244  Over the first year of 
operations the CPD spent just $98,144.32.245 To limit expenses the Committee budgeted 
to employ only two full time non-secretarial staff; Charles Tyroler as director, and Paul 
Green.246 Green coordinated media relations, arranging visits to newspaper editorial 
meetings, television appearances, and allocating CPD members to regional speaking 
events. 
It is clear that in explaining the CPD's success funding was certainly not as 
important as was the group's membership. The group operated as a volunteer 
organisation that relied almost exclusively on its Executive Committee members to 
author statements and perform outreach efforts. Additional funding amplified its 
message but the CPD did not rely on substantial financial resources to fund its basic 
operations, in contrast to the direct mailing model of organisations like the American 
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Conservative Union. The intellectual work of report writing, letter writing, and debating 
formed the core of Committee activity and was performed by members at no cost. The 
only significant expenses were its small number of support staff, printing, mailing, and 
travel costs. Access to a senator’s office to present the Committee’s latest pamphlet 
could not be bought; the ability to influence directly politicians was a result of CPD 
members’ prestige. As we shall see later, the composition of membership was much 
more important to the Committee’s initial success than was substantial funding. 
 Conscious of the ‘special risks’ of launching in an election year, the Executive 
Committee waited to introduce itself and its message to the public until after the 
conclusion of the presidential election.247 Rostow had originally intended to launch in 
the summer of 1976 but ultimately chose to wait until the resolution of the presidential 
campaign to protect the Committee’s nonpartisan image. He had informed a number of 
politicians, including Donald Rumsfeld and Henry Kissinger, of the existence of the 
CPD in April 1976, stressing its ‘bipartisanship, nonpartisan’ nature and intention to 
operate ‘in a scrupulously non-polemic fashion’, and to ‘avoid controversies’ in national 
security debates.248 Announcing the Committee after the election, Rostow hoped, would 
permit a longer-term campaign to rebuild a consensus behind containment. 
 On 11 November 1976, seventy journalists were invited to the National Press 
Club in Washington for the public unveiling of the new organisation. Rostow 
introduced the CPD’s ‘honorary chairmen’ who explained their mission and invited 
questions from the gathered press. He explained that the Committee’s honorary 
chairmen had been appointed to demonstrate that CPD membership was ‘being drawn 
from every section of the country and every major walk of life’.249 Lane Kirkland, the 
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chairman of the AFL-CIO trade union, represented labour. David Packard, the 
cofounder of the Hewlett-Packard Company, represented business. Packard had also 
served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1971 in the Nixon Administration. 
Finally, Henry Fowler, who had served as the Secretary of the Treasury in the Johnson 
Administration, represented government. Each of the honorary chairmen was a 
prominent and well-respected political figure, and their affiliation to the CPD was 
intended to demonstrate both widespread concern over the inadequacy of détente as 
well as support for the need for enhanced military capabilities.  
From its first conference the CPD was determined to manage the media 
perception of its campaign, and to challenge the labelling of the group as Cold War 
‘hawks’. The CPD’s first public appearance was designed to highlight the respectable, 
bipartisan makeup of its supporters, and, by extension, their message. Each honorary 
chairman read aloud a portion of the CPD’s statement, Common Sense and Common 
Danger.250 It unambiguously explained the Committee’s assessment of the threat facing 
America: ‘Our country is in a period of danger and the danger is increasing. Unless 
decisive steps are taken to alert the nation and to change the course of its policy, our 
economic and military capacity will become inadequate to assure peace with 
security.’251 The statement suggested that ‘awareness of danger has diminished’ and that 
political determination was required to ‘restore the strength and coherence of our 
foreign policy’.252 Soviet expansion was the single largest threat to the ‘survival of 
freedom,’ and restored confidence, strength, and leadership were required as ‘national 
survival’ was at risk.253 The opening message was intended to balance the gravity of the 
group's warning with the gravitas of the group's honorary chairmen. This was a 
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carefully considered introduction for the group: not a shrill cry for Cold War renewal, 
but a reasoned warning that the superpower rivalry had never subsided, despite the 
pursuit of détente. 
The CPD had been created, the statement declared, to ‘build a fresh consensus to 
expand the opportunities and diminish the dangers of a world in flux’, alluding to a 
reestablishment of containment as the basis for national security policy. 254  The 
Committee’s immediate objective was ‘to promote a realistic public discussion’ in 
response to ‘difficult’ and ‘deteriorating’ global political climate.255 This discussion 
would involve explaining the growing military capabilities of the Soviet Union and in 
doing so, it was hoped, generate support for the defence programmes that would allow 
American armed forces to match Soviet strength. Rostow explained that his mission was 
urgent; the Committee needed ‘to move American public opinion, American public 
policy, early enough, while there’s still time’.256 Détente had numbed Americans to the 
dangers presented by the Soviet Union and the Committee would articulate these threats 
and rebuild a consensus behind the maintenance of an adequate military shield to 
contain the Soviet threat. 
 Rostow was keen to stress that the Committee’s efforts were not merely a 
reaction to the newly elected Carter Administration. Rather than announce opposition to 
the administration, Rostow instead struck a constructive tone: ‘[W]e’re talking now 
only in terms of broad policy objectives’, he remarked, and stressed the necessity of a 
‘long term effort’ of re-establishing consensus.257 The CPD had avoided the presidential 
election cycle as the issue of national security was far more important and because the 
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Committee was ‘concerned with trends and not personalities’.258 Party politics, Rostow 
was keen to stress, did not interest the Executive Committee. He told reporters that ‘the 
activities of this committee should serve a useful national purpose, should help whoever 
is President and whoever are members of Congress for a long time to come, without 
regard to which party is in control of the Congress’.259 The Committee’s foe was the 
‘illusory’ policy of détente that now, following Ford’s defeat, could be abandoned and 
the process of restoring containment begun.260 
 The introduction of the Committee’s mission invited hostile press questioning of 
the honorary chairmen, and demonstrated the uphill battle facing the CPD in their effort 
to influence policy. To journalists the Committee appeared to be another effort by Cold 
War hawks to raise military spending by unsubstantiated scaremongering. Packard was 
asked why he had not raised similar concerns while serving as Secretary of Defense.261 
Defending his record, Packard responded that it was the current adverse ‘trends’ in the 
military balance that concerned him and that inflation had eroded the defence budget in 
real terms since his tenure.262 Lane Kirkland, as chairman of the country’s largest trade 
union, was asked whether the Committee’s position on higher defence spending would 
in fact lower the standard of living of his own union members. Kirkland’s view was that 
deciding on the defence budget was ‘a question of how big a chance you’re willing to 
take … [it is] prudent to take out fire insurance, particularly if you’re living next door to 
a pyromaniac’.263 Paul Nitze contested the insinuation that the CPD was just another 
hawkish group, determined to fight the Cold War in a particularly aggressive manner. 
He was adamant that when polled the majority of Americans agreed with the position 
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the Committee had outlined.264 To an extent this was true. Détente, while still popular, 
was slowly losing popularity and support for increased defence spending was rising.265 
The Chairmen’s responses, however, did not prevent a mixed reception for the 
Committee. 
The launch resulted in editorial comment in some newspapers welcoming the 
Committee’s formation, noting its prominent membership in particular. The Columbia 
Record welcomed the CPD ‘because of its nature, because of its expertise among 
experienced and dedicated men … Informed, intense dialogue in a democracy is 
essential for the public weal.’266 A syndicated editorial in The Montgomery Advertiser, 
however, asked ‘Where’s the Wolf?’, and compared the premise of the Committee’s 
efforts unfavourably to the missile-gap controversies of previous years. 267  The 
presentation of the Committee’s honorary chairman was designed to portray an image 
of widespread concern to justify their mission, but the more common reaction was 
recognition of prominent members coupled with scepticism of their message. 
The CPD's press unveiling did not result in a surge of sympathetic publicity for 
its view that the Soviet Union constituted a growing danger to American interests. 
Significantly, the Committee's launch was entirely ignored by the New York Times and 
the Washington Post.268 In addition, ‘Television coverage’, Tyroler noted, ‘was highly 
disappointing’.269 Tyroler later admitted that after the launch ‘All of us were crushed 
and feeling lower than a snake's belly.’270 Unsurprisingly the announcement of the 
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Committee's formation did not immediately spark a national debate on defence issues, 
but the Executive Committee had recognised this was to be a long term effort. The First 
Year Program would now be enacted and the Committee’s studies would ensure that the 
‘other side’ of the debate on Soviet relations – the less optimistic view that Team B had 
advocated – would now be heard.271 
Conclusion 
 
 In 1976, the Committee launched in order to function as an association for those 
who did not think that national leaders sufficiently acknowledged the threat from the 
Soviet Union, and who believed that a return to containment was necessary. Despite 
Reagan’s success in exposing the contradictions of détente during the Republican 
primary campaign, it was uncertain that the Ford Administration would scrap the policy 
and restore containment in its place. In the Executive Committee's view Ford was 
unwilling to tell the truth about Soviet relations, and while Carter seemed open to 
change, his intentions for Soviet relations and defence policy were uncertain. In this 
context, the Executive Committee’s objective was to gather those in favour of 
containment within one group, coordinate activities to reach as many influential people 
as possible, and then persuade them that the Committee’s stance on containment was 
reasonable. 
This chapter has shown that the Committee was not started in opposition to the 
newly elected Carter Administration. In fact, the Carter Administration was welcomed 
over the Ford Administration, which, despite committing to increases in defence 
spending, seemed incapable of recognising the dangers of détente. In contrast, despite a 
campaign pledge to reduce defence spending, Carter was seen as far more likely to be 
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receptive to Committee views. His inexperience in foreign affairs suggested he might be 
persuaded to return to containment as the basis of national security. This was certainly 
the view taken by James Schlesinger, a noted advocate of higher defence spending, who 
ended his CPD affiliation to work within the new administration. 
 The Committee intended to reach influential members of the public and 
congressmen. It had no ambition to replicate larger, more prominent conservative 
pressure groups and to operate as a direct mailing operation with a large mailing list. 
Instead, given its limited financial resources, the group would operate as an enhanced 
speakers group. By leveraging the prominence of its membership the Committee would 
prepare and distribute studies on national security and speak at events in order to build 
the case for containment. This would not be an easy task, and Rostow and Nitze 
attempted to leverage the prominence of the Committee’s supporters to gain national 
exposure for its controversial message of a present danger and the need to spend more 
on defence. Without financial backing to support an advertising campaign, the 
Committee rested on the quality of its analyses to overcome the preconceptions of a 
sceptical press. 
The sceptical reception at its launch reaffirmed the difficult balance that the 
Committee faced between forcefully presenting its alarming warning, which might 
invite accusations of undue alarmism, and adopting a bureaucratic style, which might 
risk being ignored by a bewildered press. Given the severity of the threat that the 
Committee’s board members believed America faced, this dilemma would vex the 
Executive Committee in the years ahead. Dispassionately warning of an existential 
threat would not be straightforward. 
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1977 – Establishing Credibility 
‘We have established our base and our credibility. Now we must really get to work.’272 
 
 In a June 1977 planning document, the CPD’s Executive Committee identified 
that their ‘program must have credibility’.273 Given that the Committee was a new 
organisation arguing for increased defence spending while détente remained broadly 
popular, the Executive Committee appeared to have set itself a difficult task. In late 
1976, for example, the group’s members were accused of being ‘representatives of the 
military-industrial complex’.274 A mere six months later, however, the press attitude 
was much less scathing. This was especially true after the CPD’s Executive Committee 
visited the White House to discuss their concerns over national security policy with 
President Carter in the summer of 1977. White House officials noted the Committee’s 
newfound credibility on national security issues and sought to consult Executive 
Committee members in order to moderate their public criticism of administration 
defence policy. Even if many Americans still disagreed with the group's conclusions, by 
the end of 1977 the Committee was increasingly viewed as an authority on national 
security issues. 
This chapter argues that the Committee attained credibility for the group and its 
message by pursuing a deliberate and ultimately successful legitimation strategy. First, 
the chapter will show how the selection of prominent board members provided a public 
platform for the Committee’s views on the U.S.-Soviet military balance. Second, it will 
explain how the CPD gained authority through the style and format of its publications. 
Finally, the chapter will demonstrate that as the CPD’s stature grew its relationship with 
the Carter Administration shifted from tentative support to direct opposition. This 
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examination will demonstrate that the CPD was successful in establishing credibility 
because it portrayed itself as a trustworthy and reliable organisation, which, backed by 
prominent board members, ensured that opinion makers could not dismiss its calls for 
higher defence spending out of hand. The CPD was not simply perceived by 
contemporaries as a ‘right wing’ group, as a number of studies featuring the group have 
argued.275 In fact, the Committee was increasingly respected as an authority by the 
media and politicians, and was able to participate directly in public debates on national 
security policy. 
 
Attaining Credibility 
 
 Gaining credibility for the CPD's message meant ‘to get members of the media 
to see the legitimacy of its positions even if they do not favor them’, a planning 
document suggested. 276  This appears a rather limited goal, but reflects the CPD’s 
appreciation of the difficulty of its effort to argue against détente in favour of higher 
defence spending. Even if media outlets featured Committee positions despite 
disagreeing with them, the Executive Committee recognised, the seeds of a debate on 
defence policy and Soviet relations would be sown. The fact that there was 
disagreement among foreign policy experts over détente would provide the media with 
a story and as a result encourage coverage of Committee analyses. An energetic and 
forceful campaign would then expand the debate that the CPD, the Executive 
Committee was convinced, would eventually win. However, this media relations plan 
rested on first establishing the Committee’s credibility. 
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Following its launch in 1976 the CPD achieved a mixed reception from the press. 
Max Kampelman, 277  an Executive Committee member, later admitted that ‘the 
Committee’s message was slow in reaching the public’.278 Yet by the spring of 1977 
attitudes in the press towards the Committee began to shift. In April, just six months 
after its first press conference, Rostow noted that ‘Our Committee has somehow 
achieved public notice. I couldn’t explain how this happened. But it did, and we are 
delighted.’279  The Washington Post, for example, which had pointedly ignored the 
CPD’s launch in late 1976, referred to the group as ‘a number of experienced national 
security affairs hands’, in February 1977.280 
This rapid shift in the CPD’s public perception, despite Rostow’s claim to the 
contrary, can be explained. It was the result of a well-planned public relations strategy 
that deliberately targeted an influential audience, emphasised the unusual nature of the 
Committee’s membership, and appeared to justify its argument with clear logic and 
abundant supporting data. The Committee encouraged a more favourable view of itself 
by demonstrating its differences from previous ‘alarmist’ groups. The majority of its 
members, for example, were Democratic Party members and a number were noted 
liberals. Its arguments were presented in long-form written studies, scrupulously 
evidenced with appendices of graphs and statistics. Their campaign would not rest on 
unsubstantiated assertions of Soviet malevolence - ‘red baiting’ - but would instead 
carefully build its case and set out the underlying data of its analysis for readers to 
follow. 
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Of course, this approach did not exempt the Committee from press criticism. A 
number of journalists shared the New Republic’s view that CPD’s ‘furore over Soviet 
strategic power seems laughably familiar’. 281  Such dismissive reporting certainly 
threatened the Committee’s attempt to instigate a debate on U.S.-Soviet relations. 
However, as the Executive Committee hoped, a number of newspapers did take their 
warning seriously and noted the expert, bipartisan image that the Committee sought to 
portray. The Denver Post, for example, told readers that ‘we are bound out of politeness 
and shared concern to pay attention to this group of distinguished peers’.282 In many 
media outlets the Committee’s messages were not dismissed as the work of Cold 
Warriors but were regarded as serious warnings presented by a group of notable 
American citizens. 
The rise in the CPD’s stature was not the result of large donations to buy 
coverage for its message, as one New York Post article suggested.283 Instead, as Rostow 
told CPD members on 30 March, ‘Adequate funding threatens to continue [as] a serious 
problem.’284 Charls Walker, the Committee’s Treasurer, reported in November 1977 
that the CPD’s financial position was precarious. ‘[W]e’re operating literally on a shoe 
string’, he told Board Members.285 This funding limitation, as noted in the previous 
chapter, was in part due to donor restrictions. In addition to a $10,000 donation ceiling, 
any serving government official or employee of a defence contractor was unable to 
contribute to the Committee at all. This self-imposed restriction severely hampered the 
Committee’s ability to raise funds, but ensured that it would not be dismissed as the 
mouthpiece of the defence industry. In Walker’s view this had proved ‘a very, very wise 
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move to make’ as it had ‘saved us a great deal of trouble with the press’.286 Walker 
correctly predicted that the Committee’s aims were better served by focusing on 
fostering a reputation for independent expertise rather than maximising fundraising. 
The Committee’s success in establishing its name in the early months of 1977 
was not, therefore, a result of financial clout but of clarity of message and an emphasis 
on the composition of its membership. The Executive Committee recognised the 
importance of attracting high profile board members ‘based on their leadership roles in 
American life’ in order to enhance its public standing. 287  The Committee’s public 
relations plan stressed that its membership ‘is a vehicle for the acquisition of political 
power’.288 A number of high profile board members would collectively promote the 
CPD message and enhance its political influence. The Committee would be greater than 
the sum of its parts, and its ability to influence the discourse of national security issues, 
backed by these sympathetic and prominent members, would be enhanced. 
The initial recruitment of board members in 1976 had been extremely 
successful.289 Only three people declined membership in the first year, one from ill 
health, one of old age, and only one straight refusal.290 By November 1977, the number 
of permitted board members had to be increased to 200 in order to accommodate the 
unexpectedly high acceptance rate of invitations issued by the Executive Committee.291 
Backed by hundreds of prestigious board members, the Executive Committee hoped 
that it would prove impossible for media outlets to ignore their message. 
CPD board membership, it should be emphasised, was separate from Executive 
Committee membership. Executive Committee members invited carefully selected 
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individuals to demonstrate support for the work of the CPD by accepting membership 
on its board of directors. Two nominees were rejected for each one proposed, and an 
invitation was extended only after consideration at a minimum of two Executive 
Committee meetings.292 While a handful of board members assisted writing publications, 
the function of the vast majority was only to display public support of the CPD’s 
activities.  
Unsurprisingly, the majority of early board members were drawn from the social 
networks of Executive Committee members. Rostow and Nitze in particular were able 
to recruit notable individuals whose affiliation to the Committee added gravitas to its 
warnings. ‘We picked the people as carefully as we could’, Tyroler explained.293 We 
should not conclude that the Committee was just a social club, however; board members 
joined because they genuinely supported the CPD’s mission after it was explained to 
them by prominent people they knew and trusted. 
One board member in particular, Ronald Reagan, has attracted considerable 
interest from scholars. Jeremi Suri, in one example, argues that ‘Reagan also 
popularized the viewpoint of [the CPD]’.294 But this overstates Reagan’s importance to 
the CPD in its crucial first year of operation. Reagan was not among the early members 
of the Committee who initially helped establish its reputation. He joined as a board 
member only in March 1977, and, contrary to Suri’s argument, had limited influence 
within the group at this early stage. Reagan did not even meet with the Executive 
Committee in person until February 1979. 295  Reagan’s support in early 1977, if 
anything, was a negative factor in the CPD's establishment of credibility: he was the 
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type of conservative member that might contribute to the right-wing stereotype the CPD 
endeavoured to avoid. It was for this reason that the CPD emphasised its Democratic 
members and not its Republican contingent when stressing its bipartisan composition. 
The Executive Committee was keen to highlight its liberal members to the 
media, including Nobel Prize winners Saul Bellow, Eugene Wigner, and W. F. Libby. 
These Committee board members were persuaded, or ‘converted’ as Justin Vaisse 
argues, by Executive Committee members. 296  Nathan Glazer, a Harvard University 
sociologist, explained that he joined the CPD because ‘in a world of specialists, you rely 
on friends … if my friends who know about arms say they are scared, then I am 
scared’.297 The ability to recruit a membership that included these respected liberal 
figures was a curiosity, and attracted media interest in the CPD and its message.  
A number of newspaper articles made the unlikely membership composition the 
focus of its coverage of the CPD. A New Republic article, for example, registered 
surprise at the individuals backing the CPD’s warnings and explained to readers why 
they had joined the Committee. ‘[Saul] Bellow said in a telephone interview that he is 
"appalled by the self-hypnosis" of intellectuals who "understand only one kind of police 
state" and he is "frightened when I realize in whose hands these new weapons are being 
held.”’298 Another article featured Estelle Ramey, an endocrinologist at Georgetown 
University and a noted Women’s Rights campaigner. She explained her support of the 
Committee: ‘Normally I don’t get involved in this sort of thing because I’m so busy 
with my feminism … I thought about it a good bit. I know so many of the people 
involved. It [the CPD] did give the names of other people I respect and agree with.’299 
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Inviting Democratic, liberal figures onto the board encouraged coverage based on the 
intriguing mix of the CPD membership, and discouraged instant dismissal of the group 
as Cold War hawks. The Executive Committee wanted to promote its message and also 
specify an unexpected roster of supporters. 
Other ‘surprising’ CPD board members who intrigued the press included: James 
T. Farrell, the novelist and poet; Steven Muller, the President of John Hopkins 
University; J. Peter Grace, the industrialist; Seymour Martin Lipset, the sociologist; 
Albert Shanker, the Teacher’s Union leader; and John Hannan, the former director of 
the United Nations World Food Program. These were not figures usually associated 
with groups concerned with national security issues, and each contributed to journalists’ 
curiosity toward the group and its message. 
News organisations took note of the Committee’s unusual mix of supporters and 
began to refer to the Committee less disparagingly. While criticism did continue – one 
Washington Post article labelled their view as ‘A Hawkish Argument with Holes’ – the 
Committee was also introduced in the Chicago Sun-Times as ‘knowledgeable 
Americans from all walks of life concerned with the strengthening of U.S. Foreign and 
National security policies’.300 The Nashville Banner, a Tennessee regional newspaper, 
featured the Committee in an editorial noting that the group included ‘some of the most 
prestigious names in American liberalism’, and concluded that it signified ‘that concern 
about our defenses and the continued aggression of the Soviets is widespread and 
growing, embracing liberals as well as conservatives, Democrats and independents as 
well as Republicans’.301 By the summer of 1977 the goal of the Executive Committee to 
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achieve credibility appeared to have been met as its views gained attention in 
newspapers across America. The Committee’s warning of increasing Soviet military 
strength coupled with a surprising membership proved to be a combination that 
encouraged media coverage. 
 
Gaining Influence 
 
 The Committee’s success in establishing credibility meant that Executive 
Committee members began to be asked for comment on a number of national security 
issues by the press. The CPD took full advantage of this opportunity. Rostow, at the 
CPD's 1977 annual conference, told supporters that ‘we must build on the base that has 
been established and use the pulpit that goes with it’.302 The Committee wanted to make 
the case from its ‘pulpit’ that the Soviet Union remained a serious threat and the 
renewal of containment was necessary to meet the danger. The Committee intended to 
highlight this danger, as noted in its opening statement, by facilitating ‘a national 
discussion of the foreign and national security policies of the United States directed 
toward a secure peace with freedom’.303 The Executive Committee was convinced that 
reasoned public debate would result in the abandonment of détente, as the threat 
presented by the U.S.S.R. would gain wider recognition.  
The historian Raymond Garthoff has observed that under Nixon and Kissinger 
‘there was virtually no public discussion of the issue’ of strategic doctrine and of 
détente in particular.304 CPD board members had reached the same conclusion, and, in 
1977, following the establishment of its reputation in the media, intended to spark an 
overdue debate on American Cold War strategy. To instigate this debate and change 
                                                
302 Eugene Rostow to Members of the Board of Directors, 2 June, 1977, Box 337, CPD Papers, 3. 
303 CPD Executive Committee, “How the Committee on the Present Danger Will Operate- What It Will 
Do, and What It Will Not Do”, 1. 
304 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 61. 
 
96 
policy the CPD formulated a strategy consisting of three components. First, the group 
attempted to influence the Executive Branch directly. Second, Committee members 
attempted to influence congressmen and senators by providing studies and reports as 
well as delivering testimony at Washington hearings and participating in private 
briefings. Third, the CPD sought to influence legislators indirectly by gathering support 
in swing congressional districts through speaking events. This strategy reveals the 
CPD’s primary focus on reaching those with direct political influence in the Executive 
and Legislative branches of government. Necessary fixes to the strategic force, the 
Executive Committee concluded, required quick action, and persuading political leaders 
was the fastest way to end America’s ‘self-imposed restraint’ rather than by building a 
grass roots movement.305 
In order to focus its efforts the Executive Committee divided congressmen and 
senators into three groups: one-third ‘that are always going to be against us’, one third 
‘who are always going to be for us’, and one-third ‘in the middle’.306 The Committee’s 
activities were focused on the middle one-third, and convincing these uncommitted 
congressmen and senators to accept its analysis of the ‘present danger’. The Committee 
also targeted likely supporters sitting on relevant Senate and Congressional Committees, 
including the Appropriations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, the Budget 
Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence.307 Targeting these relatively few 
but highly influential politicians would be an effective use of the Committee’s limited 
resources. 
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The Executive Committee was convinced that politicians underestimated the 
resolve of ordinary Americans to confront international challenges. The CPD’s public 
relations plan emphasised that ‘much more time must be devoted to convincing 
influential members of Congress that the national security situation is of critical 
importance and an area for which there is broad national support’.308 This low profile 
activity, often overlooked by historians in favour of the Committee’s publications, had a 
significant impact over time as Committee studies entered the working documents of 
legislators. Later, in 1979, Thomas Halsted, a State Department advisor, noted that 
Nitze had ‘done quite a job of getting anti-SALT facts into the hands of editorial writers 
and commentators’.309 This was a deliberate and successful CPD tactic. 
While a prestigious board enhanced the CPD’s credibility in the media, it was 
the Executive Committee members who were known personally by congressman and 
senators. Nitze and Zumwalt, both noted experts on national security issues, frequently 
met with legislators to discuss defence issues.310 Their prior experience in government 
and the military ensured a captive audience among respectful politicians, particularly in 
the SALT II ratification debate.311 On behalf of the Committee, Nitze and Zumwalt 
provided talking points and written reports that bolstered the group’s case, intending for 
these materials to resurface later in policy debates in Congress and the Senate.312 
The ‘one-third’ of senators that the CPD counted as supporters of its mission 
ensured that there were sympathetic legislators keen to assist the Committee’s campaign. 
Undoubtedly the most important was Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, the Democratic senator 
from Washington who had been a key critic of Kissinger’s managerial conception of 
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foreign policy. The ‘Senator from Boeing’, as critics called him, had supported 
increased military strength for many years, and was a vocal opponent of détente.313 In 
1974, he had co-sponsored the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act, which was 
intended to undermine building economic relations with the Soviet Union, considered a 
cornerstone of détente.314 This attitude ensured longstanding admiration from Executive 
Committee members. While there was no official link between the Committee and the 
senator, Committee members were familiar with Jackson’s staffers including Dorothy 
Fosdick, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. The latter two had worked with Nitze in the 
Coalition to Maintain a Prudent Defence Policy.315 
Jackson’s invitations to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
of which he was a senior member, gave the CPD additional exposure. This provided 
CPD members an opportunity, as its public relations plan had prescribed, to present 
legislators ‘with substantive arguments used to convince them of the wisdom of the 
Committee positions based on information in our possession and available to them 
through other sources’.316 Testimony not only placed the Committee’s views in Senate 
and Congressional records, but also drew further attention from both politicians and the 
media, who were intrigued by the Committee’s formidable messengers, its alarming 
views, and its persuasive analysis. 
Away from Washington, the Committee’s strategy aimed to reach ‘opinion 
leaders’ in ‘“swing” Congressmen and Senators' Districts’.317 At the heart of the public 
outreach activities in the Committee’s campaign was the belief that the American 
people were prepared to spend more on defence. Participation in regional activities was 
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an attempt to convince elected representatives in Washington D.C. that their 
constituents did support a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union, and were 
prepared to pay for the necessary defence programmes. Executive Committee members 
met national and regional newspaper editorial teams, contributed opinion pieces, 
attended local speaking events, and accepted invitations to appear on local television. 
The intention was for CPD members to ‘develop themselves as sources for newsmen’s 
stories’, which would ensure that the Committee’s message would receive attention.318 
Local support could be demonstrated to Washington leaders who would legislate 
national security policy accordingly, wary of a voter backlash in their own State or 
Congressional District. 
The Committee, having established its credibility, turned to publicising its 
analysis in the context of current national security debates. 
 
Selecting Policy Debates 
 
 Even if the Committee took care in targeting its audience, intending to ‘facilitate 
a national discussion’ was a somewhat vague mission.319 What would this discussion 
specifically address? The Committee’s publications, debate participation, and 
newspaper editorials sought to provide evidence for claims of a ‘present danger’, but 
this was not sufficient to spark a meaningful national discussion capable of shifting 
American Cold War strategy. The CPD, a recently established committee of private 
citizens, was simply unable to provoke a widespread debate on Soviet relations by 
declaring American military capabilities inadequate in self-published pamphlets. The 
CPD recognised it would have ‘to attempt to affect some shorter range legislative or 
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policy matters prior to the time that a consensus has been created’.320 Suitable issues, 
however, had not been determined prior to the group's launch. 
The need to find policy issues was balanced with the need to maintain the 
Committee’s emerging credibility. The group was wary of getting drawn into individual 
policy debates that would detract from the overall objective of restoring containment. 
Given the Executive Committee’s expertise it would have been easy to lose focus 
among the many debates surrounding the development and procurement of weapons 
systems. The looming cancellation of the B1 bomber, for example, was a potential issue 
for CPD comment but debate over an individual weapon system, it was decided, would 
not restore containment. ‘The development of a national consensus’, the Executive 
Committee realised, ‘must be based on broad principles. The focus therefore should be 
on the threat presented by the Soviet Union and the necessity for continued effort to 
meet that threat, rather than arguments over specific weapons systems or individual 
politicies [sic].’321 In particular, the Executive Committee had noted the inability of 
another group, the National Strategy Information Center, to attract media attention for 
its own anti-détente message: ‘It mostly adds up to a small group of like-minded 
[people] talking to one another. Outside the closed circle nobody much pays any heed, 
least of all the media.’322 The CPD was determined not to repeat this mistake. 
The Executive Committee contemplated the difficult balance of selecting 
specific issues for CPD comment that would attract the attention of the media – yet was 
not too specific and thus tangential to the CPD’s broader objectives – or too 
controversial – needlessly damaging its reputation. National security issues that the 
Committee might have addressed in 1977 included the Carter Administration’s 
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nominations for national security related offices, the Panama Canal Treaty, and SALT II. 
Each was an issue that garnered national attention and seemed directly relevant to 
addressing the CPD’s concerns over the principles of national security policy.  
How We Will Operate, the CPD’s opening statement, explained that, in order to 
maintain its non-partisan status, the Committee would not oppose political appointments, 
which meant the Committee did not take a position on Paul Warnke’s nomination as 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). 323  The Warnke 
nomination was nonetheless an important episode for the Committee. The Senate 
eventually approved Warnke’s nomination, but by a 58-40 margin that, if repeated, 
would prevent ratification of the SALT II treaty Warnke would now be negotiating on 
the Carter Administration's behalf. The nomination episode served notice to the Carter 
Administration that advocates for renewed confrontation and a more assertive national 
security policy, including the CPD, had the political strength to frustrate its policy 
agenda. 
In February 1977, Nitze, acting strictly in a personal capacity, testified in 
opposition to Warnke’s nomination as Director of the ACDA. As the historian Nicholas 
Thompson remarks, Nitze ‘laid his body across the tracks’ to prevent the 
appointment.324 When asked by the nominating committee if he considered himself ‘a 
better American’ then Warnke, Nitze replied ‘I really do’. 325  Nitze was heavily 
criticised for his comments, as his opposition to Warnke’s approach to arms control was 
perceived as a personal attack. Nitze took note, recognising that he had made the 
mistake of criticising the man and not his ideas. Rather than drawing attention to the 
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validity of his own analysis on arms control Nitze’s testimony instead highlighted his 
own character flaws.  
Rostow consoled Nitze over the negative reaction to his Warnke testimony. 
'[T]he sense of being responsible for the success of our Committee’, Rostow told his 
friend, ‘helps to persuade us to take on public initiatives we might otherwise ignore’.326 
While a number of Executive Committee members privately opposed Warnke’s 
appointment they learned from Nitze’s experience that the national debate the CPD 
wished to start should focus exclusively on policy issues. 
The Committee also avoided taking a position on the Panama Canal Treaties, a 
divisive issue the Executive Committee did not deem vital to the goal of promoting the 
recognition of the threat presented by Soviet military growth. In addition, the CPD was 
unable to gain consensus among its membership on the issue. Nitze supported the treaty 
and was even asked by the White House to publicise this view, which he did not.327 The 
issue attracted the interest of many conservative organisations, and Reagan, not 
representing the Committee, led a ‘Truth Squad’ that travelled the country opposing the 
treaty.328 Even without direct participation, the Canal Treaties debate was encouraging 
for the Committee. The success of groups such as Reagan’s Truth Squad demonstrated 
that the argument for renewed strength and resolve in American foreign policy was 
gaining popularity. For example, in one poll a 53-29 percent majority agreed that if the 
treaty were ratified 'the communists will take it as a sign that we can be pushed around 
in other parts of Latin America'.329 While this was certainly not indicative of widespread 
support for a renewal of containment, the poll did suggest public opinion was becoming 
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more favourable. The Carter Administration expended much of its political goodwill to 
secure ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, and senators were served notice of the 
shifting preference of Americans towards foreign policy. Fourteen senators who voted 
in favour of the treaty sought re-election in autumn 1978; half were unsuccessful.330 
After avoiding direct participation in two major foreign policy debates, the CPD 
eventually chose involvement in an issue that drew on its expertise, was nationally 
significant, and vital to national security. The emergence of SALT II as the 
Committee’s issue of primary concern was reflected in the Committee’s publications. In 
July 1977, the Committee released Where We Stand On SALT.331 Nitze, as Director of 
Policy Studies, approached the SALT II issue carefully. It was clearly an area of 
expertise for the Committee but he wanted the group to appear constructive rather than 
dismissive of the agreement from the outset; his experience during the Warnke 
nomination encouraged caution. Possessing technical expertise as well as first-hand 
experience of negotiating the treaty, Nitze was in a privileged position. As a private 
citizen working in the independent CPD he was able to critique the negotiations before 
they had reached a conclusion. The Carter Administration, however, felt unable to 
respond publicly to Nitze’s criticisms while negotiations continued in case their 
negotiating position was compromised. In effect, the administration soon found itself 
negotiating with the U.S.S.R. and also with Nitze in its efforts to secure an acceptable 
arms control treaty that would be able to navigate the Senate ratification process. 
Commenting on the unresolved negotiations was not without risk. On 1 
November 1977, Nitze released an update to the CPD publication Current SALT II 
Negotiating Posture that critics believed was too accurate to have been based solely on 
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unclassified information. Jeremy Stone of the Federation of Atomic Scientists accused 
Nitze of releasing 
seven pages of the most tightly held information in Washington on the 
status of the negotiations … [Nitze] knows, as a negotiator, how 
mischievous such a release can be to the negotiating teams on both 
sides … Premature release of negotiating details can transmute 
criticism into sabotage.332 
 
Nitze forcefully defended himself against Stone's accusation:  
The most reasonable charge that you could have made against me was 
that I spent more time and energy than others in putting together into a 
reasonably clear and understandable whole what previously was being 
made available only partially or in inherently misleading bits and 
pieces.333  
 
He also took the opportunity to encourage a public debate on the issue: 
It was intended to be, and was, a factual and objective analysis. I have 
yet to see any constructive suggestions as to how that analysis can be 
improved. Just because the analysis leads to legitimate doubts as to the 
wisdom of such a treaty does not therefore make it a "denunciation." 
The question at issue is whether the analysis is or is not sound.334  
 
Nitze, it appears, was not privy to classified documents. He was entirely unsympathetic 
to Stone's charge of mischief and also to the administration’s reluctance to respond to 
his analysis in public. Backed by the Executive Committee, he was adamant that the 
critically important issue of a legally binding arms control treaty should be discussed 
freely and comprehensively in public before its provisions became a fait accompli. The 
CPD’s analysis of SALT II, presented by Nitze, attracted considerable press interest and 
fostered the debate that the Executive Committee had planned. 
The CPD’s desire to facilitate a debate on SALT II appeared a modest goal for a 
group convinced that the agreement was so damaging to U.S. interests, but once the 
debate had been instigated the Executive Committee was determined to win. Its style of 
communication, detailed and bureaucratic, was intended to shift the terms of the debate 
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on arms control and, by extension, defence policy. Consistent with the Executive 
Committee’s intent to influence decision makers in Washington, the CPD released 
reports written in a format familiar to government officials to encourage use of their 
reports in policymaking; Committee statements would seek to persuade by thorough 
analysis of hard evidence.335 
Those who disagreed with the CPD’s position could not simply dismiss its 
conclusions but would have to engage with the analysis and demonstrate, on the CPD’s 
terms, how it was incorrect. For this reason, the Committee’s public relations plan 
stressed, ‘the most conservative and most easily defended information should be 
selected’.336 In this way Committee statements were intended to be utterly reliable, 
ensuring that government officials, legislators, and journalists could confidently cite 
CPD reports in their work. The Committee’s public relations plan also advised that ‘If 
errors are made they must be admitted quickly and confessed readily in order for the 
Committee to maintain its believability.’337  This emphasis on accuracy ensured the 
continuing credibility of the CPD and its message, and also explains why its analysis 
proved so difficult for critics to ignore. Nitze insisted that it was not just the current 
balance that was a concern, but that there was also the likelihood that ‘if past trends 
continue the USSR will … achieve strategic superiority’. 338 Raising doubt over future 
trends meant that it was extremely difficult to portray the Committee as either extreme 
or unreasonable. 
 The historian Simon Dalby suggests that the CPD was ‘attempting to change the 
terrain of political debate to exclude detente and economic managerial concerns from 
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the discussion of U.S. foreign policy’.339 He argues that by creating a debate around the 
military balance and utilising details incomprehensible to those uninitiated to defence 
jargon the Committee was able to influence how Soviet relations were perceived. As 
Dalby suggests, by emphasising numbers, tables, and graphs above all else, ‘political 
considerations are removed; the answer to the “Soviet threat” is purely 
technological’. 340  Dalby persuasively argues that the Committee was successful in 
framing the terms of the strategic debate around the technical aspects of nuclear strategy, 
their area of expertise. Even though the Executive Committee claimed to be 
democratising the debate over SALT II the effect of their campaign was in fact the 
opposite. Introducing a series of statistics incomprehensible to even the most educated 
Americans was not democratising an important debate, as Nitze claimed in his letter to 
Stone. It was a means to hide a subjective argument about Soviet intentions behind a 
screen of seemingly objective scientific enquiry. 
In making its highly technical arguments against the treaty the Executive 
Committee epitomised what the physicist Ralph Lapp had labelled in a 1965 book as 
‘the new priesthood … [who] enjoy a privileged area of argument and can always 
retreat to a sanctuary of secret dataland’.341 By the late 1970s a faction of the priesthood 
went public to make their argument. Nitze, at a press conference to launch the CPD's 
latest pamphlet in March 1977, asked for his analysis to be challenged: ‘all we want is 
for people to argue and look at these things … nobody has attempted to demonstrate 
that we were wrong in our first statement’.342 The format of Committee statements 
compelled opponents to engage the CPD on their own terms in ‘dataland’. Arguing over 
the detail made their opponents seem either petty – by nit-picking the Committee’s 
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reports without addressing their substantive claims – or ignorant – by not sufficiently 
grasping the meaning of the statistics. 
Fred Kaplan, who has labelled nuclear strategists like Nitze the ‘Wizards of 
Armageddon’, argues that by the 1970s the Cold War had reached a level of abstraction 
where Nitze’s calculations were regarded by many politicians as ‘endlessly 
fascinating’. 343  Americans who did not understand the difference between ‘throw 
weight’ and ‘circular error probable’ were excluded from the debate and left to admire 
the Committee’s nuclear arithmetic.344 Clare Boothe Luce, a Committee board member, 
admitted in a public interview that ‘it is so confusing to talk about MIRVed and throw 
weights and hard silos and soft silos and refire capacity, and all of that. It’s very 
difficult for t[he] average person to understand … one of the things that the committee 
wanted to do was avoid involving people [in the detail].’345 Boothe Luce’s admission 
exposes as false the Committee’s suggestion that it was democratising debates on 
national security. The CPD claimed that its understanding of the detail demonstrated its 
credentials to initiate a public debate, but in practice it did not intend to involve the 
public in this debate but merely present them with the CPD's interpretation. Committee 
materials did not democratise the debate, but provided the public – in a similar way to 
Team B – with an alternative view on assessments of military strength in the context of 
SALT II.  
In this way the Committee used the complexity of SALT II to make its case for a 
present danger. When considering an unfamiliar, complex issue the average person will 
select the position that appears to offer the least risk.346 Presenting its opposition to 
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SALT II as a prudent and logical interpretation of the facts, the CPD suggested parity 
could only be maintained by rejecting the treaty and spending more on defence. 
In order to maintain a perception of credibility and expertise, the style and tone 
of the Committee’s publications was crucial. Rostow was firm in his vision of how the 
CPD would operate: ‘It is perfectly clear in this year of experience what our style is, 
what tone we want. We get very uncomfortable if we get too raucous or too uproarious. 
Some of the most devastating things can be said effectively in a very austere, dignified 
manner.’347 Committee reports were designed to resemble papers of government, not 
propaganda leaflets. The disinterestedness and matter-of-fact tone of CPD written 
material was not designed emotively to plead with the reader but clearly and logically to 
demonstrate the danger the Committee perceived. In this way, the CPD created the 
impression that it was providing the only logical interpretation of data, and not one of 
many possible interpretations. ‘[N]obody’, Rostow reported with satisfaction in 
November 1977, ‘has challenged the actual accuracy of anything we’ve said so far’.348 
The apparent accuracy of supporting evidence was a vital factor in the Committee 
gaining media acceptance for its views. The stoic tone of the analysis obscured that its 
conclusion was just one of many possible interpretations of the evidence. 
Nitze made accuracy the focus of his presentation of the Committee’s report 
What is the Soviet Union Up To? on 31 March. ‘[A] lot of work has gone into that 
statement. It is a very dense statement’, he explained, ‘where each sentence and series 
of words in there have been thought through by members … [we] Went through six 
drafts — 17 people involved and we have worked long hours trying to get this thing in 
shape.’349  Nitze wanted the press to understand how much care had been taken in 
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preparing the document so its findings would not be dismissed as the work of 
propagandists. Committee reports, he stressed, should be regarded as serious works of 
scholarship to be closely studied and carefully critiqued. The CPD’s call for higher 
defence spending, Nitze and the Executive Committee regularly pointed out, was based 
on expert analysis. 
As SALT II emerged as the focus of CPD efforts, the most important publication 
series of the Committee became its Current SALT II Negotiating Posture. This was a 
regularly updated publication – there were 17 versions between 1977 and 1979 – 
analysing the military capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the context of the 
on-going arms control negotiations in Geneva. 350 Committee materials on SALT II 
were predominately authored by Nitze, and included numerous graphs and tables of 
statistics, which often overwhelmed readers with detail.351 This was true even within the 
Committee’s board. ‘[W]e need a little running commentary on what these charts show’, 
one board member pleaded at the group's first annual meeting.352 ‘[Nitze’s] detailed 
analyses are Sanskrit to me’, another board member, Edward Bennett Williams, told 
Rostow.353 
Nitze’s style was deliberate. The purpose of his pamphlets was to demonstrate 
the CPD’s expertise and authority on defence issues and SALT II in particular. Critics 
of the Committee’s interpretation on the military balance would be forced to pick 
through Nitze’s statistics and make the case that either a certain metric was incorrect, 
insignificant, or argue more generally that America did not require equal military 
strength with the U.S.S.R.. 
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 The Committee’s public relations plan proved remarkably successful in 
establishing credibility over 1977. The Executive Committee developed a platform for 
debating defence issues by recruiting a prestigious board and by releasing evidence-
based materials that quickly placed them in a position of authority. When critics 
complained about the terms of the Committee’s debate it was they who seemed 
unreasonable: why did they not address Nitze’s statistics? By emphasising that its 
analyses were based on fact, logic, and prudence the Committee positioned itself as a 
reasonable voice on national security policy by mid-1977. 
 
The CPD and the Carter Administration 
 
 Carter Administration officials recognised the Committee as an increasingly 
influential group. As a majority Democrat group, the administration noted, the CPD 
could be a useful ally in deflecting critics of its defence policies. The Executive 
Committee, as the previous chapter argued, hoped to convince Carter to abandon 
détente and recognise the increasing danger posed by the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
early in 1977, both the Committee and the administration sought to foster a working 
relationship. While both sides sought to develop this relationship in good faith, 
fundamental differences in evaluating the U.S.S.R. quickly became apparent and meant 
that cooperation proved impossible by the end of the year. This was because 
administration officials underestimated the CPD’s determination decisively to overturn 
détente. The CPD did not simply advocate an increased defence budget, as their 
ambivalence to Ford’s re-election had demonstrated, but rejected the entire structure of 
détente, and particularly the suggestion that 'peaceful coexistence' was even a possibility. 
The administration, on the other hand, saw no reason so soon after its electoral victory 
fundamentally to restructure its national security strategy on the Committee’s terms. 
 
111 
During the 1976 election campaign, Carter announced his intention to make 
America ‘a beacon of light for human rights throughout the world’, and suggested that 
his policies would reflect the morality and decency of ordinary Americans.354  The 
nomination of advisers such as Leslie Gelb, Cyrus Vance, Paul Warnke, and Andrew 
Young epitomised an approach based on transcending conceptions of geopolitics 
defined solely by the Cold War. Gelb explained that ‘the Carter approach to foreign 
policy rests on a belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced to a 
doctrine, but that there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all’.355 
There would be no more doctrines, containment included, and policy would instead be 
decided on a case-by-case basis.  
This deeply troubled the Executive Committee. Rostow lamented that ‘[when I] 
recall that Carter has actually nominated Sorensen, Warnke, Brown, Tony Lake, Leslie 
Gelb, and dozens more, I sigh, and realize there is no rest for the likes of us’.356 These 
appointments did not suggest an end to détente, but rather an uphill challenge for the 
Executive Committee to convince Carter to adopt their analysis, change administration 
policy, and prevent further deterioration of America’s Cold War position. Despite 
Rostow’s reservations, however, there were some positive signs at the start of 1977 that 
the president might be persuaded to alter his approach and adopt the CPD's view on 
national security. Alongside the appointments that concerned Rostow, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, whose approach to U.S.-Soviet relations was much more compatible with 
CPD thinking, also joined the administration as Carter’s National Security Adviser. 
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Brzezinski, a Polish émigré, was a political scientist who first entered politics as 
an adviser to the Kennedy campaign in 1960.357 He was sympathetic to the CPD's hard-
line approach towards national security issues. In his memoir, Brzezinski states that he 
shared Carter’s vision only ‘up to a point’ and nevertheless remained convinced ‘that 
power had to come first … [without it] we would simply not be able either to protect 
our interests or to advance more humane goals’.358 Vance and Brzezinski seemed to 
represent two factions within the Carter Administration, a split that ‘became an issue 
behind the scenes’ according to historian Betty Glad. 359  The Committee were 
themselves unsure which faction, Vance or Brzezinski’s, best represented the basis of 
Carter’s foreign policy. 
Early in 1977, the Committee was tentatively satisfied with the Carter 
Administration, especially in April when Carter presented the Soviet Union with a new, 
more stringent SALT proposal.360 Surprised and angered that Carter had ignored prior 
negotiations with the Ford Administration at Vladivostok, Kremlin leaders rejected the 
proposal, which the historian Strobe Talbot argues ‘was inevitable’ as these new terms 
reneged on previously negotiated terms.361 Yet the fact that the administration seemed 
to favour a renegotiation of the SALT II agreement was welcomed by Nitze who, in the 
wake of the new proposal, declared that ‘the President is doing very well’.362  The 
proposal encouraged hope that Carter would come around to the Committee’s position, 
acknowledge the reality of the Soviet build up, and reconstitute containment.  
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The Executive Committee attempted to engage with the administration to 
discover if it could assist the restoration of a policy more consistent with containment. 
A month into the administration’s term Rostow explained to Vance that ‘our Committee 
on the Present Danger wants to be helpful to you … We should prefer to defend the 
foreign policy of the United States, not criticize it.’363  Rostow hoped for sustained 
dialogue with the administration to allow for an explanation of the CPD’s position 
before policies were formulated and implemented. In addition to his correspondence 
with Vance over the first half of the year, Rostow exchanged letters in March 1977 with 
Phil Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, revealing the less conciliatory 
nature of the Committee:  
The function of leaders is to lead, not to follow the god-damn Gallup 
Polls. And the situation really requires Churchillian vision, programs, 
and rhetoric, not a government of small men and small ideas. War can 
be prevented, still. But … not by pussy footing. We are at 1935 or 
1936, in my view.364  
 
Rostow made his strength of feeling clear, and hoped he would convince the 
administration to take the Committee’s analysis seriously, not merely question the 
terminology of its critique of SALT II negotiations. 
Administration officials recognised the Committee’s growing influence among 
senators and congressmen on foreign policy matters. In addition to exchanging written 
correspondence, administration officials met with CPD members five times during 1977. 
In July, Rostow and Nitze met Vance.365 On 4 August, a CPD group met Carter at the 
White House. 366  On 17 August, the same group met Harold Brown, Secretary of 
Defence, and Brzezinski again at the White House. 367  On 16 September, Samuel 
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Huntington visited the CPD’s offices.368 Finally, on 11 November, Brown agreed to 
speak at the Committee’s annual conference. 369  This was a substantial level of 
engagement between the administration and a group less than a year old. Clearly, 
Brzezinski and Vance, Carter’s chief foreign policy advisers, took the Committee very 
seriously. They recognised its potential influence on public and congressional reception 
of administration policy. 
By mid-1977, Rostow and Nitze believed that Carter was in danger of repeating 
the same mistake as Ford: his administration was also unwilling to explain to Americans 
that growing Soviet military power remained the single greatest threat to national 
security. Nitze and Rostow met with Vance in June 1977 and stated that their ‘most 
important single criticism of the administration's foreign policy was its failure thus far 
to liberate the nation from the Nixon-Kissinger vocabulary about “detente”’.370 In their 
estimation Carter was too focused on his polling data, rather than the observable growth 
in Soviet military power. This responsiveness to public opinion made sense to the 
president, who told University of Notre Dame students in a major foreign policy speech 
that he was ‘confident of the good sense of the American people, and so we let them 
share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the 
voices of 215 million, not just an isolated handful.’371 Following public attitudes so 
closely, however, infuriated the Committee, who regarded Carter’s sensitivity to public 
opinion as weak leadership.  
To the CPD, it was the president’s duty to explain the challenges facing the 
nation. Americans should not be asked whether they were willing to spend more on 
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defence, the CPD stressed, they should be persuaded that it was necessary. The 
Committee stated that it wanted ‘to further the two-way process of communications 
here at home on foreign and national security policy matters’.372 Leaders should inform 
the public before attempting to incorporate opinion into policymaking and not the other 
way around. As this fundamental disagreement over national security leadership became 
apparent, the Executive Committee’s initial optimism of working with the 
administration on national security issues faded. Faint hope that the Committee might 
persuade Carter to break decisively from détente remained until the summer of 1977, 
when a handful of Committee members met with the president. After this meeting the 
Executive Committee feared that its 1976 nightmare had come to pass: another 
presidential term of détente was in prospect.  
On 4 August, a number of Committee members, recorded in the White House 
diary as ‘a group of national leaders’, met the president.373 Reading from a ‘talking 
points’ document for the White House meeting, the Committee repeated their June 
criticisms to the president: 
In our view, it will be difficult if not impossible to develop a fresh 
bipartisan consensus on foreign and defense policy until you liberate 
the nation from the misleading vocabulary President Nixon used in 
claiming that detente had become a reality; that negotiation had been 
substituted for confrontation; and that the Soviet Union was 
cooperating with us in the quest for peace … Until we face these facts 
as a nation, and take the steps necessary to restore a stable balance of 
forces in the world and policies of collective defense based upon it, 
none of the other great political, social, economic, and human 
objectives of our foreign policy is within our reach.374 
 
The CPD hoped to persuade Carter to drop the conciliatory language of détente, which 
they argued obscured Soviet aggression and prevented Americans from understanding 
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that the Cold War was an ongoing conflict. 'We made as much input as they’d take and 
with as much force as we could muster’, Rostow reported to board members after the 
meeting.375 In a memorandum of the meeting Rostow assessed that ‘The President’s 
personality and style came through as pathetic, almost pitiful.’376 Carter did not impress 
Executive Committee members who, despite optimism when he had been elected, were 
now convinced that this was not an inexperienced president searching for a coherent 
policy, but a naïve idealist repeating the mistakes of Nixon and Ford. 
Two weeks after his meeting with the CPD, on 26 August 1977, Carter issued 
Presidential Directive 18 (PD-18). It outlined a strategy to ‘Counterbalance … by a 
combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military 
power and adverse influence in key areas’. 377  The president dispatched Samuel 
Huntington, a National Security Council advisor, to the CPD’s offices on 16 September 
to convince the Executive Committee that change had arrived. However, to the 
Committee PD-18 hinted at a return to containment but without conviction or substance; 
it was not sufficient to spend more on defence without explaining why it was necessary. 
Rostow wrote to the president, considering PD-18 ‘promising’, but that ‘its background 
and content should be explained to the American people’.378 The Executive Committee 
assumed that Carter was attempting to take the minimum action that would deflect their 
own criticism, but without accepting the basis of their analysis of the adverse strategic 
situation. The CPD’s April 1977 publication What is the Soviet Union Up To? had 
argued that Kremlin leaders responded to real power, ‘the ultimate instrument’, and not 
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to statements of intent. 379  PD-18, the Committee was convinced, would make no 
difference to limiting the present danger. 
Carter had not taken advantage of the presidential platform to explain the 
challenges of the Cold War and to inspire public support to overcome them. In fact, the 
CPD worried, his speeches implied the very opposite of confronting the Soviet threat. In 
his inauguration speech, Carter had called for ‘the elimination of all nuclear weapons 
from this Earth’, in his first White House press conference he announced the withdrawal 
of U.S. ground troops from South Korea, and in June he announced the cancellation of 
the B1 bomber project.380 Alongside an election pledge to reduce defence spending, 
these actions did not convey to Americans the enormity of the strategic problems facing 
the country as Soviet military capabilities continued to improve. To the CPD, PD-18 
was a meaningless piece of paper without the president’s full and unequivocal backing, 
stated forcefully and frequently in public speeches. 
Despite becoming increasingly frustrated at the president’s refusal to accept 
their analysis, the Executive Committee understood that it would be counterproductive 
to cease all communication with the White House. On 8 September 1977, Rostow wrote 
to Carter: ‘I hope the process of discussion will clarify the issues, and narrow — or 
indeed eliminate — the gap between our positions on SALT, and on Soviet policy more 
generally.’381 With markedly less enthusiasm than earlier in the year, both sides agreed 
to continued discussion. Rostow recalled to board members that Carter told him ‘regular 
meetings might narrow differences and make it possible for our Committee to support 
his policies in the years ahead’.382 However, continued dialogue did not resolve these 
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differences, and instead the relationship reached an impasse. Neither side was prepared 
to compromise. With the creation of PD-18 Carter believed the CPD should be satisfied 
that the Soviet threat was recognised in an administration strategy document. The 
Executive Committee, however, would not be satisfied until their analysis was fully 
incorporated in administration policy and explained to the public. 
Brzezinski wrote to Rostow on 11 October 1977 hoping to maintain contact 
between the administration and the Committee. The National Security Advisor told 
Rostow that ‘the President wants to continue to benefit from the advice and help which 
you and the other members of your Committee can furnish him.’383 A month later 
Harold Brown attended the Committee’s annual meeting, but he failed to impress the 
Committee after he ‘lost his temper’.384 Rostow told CPD member Dean Rusk that 
Brown’s discussion ‘was interesting, and indeed rather stupefying’.385 By November, 
the Committee recognised it would have to focus on its legislative branch outreach and 
public activities in order to generate external pressure on the White House to prompt 
policy change. In Rostow’s view the CPD had tried to be ‘a good friend of the 
administration’, but at the end of 1977 had ‘come to a crossroads’.386 The Committee 
initially hoped to ‘influence the administration [rather] than fight it’ Rostow told CPD 
board members, but this proved impossible.387  
The administration also recognised that the relationship was broken. Phil Habib, 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs, told Rostow later in 1977 that he considered the 
CPD to have ‘declared war’.388 Relations with the White House had not resulted in 
policy change, so the Executive Committee shifted the Committee’s focus towards 
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affecting public opinion. Committee members were now prepared to ‘act like back 
benchers of the Churchillian stripe’.389 By the end of 1977, they realised that Carter 
would not be persuaded of the validity of their analysis and prepared themselves for 
direct opposition of the president's policies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In a speech at the Committee’s annual meeting Rostow explained to members 
that ‘our efforts and … our approaches to the media … have produced absolutely 
extraordinary results’.390 Driven by its notable membership, the message of danger that 
the CPD presented had attracted considerable attention from opinion makers in early 
1977. Its analyses of America’s national security problems were not easily dismissed as 
a result of the carefully argued and well-evidenced materials the Committee published. 
These seemingly reliable reports, written in a bureaucratic style and endorsed by a list 
of unusual board members, ensured that the media covered the CPD’s argument of 
American military weakness.  
 Symptomatic of this elevated status was the Carter Administration’s invitation to 
the Executive Committee for discussions at the White House. The president, however, 
was not willing to change his approach to the satisfaction of the Committee. Rostow 
explained that the Executive Committee considered that Carter was trying to silence a 
vocal critic of his policies and only ‘responding to the political winds’, using the 
Committee as political cover. 391  While the CPD had hoped to persuade the 
administration, it was apparent by the end of the year that it would have to oppose 
Carter to alter national security policy. 
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Rostow prepared the group for an oppositional role, cautioning board members 
against ‘any sense of despair about our task’. 392  To succeed, he continued, the 
Committee needed ‘to reach as far as we can reach and we have to multiply efforts’.393 
The Executive Committee would use its credible status to influence the developing 
debate on SALT II. Referring to the CPD programme for 1978, Rostow targeted an 
expansion of the Committee’s operation, not widening the focus of its publications, but 
‘in the realm of getting the message across’.394 SALT II, the Executive Committee 
decided, was critically important to American national security and would occupy the 
Committee’s activities until the treaty was defeated and American military strength 
restored. 
Over 1977 the Committee had established its reputation but had also learned that 
it would not be a partner with the Carter Administration. Restoring détente would have 
to be achieved by generating external pressure on the White House. Nitze’s involvement 
in the nascent SALT II ratification debate would provide the ideal ‘pulpit’ that Rostow 
had identified as necessary to spread the CPD’s message of danger.  
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1978 – The Military Balance 
‘Our appearance [in the Senate] … has become the most important opportunity we have 
had so far to convert the changing climate of opinion into a change in policy.’395 
 
 Throughout 1978 American and Soviet negotiators in Geneva were attempting 
to finalise a SALT II agreement. Paul Warnke, the chief SALT negotiator, was also 
mindful that two-thirds of senators would have to assent to the treaty for the agreement 
to be approved.396 In effect the Carter Administration had two SALT II negotiations, 
one in Geneva and another at home. The CPD noted this need for domestic approval 
and recognised that vigorous opposition to the treaty might defeat ratification and, more 
importantly for the Executive Committee, also publicise the wider issue of raising 
defence spending in order to match CPD estimates of Soviet military strength. 
The SALT II issue provided a national forum for the Committee to discuss the 
need to redress the military imbalance with the Soviet Union. Due to the high-profile 
nature of arms control negotiations, the Committee’s allegations regarding inferior 
American strength generated significant media attention over 1978 and 1979. This 
chapter will examine the CPD's efforts to shift the terms of the debate away from the 
merits of arms control and towards SALT II's risks and supposed inequalities. As a 
result of these efforts, as the Executive Committee intended, the treaty debate frequently 
morphed into a discussion of the ‘Soviet military buildup … [and] the significance one 
attaches to it and the way one explains the reasons behind it’.397 This had the effect of 
limiting senatorial support for the treaty and bolstering calls for additional defence 
spending. 
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Executive Committee members had a particularly influential role in the domestic 
debate over the treaty. On 1 March, for example, Rostow, Pipes and Nitze were invited 
to testify at the Senate Committee on the Budget.398 In addition, on 13 March Rostow 
appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 399  Over the summer 
Executive Committee members were invited to the White House as the Carter 
Administration once again attempted to gain CPD support for its national security 
policy. In August, the Committee assisted a new organisation, the Coalition for Peace 
Through Strength (CPTS) in reaching a mass audience to oppose SALT II. The CPD 
lent its expertise for CPTS materials, which buttressed CPTS's own more forceful 
arguments against SALT II and for increased defence spending.  
This chapter shows that the Committee's activities in the debate successfully 
influenced how the treaty was framed to the public. The CPD argued that the need to 
maintain parity necessitated the rejection of SALT II. Is America Becoming Number 
Two? was published in October and set out this case against the treaty.400 The pamphlet 
implied that the treaty was decidedly unequal and constructed this case on carefully 
selected metrics and worst-case projections. The CPD believed that its metrics 
permitted those uninitiated in nuclear strategic thinking to participate in the treaty 
debate. In practice, however, the Committee used these metrics to distort the issue and 
create the perception that SALT II was dangerously unequal. It presented its worst-case 
predictions as established fact, and did not explain or justify this methodology in its 
pamphlets. This omission, the Executive Committee maintained, was to enhance 
accessibility to the issue of SALT and was not a misrepresentation of the facts. 
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The Executive Committee's presentation of its fears as fact and 
recommendations as ‘common sense’ explains the difficulty that faced pro-SALT 
groups in arguing against CPD analysis of the treaty.401 The Committee claimed to have 
quantified the treaty’s risks, which placed the burden of proof on the treaty's supporters 
to explain how the CPD's metrics had been miscalculated. Nitze generated a number of 
metrics to express his concerns, but George Kennan, a leading supporter of the treaty 
within the American Committee for East-West Accord (ACEWA), was unable to do the 
same. As a result, the chapter concludes, CPD publications convinced many senators to 
doubt American military strength and conclude that SALT II was an unnecessary risk to 
national security. 
 
The SALT II Debate 
 
 At the Committee's 1978 annual meeting, held on 10 November at the Sulgrave 
Club in Washington, Rostow shared the Executive Committee's belief that the U.S.S.R. 
now presented a ‘risk of enveloping Europe’.402 The CPD’s task, Rostow stressed, was 
to ‘arouse the sleeping giant before that kind of event’.403 The SALT II debate offered a 
means for the Committee to raise its concerns and change defence policy before 
Rostow's nightmare scenario could unfold. Nitze told board members that as the group’s 
Director of Policy Studies he regarded the SALT debate as ‘absolutely central to this 
whole network of problems, political as well as military’.404 The terms of SALT II, if 
ratified, would determine the legal parameters of the Cold War arms race until the end 
of 1985, and its provisions were therefore vital in determining American strategy well 
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into the next decade.405 Accordingly, the CPD would be dedicated for the next two 
years to defeating a treaty that, in their estimation, preserved the status quo and could 
potentially facilitate Soviet action in Western Europe. 
There was no guarantee of success for the Executive Committee's objective to 
derail SALT II. For most Americans the benefits of détente were manifested most 
prominently in arms control agreements, and the prospect of a SALT II agreement was 
undoubtedly popular. One June 1977 poll found that 77 per cent of respondents 
favoured a SALT agreement.406 The same poll also found, however, that 78 per cent of 
respondents agreed that ‘The Russians only want agreements under which they can gain 
an advantage.’407 Even as Americans desired arms limitation agreements many also 
distrusted the Soviet Union. It was this contradiction, a result of 'doubt and confusion' 
over the technical aspects of the negotiation process, that the Committee intended to 
exploit in its campaign to defeat SALT II.408 If Americans discovered the compromises 
contained within the treaty, the Committee reasoned, they would be less likely to favour 
SALT II and more likely to support matching Soviet strength. In this way the 
Committee hoped to kill two birds with one stone: its efforts would defeat SALT II and 
in doing so rally support for an expansion of American military strength. The CPD 
would therefore author pamphlets to present its interpretation of the treaty’s risks, create 
metrics showing U.S. weakness, and publicise its analysis of a shifting military balance 
in the U.S.S.R.'s favour. 
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Rostow recognised that the necessity of Senate ratification meant SALT II was 
‘an internal domestic issue in the first instance’.409 Most Americans, including senators, 
did not fully understand the subtleties of the treaty’s convoluted provisions and their 
potential effect on the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. One 1978 poll 
revealed that just 34 per cent of respondents were aware which two countries were 
negotiating the SALT II treaty, let alone details of the treaty’s provisions.410 In this 
context, expert opinion was crucial. Executive Committee members utilised the CPD’s 
growing influence in defence issues to exploit the lack of understanding of the treaty 
and generate doubt over its merits. Executive Committee members were confident they 
could persuade one-third of senators to block ratification and approve remedial 
improvements to American defence capabilities. 
Max Kampelman identified ‘one objective’ for the Committee in the SALT II 
debate, ‘to persuade at least one third of the Senate that the Treaty should not be 
ratified’.411 He set out six steps to achieve this: first, ‘to translate the complicated 
technical data … into language and concepts that non-experts can understand’. 412 
Second, to identify the senators who were undecided on their position towards 
ratification. Third, ‘assemble a team of four or five people … [to] personally meet with 
as many of the Target Senators as will meet with us’.413 Fourth, to create documents 
‘with devastating facts and argument, logically and clearly presented’. 414  Fifth, 
determine whether a reservation be drafted to attach to ratification. And finally, sixth, 
‘continue to assign our people to speak at public forums’.415 Kampelman’s strategy 
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demonstrates that the Committee intended to play an extensive role in the ratification 
debate. 
In practice the first objective of ‘translating’ the treaty's technical data meant 
framing the debate in an oversimplified manner to emphasise the Committee's concerns. 
The Committee was able to shift the terms of the debate as the Carter Administration 
shied away from public discussion while still negotiating the treaty, which gave the 
CPD a significant advantage. While ostensibly a debate over the particulars of an arms 
control treaty the deliberation morphed, as the Committee intended, into a general 
discussion on the U.S.-Soviet military balance. As the historian Garthoff argues, ‘SALT 
II became a lightning rod that attracted attacks on the administration, on détente, and on 
SALT.’416 
The CPD campaign against SALT II began in earnest in March 1978 when 
several Committee members were invited by Senator Edward Muskie to address the 
Senate Budget Committee on the defence budget. Rostow described the platform as ‘the 
best opportunity we have had so far to strike a dramatic and effective blow for 
progress’.417 In his testimony to the Senate committee Rostow read a prepared statement 
from the Executive Committee, 
We appeal to you, and through you to the Congress, to seize the 
opportunity for leadership which events have thrust upon you. Our 
plea, Mr. Chairman, is that you stir the nation to wake up from its 
prolonged dream, and face the world as it is. We can conceive of no 
step we could take to improve our national health and security more 
valuable than a decision to raise this budget prudently, substantially, 
and with determination.418 
 
The Executive Committee hoped this Churchillian rhetoric would inspire the Senate 
committee to raise the FY1979 defence budget under consideration. The CPD, in 
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imploring the Senate committee to ‘stir the nation’, was searching for likeminded 
leadership in the legislative branch to recognise, as its own board members did, the 
present danger of Soviet military power.  
 The FY1979 defence budget did increase though not as substantially as the CPD 
hoped, rising from $105.3 billion for FY1978 to $115.2 billion for FY1979.419 The 
CPD's appearance before the Budget Committee did demonstrate that invitations to 
provide testimony offered a means to sidestep the White House and achieve a budget 
increase directly from the Congress. Accordingly, Committee board members would 
give seventeen testimonies over 1978 and 1979.420 
Senate testimony did not preclude CPD efforts to influence the White House, 
despite the disappointing relationship of 1977. Rostow told Brzezinski in March 1978 
that ‘We are more anxious to persuade the Administration than to win a spectacular 
victory in Congress: — much more.’421 Lobbying the Executive Branch was an easier 
task than persuading the dozens of senators and congressmen that Kampelman's plans 
singled out. The CPD still hoped to convince Carter to alter his approach to national 
security, but, it should be stressed, had no intention of supporting the president at the 
cost of a compromised agreement on national security. 
The White House did seek compromise, however. To ensure a SALT agreement 
and its ratification the Carter Administration was prepared to tweak the treaty’s 
provisions to satisfy domestic critics, including the increasingly outspoken CPD. On 13 
June 1978, Nitze, Kirkland, and Fowler met with Landon Butler, Deputy to the Chief of 
Staff and the administration's coordinator for SALT II ratification, at the White House. 
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In a memorandum of the meeting, Nitze noted the ‘President's problem’. 422 
‘Domestically’, he recognised, ‘if he agrees with COPD position [he] will lose [the] 
McGovern wing of [the] Party. If [he] agrees with Warnke/Kennan/McGovern view [he] 
will lose [the] center and conservative wing of [the] Party. Either would open [the] field 
to Republicans. Therefore, [Carter] tries to straddle.’423 Nitze clearly understood how 
domestic politics affected Carter’s approach to arms control. Yet Carter's political 
problems did not concern the Committee. The Executive Committee sought a policy 
that in their view best preserved American national security. Given their fears of 
growing Soviet military power, Executive Committee members were little concerned 
with maintaining Democratic Party unity. The Committee position was clear: ‘[T]he 
issue is not so much whether a SALT II Treaty can be negotiated and ratified’, its 
March pamphlet Peace with Freedom declared, ‘but rather what the United States 
should be doing to correct the currently adverse trends in our strategic posture’.424 
SALT should not be approached as a way to heal divisions within the Democratic Party 
when America’s strategic position was so precarious.  
At the 13 June meeting Butler expressed his frustration that the majority 
Democrat CPD continued to oppose the administration even as SALT negotiations 
continued. He hoped the Committee would ‘come out against’ the efforts of grassroots 
conservative groups to criticise the treaty.425 Nitze, however, was unsympathetic and 
refused to restrict debate over such an important issue: ‘Why should it be all one-
sided?’, he asked Butler.426 An ‘understanding of facts’, Nitze believed, ‘should confirm 
doubts’ over the treaty and thus reduce support for ratification.427 Instead of offering 
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assistance, Nitze repeated his two main criticisms of the negotiations, survivability of 
Minuteman ICBMs and the need for a higher defence budget to match Soviet 
procurement, but stated if these issues were addressed he ‘would then be for [the SALT] 
package’.428 Nitze was not prepared to offer Butler the Committee’s support without his 
two concerns resolved, and the meeting ended without cooperation on SALT II. A 
compromise could not be reached because while the administration was committed to 
finalising the treaty, the CPD was equally committed to avoiding any restrictions on 
American defence programmes. Appeals to party loyalty would not sway Executive 
Committee members, who were convinced that SALT II would not restrict Soviet 
military expansion but instead further weaken American military capabilities. 
Perhaps dismissing the Executive Committee's Churchillian rhetoric as posturing, 
the administration did not grasp the strength of the CPD's concerns. A month after 
Nitze's first meeting, Butler again met him and Zumwalt on 11 July desperate to secure 
the Committee's support. Butler explained that Nitze’s criticisms of 13 June had been 
specifically clarified during treaty negotiations in Geneva, and that ‘his understanding 
of Nitze's previous position [w]as the basis of his subsequent inputs which had been a 
factor in moving the Executive Branch toward its present position affirming the 
preservation of a right to deploy [Multiple Aim Point System] MAPS’.429 This initiative 
was undertaken exclusively to satisfy Nitze's concerns about Minuteman vulnerability. 
Yet Nitze still refused to support the treaty. Butler was furious, and ‘expressed chagrin 
over having been prompted to make his initiatives by a misperception of Nitze's 
attitude’.430 Nitze was unmoved and told Butler of ‘his doubts concerning the Executive 
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Branch's grasp of the realities of the U.S. strategic situation’.431 He also described ‘the 
President's presentation [in a commencement speech at Annapolis on 7 June 1978] as a 
set of misleading suggestions amounting in sum to deception of the American 
people’.432 Nitze, determined to raise defence spending, saw no reason for compromise 
on the SALT treaty. 
Butler, desperate to dampen CPD criticism and prepare for the treaty’s passage 
through Senate ratification, ‘again urged COPD examination of the question of what it 
can do in support of Executive Branch initiatives. He stressed the importance of a 
feeling of common understanding in enhancing COPD influence with the Executive 
Branch and the greater utility of discussion as opposed to confrontation.’433 But unless 
President Carter indicated that he shared the Committee’s alarming analysis of the 
Soviet Union there would be no support. Butler went to great lengths to satisfy Nitze, 
but the administration and the CPD were separated by an entirely different perception of 
the risks presented by the U.S.S.R. and not by relatively minor technicalities within the 
SALT treaty. 
The administration's decision to leave the public forum to groups like the CPD 
while they attempted to assuage its critics in private ‘failed utterly’, as Garthoff has 
argued.434 When compromise with the CPD proved impossible and the administration 
began its own public appeals in favour of the agreement, treaty opponents had already 
been permitted many months to frame the debate entirely on their own terms. 
Administration officials underestimated the CPD's determination to oppose SALT II 
and wasted time and effort negotiating directly with Nitze when it would have been 
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more effective – as the CPD was doing – to try to convince undecided senators of the 
treaty's merits. 
 
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength 
 
 Commencing with Senate appearances in March the Committee implemented 
Kampelman’s strategy to oppose the treaty, and continued to follow its media strategy 
as formulated in its 1977 Public/Congressional Relations Plan. 435  As part of this 
campaign, the Committee published three pamphlets over the rest of 1978 (and a further 
six in 1979), Executive Committee members continued to brief senators in private, and 
also contributed to local discussion forums across the country.436 All these activities 
were designed to persuade opinion leaders to oppose SALT II ratification. 
Despite the importance of its written studies – 14,000 for its largest print run 
was sizeable but by no means vast437 – contributions to newspapers and television 
appearances reached far greater numbers. In one typical example, Zumwalt and Nitze 
were invited as guests on a televised NBC News SALT II debate that aired on 10 July 
1979, and were introduced as experts on the treaty. ‘NBC News’, anchor John 
Chancellor announced, ‘has invited some of the more distinguished and knowledgeable 
supporters and opponents of the treaty’ to debate.438 Alongside Senator Jake Garn, the 
two CPD officers made the case for the rejection of the SALT II treaty. This format was 
repeated on a number of television shows and also at local discussion groups as part of 
CPD strategy to reach beyond a limited Washington audience and present their message 
to a national audience. 
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Some CPD board members questioned the effectiveness of this approach of 
measured debate and discussion, suggesting that it did not convey sufficient urgency. 
‘[T]he time has come for us to bring about some very effective and startling and 
terrifying realization on the part of the people what we are really confronted with’, one 
board member suggested at the CPD’s 1978 annual meeting. 439  It was discussed 
whether an even more alarmist rhetorical style would decisively shift public opinion 
against the agreement, but the Executive Committee, and Rostow in particular, rejected 
this more forceful approach. ‘We’re trying to deal with it in the only way we know', he 
responded, 'which is through reason and persuasion’.440 The Executive Committee was 
adamant that pamphlets, meetings, and debate would remain its principal activities. This 
discussion highlights the CPD’s dilemma of persuading Americans in a stoic, measured 
manner that there was a dangerous and urgent threat. The Executive Committee 
intended to explain its concerns in a style that drew on its reputation for credible 
analysis, but this style did not amount to a rallying cry for an immediate change in 
national security policy. More forceful appeals were rejected, as they would be 
perceived as propaganda and potentially tarnish its hard-won reputation, thus limiting 
its ability to influence national security policy in Washington. The Executive 
Committee, conscious of balancing its credible reputation with the need to spread its 
urgent message, instead left more bombastic methods to other SALT II oppositional 
groups.441 
The historian Bruce Shulman has shown that over the early 1970s conservative 
activism became ‘an institutionalized, disciplined, well-organized and well-financed 
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movement of loosely knit affiliates’.442 Organisations focused on creating grass roots 
movements were becoming particularly effective in mobilising support for single-issue 
campaigns. The 1977 Panama Canal Treaties campaign, for example, was particularly 
important in developing formal and informal cooperation between myriad conservative 
groups on foreign policy issues. Millions of dollars were spent sending millions of 
letters, organising rallies, and securing airtime for advertisements that made the case 
against the treaties.443 These activities did not prevent ratification of the Canal treaties, 
but nevertheless developed formidable campaign structures and experience.444 
On 8 August 1978, the American Security Council, a leading opponent of the 
Canal Treaty, announced the formation of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength 
(CPTS). Its purpose was to oppose SALT II, make the case for renewed military 
strength, and reject a recent period of ‘Official Washington … unilaterally disarming 
the United States’.445 CPTS, said co-director Paul Laxalt, would gather ‘some of the 
most prestigious names and groups in the defense community to build a formidable 
organization dedicated to the adoption of a national strategy for Peace Through 
Strength’. 446  The CPTS counted 145 Congressmen among its initial membership, 
demonstrating the growing popularity and political impetus of the ‘peace through 
strength’ message.447  
The CPD did not formally join the CPTS as it was prohibited from any such 
affiliation in its articles of association. However, the American Security Council, 
Rostow reported to Committee board members, ‘are in touch with us all the time’.448 
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The Committee's role within the CPTS was to provide intellectual substance to its 
claims of growing American inferiority. ‘What is clear so far’, Rostow explained to 
board members in November 1978, ‘is that many groups are going to be depending 
upon us for our analysis of the SALT problems and our formulation of it. That is the 
function we have already defined for ourselves.’449 The CPD role was to provide the 
detailed analytical studies that would underpin anti-SALT arguments. This solved the 
CPD's dilemma over the presentation of the ‘present danger’. It would provide the 
credible analysis, and the CPTS would stress the urgency of the message. 
CPD work, and Nitze's Current Negotiating Posture pamphlets in particular, 
were frequently cited in Coalition materials.450 In the 1980 ASC documentary film The 
SALT Syndrome a number of CPD officers provided commentary. 451  In this film, 
dramatic music and ominous footage of Soviet military hardware created an alarming 
context for experts, often Committee members, to explain the growing threat of the 
Soviet Union. This represented how the CPD and the ASC worked together most 
effectively: the CPD offered expert credibility, and the CPTS provided a platform 
stressing urgency and danger. The CPTS claimed that The SALT Syndrome aired 2,300 
times on local television stations, and, rather optimistically, that the film reached an 
estimated 100,000,000 viewers across the country.452 
The American Security Council operated as the organiser of a mass movement 
that worked to foster popular support for 'peace through strength'. The CPD, through its 
pamphlets of policy analysis, provided more sophisticated materials for opinion leaders 
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and politicians who recognised the shifting policy preferences of the wider public in 
favour of greater military capabilities. These functions were complimentary and were 
both crucial in the campaign to oppose SALT II. CPD and CPTS campaigns 
successfully raised the issue of military strength through the SALT II debate and 
activated public awareness of American weakness. In December 1976, 27 percent of 
poll respondents, and in July 1978, 31 percent of respondents, expressed the opinion 
that the U.S. defence system was weaker than the Russian defence system. 453  A 
December 1978 poll found that 40 percent of respondents felt the same, demonstrating a 
clear trend in the public attitude as Americans became more supportive of an assertive 
foreign policy after the CPD and CPTS entered the SALT II debate.454 
 
Metrics of the Military Balance 
 
 The Committee’s most important contribution to the SALT campaign, the 
historian David Skidmore suggests, ‘was to issue reports critical of the treaty written by 
noted arms control and defense experts’.455 This was certainly the Committee's intention. 
Its 1978 pamphlet Where We Stand on SALT suggested that American deterrent 
capability was insufficient, urgently required strengthening, and that the SALT II 
agreement would hamper this vital effort. 456  It was ‘common sense’, Committee 
pamphlets argued, that American strength should match that of the U.S.S.R.. 457 
Rejecting the treaty and increasing defence spending, the CPD wrote in a letter to Carter, 
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was ‘wise and prudent’ in order to maintain parity and dissuade Soviet aggression.458 To 
argue this position, the CPD assessed strategic disparity using a handful of metrics, and 
claimed that they clearly demonstrated America was falling behind. 
 Looking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock, for example, highlighted three ‘dangerous 
disparities’ in the treaty.459 The first disparity was the permitted number of launchers, 
the second was the permitted numbers of warheads on MIRVed ICBMs and the third 
was the prospective deployments of ICBMs.460 The CPD argued that these disparities 
indicated ‘the basis for a determinative strategic imbalance’, even though these were 
certainly not the only metrics by which the treaty's merits could be judged.461 By late 
1978, as the Committee hoped, the SALT II debate was no longer simply an issue of 
negotiating a final agreement with the U.S.S.R., but had widened to encompass public 
debate over how to assess the military balance and whether SALT II was a positive or 
negative influence on the balance. 
The CPD's simplified metrics that informed this debate, however, distorted 
America’s strategic situation, and, as Garthoff correctly argues, increased ‘sensitivity to 
a symbolic arithmetical "balance"’.462 The CPD argued that the survival of American 
land-based Minuteman III missiles could no longer be assured as the Soviet Union had 
vastly strengthened its strategic arsenal, pointing out that ‘a third-strike capability … 
would undermine the credibility of our second-strike capacity’.463 But this assessment 
of Soviet capabilities was based on the CPD’s own estimated metrics, which were 
                                                
458 ‘Committee on the Present Danger Letter to President Carter’, 4 August, 1977, Box 70, Folder 5, Nitze 
Papers, 2. 
459 Charles Burton Marshall, “Looking For Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock: Observations on SALT II”, in 
Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger, ed. Charles Tyroler II (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1984), 95. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1142. 
463 CPD Executive Committee, “Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet 
Military Balance”, 41. 
 
137 
compiled through hypothetical worst-case assumptions of current trends of Soviet 
strength and deployments.  
Nitze was particularly troubled by comparative throw-weight, a metric that 
represented the effective payload each side could deliver in a nuclear attack. In 1978 
this was an area of Soviet advantage following the deployment of SS-18 and SS-19 
ICBMs.464 Nitze concocted a nightmare scenario, which underpinned the Committee's 
alarm during the SALT II debate. If the accuracy of guidance systems were enhanced, 
and if MIRV technology improved to allow the attachment of additional warheads, then 
Kremlin leaders might be able to launch a disarming first strike against U.S. land-based 
Minuteman III missiles. However, this scenario assumed the perfect coordination of a 
surprise missile attack, which obviously had never before been attempted. It also 
assumed that Soviet leaders would not anticipate an immediate, 'launch on warning' 
response by American missiles before the hypothetical Soviet strike hit its targets. There 
were considerable doubts over Soviet strategic capabilities as well as its ability to 
coordinate a disarming first strike, but the Committee repeatedly made the case that 
American weakness stemmed from the risk of this unlikely scenario.465 
As Kampelman suggested in his planning document, the Committee would 
'translate' these esoteric concepts into terms that could be readily understood. Put simply, 
despite the apparent complexity of CPD analyses, its pamphlets appealed to the desire 
of many Americans to match the military capabilities of their communist rivals. 
Committee pamphlets did not offer a balanced case for a re-examination of Cold War 
military strategy and a return to containment. Instead the CPD provided an 
unambiguous conclusion that the consequences of SALT II and lack of military 
investment would be catastrophic. Executive Committee members recognised that a 
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simplified argument over who was the stronger power would resonate. ‘Those people 
out there don’t want to be number two’, Charls Walker explained at the 1978 annual 
conference, ‘They don’t want to be anywhere close to number two, when it comes to 
military strength and security. That one you can sell around the country.’ 466  The 
Committee clearly understood the power of its publications that offered clear 
conclusions that seemed to be based on complex analyses. 
Zumwalt expressed his own understanding of the Committee's tactics in his 
memoir. For him opposition to SALT II was based on using the very complexity of the 
treaty to encourage doubt: 
I thought the most intense resistance possible was the appropriate 
tactic … It was necessary to stick to the forms, to construct and 
marshal the elaborate agreements about MIRVs and Throw Weight and 
Forward Based Systems and Threshold Test Bans and 
Denuclearization … [but] those arguments were pretty much a cover. 
The substance was, "Stop the Talks! We Want to Get Off!"467 
 
Walker and Zumwalt’s comments suggest that the Committee understood that its 
detailed analysis was less important than the conclusion that it purported to support. The 
alarming conclusion would receive more attention than the metrics that underpinned the 
interpretation. The Executive Committee started with the premise of inferiority and 
created the metrics that would demonstrate this view. As the historian Halliday argues, 
‘much of the argument rests upon a combination of linguistic slippage and debatable 
systems of measurement’.468 How to assess the military balance was an issue of intense 
disagreement as there was no easy measure of nuclear parity. Although the Committee 
was clearly sincere in its belief in American inferiority, its case against SALT II was not 
based on the clear logic and reason that Rostow claimed was the Committee’s style. 
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The veneer of evidenced logic exposes the CPD's claim of democratising 
national security as misleading. Committee metrics highlighted only the Executive 
Committee's view of the military balance and either obscured or ignored other metrics 
that undermined their own analysis. For example, as Garthoff points out, ‘The American 
lead in absolute numbers of strategic bombs and warheads actually widened between 
1970 and 1980.’469 This fact was not highlighted in Committee material. There was no 
simple measure of nuclear parity, but the Committee chose to ignore the less alarming 
possibility that there was rough parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
The Committee instead focused on the areas of contention and, rather than acknowledge 
the ambiguity of comparing relative strengths and weaknesses of each side’s military 
capabilities, argued that 'if present trends continue, the U.S. will soon be in a situation 
of military inferiority'.470 It made this claim on the basis of comparative throw weight, 
projections of MIRVing, and predictions of Soviet technological developments, which 
were measures the CPD selected precisely because they presented the military balance 
in its least favourable terms. 
In the Executive Committee's view, they were permitting wider participation by 
providing these metrics to the public, but their pursuit of simplicity also meant that the 
group did not present a detailed clarification of their approach to threat assessment. 
Rostow believed that ‘If our people are told the truth, they will respond today.’471 
However, CPD members did not explain that the metrics they presented as ‘truth’ were 
merely estimates calculated using a worst-case methodology. Kampelman later 
explained that the Committee followed the Team B approach of 1976, which he 
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described as the CPD's ‘intellectual basis’. 472  Executive Committee members felt 
justified in adopting a worst-case approach to threat assessment rather than explaining a 
range of possibilities in military developments. In their view readers did not need to 
know the optimistic analysis but, given Soviet hostility, should be informed how 
potentially dangerous their adversary remained. However, by withholding an 
explanation of this worst-case methodology the CPD gave the impression that their 
estimates were not merely a possibility but were an accurate representation of future 
trends. 
This approach is seen clearly in Is America Becoming Number Two?, which was 
published in October 1978 and sought to worry readers about American inferiority in 
relation to the Soviet Union. This publication, the CPD's longest and most detailed 
pamphlet yet released, set out an analysis of the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the 
context of the SALT II negotiations. The pamphlet argued that the Soviet Union was 
close to reaching superiority but that there was still opportunity to prevent that 
eventuality albeit only with a prompt and decisive effort to raise defence spending to 
match Soviet strength. 
The Committee's assessment of technological research in the pamphlet 
demonstrates its worst-case approach. ‘[I]t is clear’, the pamphlet warned readers, ‘that 
unless present trends are reversed they [the U.S.S.R.] will achieve superiority’.473 It 
cautioned against ‘a strategically significant “breakthrough” … that could give them, 
overnight as it were, a decisive military advantage’.474 To make this case the pamphlet 
alleged that the Soviet Union was developing an ‘anti-satellite satellite’ with ‘high-
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energy lasers’, and ‘directed-energy charged-particle beams’.475 The Committee claimed 
that the Soviet Civil Defence programme  ‘directly affects the basic arithmetic of 
deterrence’ and this programme had been so successful that the U.S.S.R. might suffer 
just one-tenth the casualties of the U.S. in a nuclear exchange.476 Soviet capabilities in 
1978, even before considering these developments, ‘raise doubt as to whether we 
possess an adequate second-strike capability today’.477 
While these Soviet research programmes were assumed to be on the verge of 
deployment the possibility of American technological advances were played down. For 
example, many experts considered cruise missile technology as an area of American 
advantage, but the CPD argued that the technology should not be assessed in this way. 
‘Like the Japanese a generation ago, Soviet science has often surprised our experts’, the 
Committee cautioned.478 ‘Policy should prudently assume that Soviet cruise missile 
technology … will soon at least equal our own.’479 CIA predictions of Soviet economic 
constraints in the 1980s, which suggested restraint in Soviet military procurement, were 
dismissed as long term ‘uncertainties’ when compared to how the ‘risks of the shifting 
military balance threaten the position of the United States in international diplomacy 
now and in the 1980s’.480 In short, the Committee analysis assumed a formidable enemy 
and a hapless defence. This was a very one-sided approach to threat perception. 
These technological developments were all complicated issues within 
assessments of comparative military power that years of SALT II negotiations had 
failed to solve. With different force mixes, deployments, and technologies it was 
extremely difficult to establish parameters for mutual security. Yet the Committee 
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highlighted any area of unfavourable comparison in their assessment of SALT and in 
doing so presented the treaty in its worst possible light. Executive Committee members 
did not explain to readers that General David Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, regarded the treaty as ‘a modest but useful step’. 481  By restricting Soviet 
programmes, he reasoned, they would be more predictable and therefore make planning 
effective countermeasures less fraught with uncertainty. 
The Committee's assessments purported to offer a simplified view of the military 
balance. In simplifying, however, the Committee distorted. Undoubtedly Executive 
Committee members sincerely believed that worst-case planning was the prudent course 
against America's most potent adversary. But the Committee did not attempt to justify 
this basis for assessing the Soviet threat. 'It was easy, all too easy', Fred Kaplan 
observes.482 It certainly proved easier to highlight and publicise disparity to generate 
support for its opposition to SALT. CPD examples of American inferiority were based 
on conjecture, worst-case projections, and unrealistic scenarios. A more accurate 
presentation of its views would have explained that there was a chance that the Soviet 
Union might gain certain advantages in some fields of military technology, but that 
American research might also develop similar advantages in other fields. To claim, as 
Committee publications did, that it was 'clear' that the U.S.S.R. was on the brink of 
gaining military superiority could not be supported by the firm evidence available. 
Fred Kaplan also suggests that Nitze ‘hit new heights of abstraction in strategic 
thought’ during the SALT II debate.483 This level of abstraction was incorporated as an 
additional component to the Committee's analysis, which stressed the need to 
‘demonstrate our determination’ to Kremlin leaders.484 Is America Becoming Number 2? 
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warned that if the U.S. were to ‘permit these clear trends to materialize, we may expect 
to lose the “battle of perceived capabilities”’.485 If Kremlin leaders believed they could 
win a war, the Executive Committee reasoned, they just might try. Deterring Soviet 
aggression therefore required not only matching their capabilities in practice, but being 
perceived by Kremlin leaders as matching their capabilities. Therefore, the Committee 
argued, ‘it is essential that our second-strike capacities be convincing and visible 
beyond the shadow of a doubt’.486 The conclusion was that ‘Until we have adequate 
capabilities for the most demanding contingency, we can hardly have assurance of 
deterring aggression.’ 487  This was a high bar for American security needs, and 
essentially defined security as possible only with Soviet insecurity. The Committee’s 
critics pointed out that it was this logic that fuelled the arms race.488 
 
The American Committee on East-West Accord 
 
President Carter’s Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Hodding 
Carter, warned in December 1978 that ‘the public will be highly susceptible to 
attention-arresting, seemingly plausible criticisms of SALT’. 489  This, as has been 
demonstrated, became the basis of the CPD’s publications. Their presentation of metrics 
that appeared to demonstrate growing Soviet power proved extremely effective in 
sowing seeds of doubt over the SALT II treaty. After one presentation to the regional 
San Diego World Affairs Council, for example, its president wrote to the Committee 
‘You really were primed with facts and figures which were difficult to refute.’490 
Apparent inequalities in the military balance, when pointed out by CPD experts, struck 
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many Americans as unfair as well as dangerous, and opposition to the treaty seemed 
prudent. The CPD's unsettling metrics forced advocates of the SALT II treaty to explain 
to the public how, despite the Committee's suggestions of disparity, the treaty was in 
fact beneficial to American national security. 
‘Competition’, Richard Pipes noted in March 1978, emerged ‘in the form of the 
American Committee on East-West Accord [ACEWA]’.491 The success of the CPD's 
model of bureaucratic opposition prompted imitation from supporters of the SALT 
process. The ACEWA had been founded in July 1974, but reorganised its efforts in 
early 1978 to participate in the SALT II debate.492 Its membership included George 
Kennan,493 W. Averell Harriman,494 Sidney Drell,495 and John-Kenneth Galbraith.496 In 
language strikingly similar to the CPD's own public introduction, the ACEWA 
announced it would set forth the ‘moderate, objective, expert opinions of distinguished 
Americans, based on realistic concern for the best interest of the United States’.497 Its 
members, the group claimed, were a ‘remarkable non-partisan group of private citizens 
— corporation executives, former ambassadors, college presidents, Soviet specialists, 
nuclear physicists, clergymen of all faiths — who differ widely among themselves 
about politics, economics, and international affairs’. 498  The ACEWA intended to 
replicate the success of the CPD by establishing itself as an independent authority on 
defence issues, but in contrast the ACEWA sought to rally support for arms control and 
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détente. This was a clear example of what the historian Francis Gavin has called ‘the rift 
in the strategy “church”’ in the late-1970s.499  
The ACEWA's primary concern was not the risk of Soviet expansion, but the 
risk of nuclear war. Kremlin leaders, Kennan argued, were ‘moderate’ and Brezhnev 
himself was ‘a man of peace’.500 Kennan also likened those who saw ‘dangers on every 
hand’, obviously referring to CPD members, to ‘frightened children’.501 If American 
leaders took the lead in lowering tensions and promoting arms control, ACEWA 
members believed, Kremlin leaders would reciprocate. They ‘have good and sound 
reason, rooted in their own interests’, and Kennan argued that they desired ‘a peaceful 
and constructive relationship with the United States’.502 This was in direct contrast to 
the CPD view, which maintained that Kremlin leaders, inspired by Marxist-Leninism 
theory and guided by a history of Russian imperialism, were inherently committed to 
expansion.503 The ACEWA and the CPD in effect provided the intellectual leadership 
for the opposing positions on SALT II and on U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Containment’s primary architects, Kennan and Nitze, were on separate sides of 
this debate on U.S.-Soviet relations by the late-1970s. Kennan believed his famous ‘X’ 
article in 1947 had ‘dogged my footsteps ever since’, because he did not emphasise that 
the ‘danger was not one of further military conquest’.504 Nitze, however, thought that 
his own approach, first in NSC-68 and now through the CPD, ‘more realistically set 
forth the requirements necessary to assure success of George Kennan's idea of 
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containment’.505 The contrasting views on how to perceive Soviet capabilities gained 
national prominence in a May 1978 New Times Magazine feature on Soviet relations, 
which included two lengthy articles featuring Nitze and Kennan.506  
Nitze repeated his warning about Carter's ‘misreading of the Russians’.507 The 
Kremlin, he argued, was ‘doctrinally dedicated to achieving world hegemony’ and the 
president did not acknowledge this threat to American interests.508 Kennan, in contrast, 
made 'An Appeal for Thought', arguing that Soviet leaders were ‘Not at all 
adventurous … they have something approaching a complex about the possibility of 
another war.’509 In Kennan's view ‘alarmists’, a reference to the CPD, had taken its 
concerns over the military balance too far: 
What bothers me about a great deal of the present discussion of the 
military realities is that they all have … a certain image of the Soviet 
leadership … Somehow or other, when you start to think in military 
terms of what we could do to them and what they could do to us, 
insensibly you move quietly to the assumption that since they could 
do this, this is what they would like to do.510 
 
Nitze observed Soviet capabilities, in theory a quantifiable factor, and attempted to 
deduce intentions. Kennan advocated the reverse. He argued that Soviet intentions were 
defensive in nature, but did not quantify this assessment. Nitze, on the other hand, had 
meticulously quantified his own thinking in CPD analyses. The ability to refer to 
numbers gave Nitze's interpretation of Soviet intentions the appearance of credibility. 
As the historian Johnson observes, ‘Quantification appears to reduce uncertainty and 
enhance predictability.’511 The Committee’s approach, which seemed to be based on 
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hard evidence rather than intuition, struck many as the more prudent method of 
assessing the threat of the U.S.S.R.. As Gaddis correctly notes, ‘Nitze seemed right in 
the short run, because only the long run could confirm Kennan’s claim.’512 
Quantification was the Committee’s trump card in the SALT II debate. Parity 
was ambiguous, but Nitze relished the task of quantifying the unquantifiable. In the 
words of his biographer, Strobe Talbott, he had put ‘Calipers on the Rubble’ as part of 
the U.S. Bombing Survey at Hiroshima in 1945.513 Nitze later described this task as 
measuring ‘precisely the physical effects and other effects as well, to put calipers on it, 
instead of describing it in emotive terms. I was trying to put quantitative numbers on 
something that was considered immeasurable.’514  Over thirty years later Nitze was 
undertaking a similar task on the SALT II treaty. This time, however, there was no 
actual rubble to measure only the hypothetical worst-case situations that Executive 
Committee members had themselves devised. 
Nitze claimed that he was worried solely about measurable military realities. 
However, a letter he wrote to a CPD supporter demonstrates his uncertainty over 
assessing capabilities: 
One can never be certain that what one believes to be true is in fact 
true. All that is possible is to be as careful in searching out the 
evidence and as clear in laying out that evidence and the chains of 
logic derived therefrom as possible.515 
 
Nitze was convinced that his own chain of logic was common sense. Yet he also 
admitted ‘I still worry about surprises.’516 He presented his intuition in CPD analyses as 
evidenced logic, rationalising his own fears as prudence and incorporating them in his 
computations. However, when his ACEWA critics incorporated their own less fearful 
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assumptions into their assessments he dismissed their logic. His conclusion was logical, 
whereas, he wrote to a newspaper in 1980, ‘Averell [Harriman]’s piece is over 
simplified, polemical, and hardly contributes to sound judgment.’517  
 ‘Nitze was an operational pessimist’, Talbott suggests, ‘someone who believed 
that policy was largely a matter of making the best of a bad situation, of planning for the 
worst, while doing so in a way that would prevent it from happening’.518 The effect was 
that Nitze, and his likeminded CPD colleagues, regarded those who did not subscribe to 
similar pessimistic planning to be naive, even reckless. Kennan, in particular, was seen 
as particularly dangerous. Rostow, in a scathing review of Kennan's 1978 book The 
Cloud of Danger, called him ‘an impressionist, a poet, not an earthling’.519 He labelled 
Kennan’s ideas on foreign policy ‘as confused, inconsistent, and detached from the 
most objective measures of reality’.520 
Kennan and his ACEWA colleagues, despite replicating the CPD’s structure, 
were unable to match its success. The CPD’s calls for additional military strength 
proved much more popular than the East-West Accord’s calls for reconciliation. The 
ACEWA members recognised the seductive the appeal of the Committee's approach, 
but could not shift the terms of debate away from CPD metrics of inferiority. Galbraith 
agreed with Kennan and claimed that ‘The subject of American-Soviet relations is one 
that invites the worse tendencies in our political literature – apocalyptic vision, the 
elaborately torrid phrase, discovery of deeply sinister motive.’521 But appeals to hope 
and trust did not address the issues raised by the CPD's anti-SALT campaign. Ignoring 
the CPD’s heavily publicised indices of inferiority seemed naive and dangerous. Why 
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should America take the risk of limiting its military strength and hope that the U.S.S.R. 
would reciprocate? The CPD recognised and encouraged this sense of distrust, whereas 
the ACEWA appealed to the desire for peace and arms control. When the SALT II 
treaty was framed in terms of its risks the CPD's argument for additional military 
strength seemed sensible. 
Ultimately the CPD was proved correct; a clear majority of Americans did 
accept a higher burden of military expenditure.522 By using the complexity of the treaty 
to point out areas of potential risk the Committee activated longstanding distrust 
towards America's communist adversary. Once the CPD established that the Soviet 
Union was expanding its military capabilities Americans were more likely to accept the 
argument that this expansion would continue. This is shown in polls, which by the end 
of 1978 indicated that Americans were increasingly wary of Soviet military strength and 
suspicious of Kremlin leaders' motives; the CPD's campaign to restore containment was 
proving successful. 
Conclusion 
 
 After attaining considerable credibility as an expert group on defence issues in 
1977 the CPD were in a position to take an active role in the SALT II debate the 
following year. The platform of credibility that the Executive Committee had 
established for the group ensured that Committee publications were able to frame the 
issue in terms that shifted the debate away from hopes of peaceful coexistence and 
towards fears of Soviet strength and intentions. In part because of the Committee’s 
activities, SALT II became a focal point for a wider debate over national security 
requirements and the need for additional military strength in particular. 
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The Committee was prepared to work with the Carter Administration, but only 
on the basis of a substantial policy shift from the president. In meetings with Landon 
Butler, Nitze suggested that with a provision for MAPS included in the treaty, alongside 
an increased defence budget, the Committee could support an agreement. Yet when this 
provision was later included Nitze refused to give his support. Nitze and his Executive 
Committee colleagues, this episode suggests, were less concerned with details of the 
SALT treaty than with the president recognising their broader view of growing Soviet 
power and the need to raise defence spending to confront the concomitant danger. 
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength was established in August 1978. 
While the Committee did not pursue official affiliation with this new group it 
nevertheless was a key constituent of the coalition, providing the intellectual substance 
that much of the campaign against the treaty relied upon. The Committee’s analyses 
received a wide audience through CPTS grassroots campaigns and public doubt over the 
risks of the SALT II agreement rose steadily. 
Much of the Committee’s evidence, however, was based on an oversimplified 
presentation of carefully picked metrics of the military balance. These purported to 
demonstrate clearly emerging Soviet superiority but were in fact based on worst-case 
assumptions that presented Soviet military capabilities in their most favourable terms 
and downplayed any American advantages. This was not a disingenuous argument but 
the CPD did not explain the methodology of their worst-case analysis. Planning national 
security requirements on this basis was a valid approach but the Committee too often 
presented its analysis as fact rather than as one interpretation of the limited evidence 
available. Committee publications appeared to quantify the threat of Soviet superiority 
and placed a high burden on opponents to unpick these metrics. This proved to be an 
extremely difficult task. 
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The CPD’s appeal to distrust of Soviet leaders, which rested on its worst-case 
estimates, proved much more successful than the efforts of the group’s direct opposition, 
the American Committee on East-West Accord. The Committee’s ostensibly 
comprehensive studies seemed authoritative, and were exceedingly effective in 
spreading doubt over the current state and future direction of the military balance. 
SALT II, Committee pamphlets argued, had become an agreement not worth the risk to 
American national security. As Kremlin leaders responded only to military strength, the 
Committee argued, it was higher defence spending alone that would redress the balance 
and ‘secure peace with freedom’.523 
Over 1978 the CPD was able to convert its credibility as a national security 
authority into political influence, and became an important participant in the debate over 
SALT II. Through this issue the group had secured the means of spreading its warning 
of Soviet strength to a national audience. Its alarming analysis of Soviet strength was 
increasingly accepted as accurate, rather then as just one interpretation. This contributed 
to a climate of anxiety over Soviet military strength, which would shape how a number 
of international crises were perceived in 1979.  
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1979 – SALT II and the Soviet Victory Strategy 
‘The analysis offered by the Committee in 1976 has been fully confirmed by 
subsequent events.’524 
 
 In 1978, participation in the SALT II ratification debate permitted the CPD a 
national stage to share its analysis of the military balance. This analysis was based on a 
collection of metrics that purported to show a widening imbalance of military strength. 
These computations, while undoubtedly adding credibility to the argument of treaty 
opponents, remained in dispute at the beginning of 1979. This chapter establishes that 
by the end of the year the Committee regarded its interpretation of Soviet intentions as 
unambiguously vindicated by Red Army 'adventurism': The U.S.S.R. perceived its own 
military superiority, the CPD argued, and was actively expanding. The Iranian 
Revolution, Cuban Combat Brigade crisis, Soviet-backed South American revolutionary 
movements, and, most dramatically, the Afghanistan Invasion, were all crises that the 
CPD attributed to the machinations of Kremlin planners. They were interpreted by 
Committee board members as unambiguous indicators that their analysis of insufficient 
U.S. military strength was correct. The chapter also argues that the Executive 
Committee judged that Carter still did not grasp the nature of this Soviet strategy. It 
demonstrates that the Committee considered that without substantial military investment, 
a 'hot' war with the Soviet Union was a risk, thus equating Carter’s dedication to SALT 
II ratification to a repetition of 1930s appeasement.  
The first section explores the CPD’s efforts to expose the risks of the SALT II 
agreement. Over 1978 and 1979, Executive Committee members made 17 
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Congressional testimonies, the most of any oppositional group.525 Over 200,000 copies 
of CPD pamphlets were distributed to its mailing list of over 13,000 subscribers.526 In 
addition, between November 1978 and November 1979, the Executive Committee made 
479 public appearances, a figure that does not include private meetings with senators or 
meetings with newspaper editorial boards.527 The Committee also commissioned and 
published a poll that revealed that a majority of Americans desired, at a minimum, equal 
military strength, and would oppose the treaty if this were in doubt. 528  Aimed at 
influencing undecided senators, the poll suggested that voting against ratification would 
not be punished at the ballot box. As a result of these activities the SALT II treaty 
would never attain the 60 Senate votes necessary for ratification. Nitze, in early January 
1980, told fellow CPD member Clare Boothe Luce: ‘SALT II was dead in the water 
well before Afghanistan and Iran. Our count showed 39 solid anti-votes.’529 This was 
not just Nitze's opinion. Independent polling demonstrated that Americans were 
increasingly sympathetic to the Committee's argument that military capabilities needed 
to be strengthened by the end of the summer of 1979. 
The second section argues that this focus on the risks of SALT II ratification 
resonated over the summer of 1979. The Executive Committee insisted that the Iranian 
Revolution, the revolution in Nicaragua, and the alleged discovery of a Red Army 
combat brigade in Cuba were all the result of U.S. military weakness and an 
expansionist Kremlin strategy. The invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December was 
merely the most egregious example of a growing trend of Soviet aggression, they 
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suggested. The section demonstrates that the CPD’s explanation of Soviet expansion 
amounted to a critique of American strategy in the absence of containment. Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD) did not deter Soviet Third World expansion without 
conventional military strength, and, if containment was not fully restored, an 
encirclement of Western Europe and Cold War defeat were in prospect. 
A final section argues that the Committee, in the context of its assessment of a 
Soviet victory strategy, regarded the Carter Administration’s insistence on SALT II 
ratification as dangerous and obviously detrimental to American national security. 
While a number of new defence policies were enacted, Executive Committee members 
assessed that they served only to assuage SALT II's critics and were not earnestly 
designed to restore American deterrent capability. The Assistant Secretary of State, 
Russell Murray II, attended the CPD’s 1979 annual meeting in November to persuade 
the CPD that the administration did in fact accept its analysis of military imbalance. 
This attempted reconciliation, however, was rejected as CPD board members noted that 
the president still refused to warn Americans of Soviet expansion in his public 
statements. Carter, they decided, had consistently demonstrated his lack of commitment 
to containment and could no longer be trusted to lead the American response to the now 
observable Soviet policy of expansion. 
The chapter concludes that the CPD regarded its analyses since 1976 to have 
been unequivocally proved correct by the end of 1979. The invasion of Afghanistan on 
24 December, for many Americans, emphatically confirmed the CPD’s analysis of 
Soviet strength and aggression. The Executive Committee, judging that a clear majority 
of Americans supported its call for increased defence spending, was concerned that the 
president's response was dangerously inadequate. They believed that Carter’s inability 
even to perceive the threat, let alone to propose an adequate response to supersede the 
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antiquated MAD doctrine, would permit the U.S.S.R. to continue its expansion 
undeterred. As a result, CPD board members feared, the United States faced an 
imminent risk of Cold War defeat. 
Failure of SALT II Ratification 
 
 The SALT II ratification debate provided a significant platform for the CPD to 
offer its analysis that a Soviet expansion strategy was being pursued. In particular, the 
CPD’s two-year campaign to highlight American military weakness contributed to the 
alarm over a series of crises during 1979. As a result, the Committee’s analysis became 
increasingly popular as it appeared to offer both a clear explanation for the crises — 
Soviet malevolence — and a simple remedy to rectify the situation — rejecting SALT II 
and raising defence spending. In part as a result of the Committee's warnings to 
undecided senators, and also as a result of perceived Soviet aggression, the SALT II 
treaty would never attain two-thirds Senate support. Rostow told CPD board members 
on 8 November 1979 that ‘we can stop focusing on that’.530 This section concludes that 
by the end of the year the appetite for arms control was superseded by an ambition to 
end perceived American weakness in order to block Soviet expansion. 
As details of the finalised treaty terms emerged from Geneva over the first half 
of 1979, the Committee's primary justification for its opposition shifted. In 1978, the 
Committee had focused on creating and publicising metrics that demonstrated unequal 
military strength, and had suggested that SALT II would preserve this Soviet advantage. 
In 1979, Committee criticism of the treaty was substantiated by stressing the inadequacy 
of the verification methods that would ensure adherence to the treaty's terms. Without 
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reliable verification Kremlin leaders might ignore the treaty and continue Soviet 
military growth. 
A number of treaty critics argued that the loss of listening posts in Iran, 
following the January revolution, would hamper monitoring Soviet weapons testing in 
Kazakhstan. It also emerged that the Soviet Union refused to ban the encryption of 
telemetry data.531 The ability to intercept unencrypted telemetry data was a crucial 
method of verifying that ICBM tests conformed to treaty provisions. Both of these 
developments made SALT II ‘far from being verifiable’, Nitze argued in a Committee 
pamphlet, thereby fuelling the Committee's charge that the treaty was an unacceptable 
risk and not in American interests.532 
In tandem with highlighting these risks, the CPD hoped to convince undecided 
senators that voters would not punish opposition. The Executive Committee believed 
that ordinary Americans desired equal, if not superior, military capabilities to the 
U.S.S.R. and commissioned a poll to confirm this assumption.533 The Committee hoped 
that the poll would convince senators that rejecting ratification was not a political risk 
and would also encourage further scepticism toward the administration's claims about 
the treaty's benefits. The poll asked respondents their reaction should their senator vote 
against the treaty, and a substantial 60.9 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘It wouldn't 
make that much difference.’ In contrast, just 7.9 per cent would ‘definitely oppose him 
[their senator] for reelection’. The poll, the Executive Committee intended, comforted 
undecided senators who were contemplating withholding support for the SALT II 
treaty.534 
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The CPD’s poll also exposed a general lack of understanding of the treaty's 
provisions. It was no surprise that Americans favoured the general concept of arms 
control, the Committee pointed out in its explanatory pamphlet.535 Reducing the cost 
and number of nuclear weapons was a universally popular ideal. However, poll 
respondents were less enthusiastic when they were asked to consider specific provisions 
in the SALT II agreement. When asked whether the exclusion of the Backfire bomber 
from the treaty – 'capable of attacking the U.S. with nuclear weapons' – would lead to 
respondents either 'definitely' or be 'somewhat more inclined to' oppose the treaty, 42.4 
percent and 30.7 percent of respondents agreed with these statements respectively.536 
Overall, the Executive Committee concluded, their poll demonstrated that ‘The 
American people are skeptical about SALT II, don’t know much about it and, clearly, 
are not prepared to support the treaty without additional safeguards.’537 The poll was 
published in March 1979 and featured in Committee breakfast meetings with undecided 
senators. The poll indicates that the Committee was conscious that when its opposition 
to the treaty was presented in terms of its risks, ordinary Americans were much more 
likely to express reservations towards arms control. Highlighting the compromises 
within the treaty, such as the exclusion of the Soviet Backfire bomber, ensured that 
support for the treaty dropped among those surveyed.  
To convince undecided senators, the Committee established that Americans 
were unwilling to compromise security for the sake of the SALT II treaty. In this way 
the CPD’s contribution to the ratification debate in 1979 was to continue to provide the 
intellectual substance for opposition to the treaty. This included supplying its poll to 
senators, but also providing analyses of details of the treaty’s flaws and the risks these 
presented to American security. Executive Committee members continued to appear 
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before Senate Committees to testify against the treaty, featured in numerous televised 
debates with administration representatives, and frequently met with undecided senators 
at 'breakfast sessions'.538 During the SALT II debate, Executive Committee member 
William Van Cleave noted, there were 'too many [meetings] to list' with senators, 
congressmen, and their staff.539 In focusing on the Senate the Committee was able to 
keep support below the two-thirds threshold required for treaty ratification. 
How far can we attribute the treaty's defeat to the efforts of the CPD? The group 
systematically targeted wavering senators and supplied them with evidence of risk and 
uncertainty about the treaty's effects. Any uncertainty over verification, assessments of 
Soviet military strength, or indication of Soviet malevolent intent was leapt upon by 
Executive Committee members and presented to senators as proof of American 
weakness, emphasising the need to reject SALT II and reinstate containment. The risks 
to national security of the treaty's compromises, the CPD suggested to senators both in 
person and in its pamphlets, were too great. '[T]he core of the question', the Committee 
asked in Looking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock, '[is] whether SALT II is consistent with 
the obligation to provide for the common defense', and their answer was that it was 
not.540 It is impossible to gauge accurately the effect of the Committee's efforts, but 
there is little doubt that its studies, meetings, and testimonies did reach the senators who 
would withhold support for ratification. 
Eugene Rostow wrote in the autumn to Senator Jackson, the leader of treaty 
opposition in the Senate, explaining that the CPD had ‘done everything you have asked 
us to do’ in opposing the treaty by ‘producing analyses, and in briefing veterans’ groups, 
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editorial writers, and members of the Senate’.541  Rostow was convinced that these 
efforts helped to ensure that the treaty would not be ratified. CPD studies and briefings 
emphasising the risk and uncertainty of SALT II – in conjunction with the efforts of the 
Coalition for Peace Through Strength, and the political organisation of Senator Jackson 
– persuaded many undecided senators that the agreement was unfair and potentially 
dangerous. In a significant indicator of unease over SALT II, on 20 December, before 
the Afghanistan invasion, ten members of the Senate Armed Service Committee 
adopted a report from Jackson’s office stating that the treaty was not in the national 
interest.542  
This statement followed testimony earlier in the year by Nitze to the Foreign 
Relations Committee in which he argued that in contemplating SALT II ratification ‘the 
Senate must first resolve the question of whether, in times of increasing danger, 
including military danger, it is wise to let down our guard or whether it is time to pull 
the country together for the effort that is required on many fronts’.543 SALT II was 
unequal, Nitze proposed, and senate leaders should recognise their ‘broader … role to 
advise’ on the treaty rather than merely consent to it, and ensure that the treaty would 
not permit the Soviet Union a clear margin of military superiority.544 Ratifying the 
treaty as it was written limited the policy options that would allow an adequate response 
to Soviet military expansion. Nitze was certain that CPD studies established that 
American forces were inferior; if senators could not refute the CPD analysis then they 
should not ratify the treaty before ‘appropriate steps to correct’ the military balance 
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were taken. 545  To do otherwise was a dangerous gamble with American national 
security. 
The resignation of the military representative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
Geneva, Edward Rowny, emphasised the strength of the CPD's warnings about SALT 
II’s dangers. The agreement was signed on 18 June and in early August Rowny retired 
and joined the Committee to assist its efforts to oppose the treaty.546 This was a high 
profile addition to the CPD’s Executive Committee that further corroborated its analysis 
of the treaty’s deficiencies. Rowny argued that he had witnessed the negotiation of an 
inadequate treaty, in part due to the fact that Carter ‘lacked the experience required to be 
practical in dealing with the worldly Soviets’.547 Kremlin leaders wanted an agreement, 
Rowny argued, but the Carter Administration was overeager to finalise the treaty and 
had been out-negotiated as a result. He wanted the treaty rejected by the Senate and the 
process for an entirely new agreement started.548 A number of newspaper reports noted 
that such a prominent negotiator had resigned to join the Committee. 549  Rowny’s 
resignation was only the first incident over the summer of 1979 that raised doubts over 
the merits of SALT II ratification and strengthened the Committee's argument for 
rejection. 
As the ratification debate entered its final stage of Senate deliberation in the late 
summer, Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
announced on 30 August that a Soviet combat brigade had been discovered in Cuba.550 
The existence of the combat brigade was deeply troubling; if intelligence services were 
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unable to identify a combat brigade 90 miles from the Florida coast, the CPD suggested 
to undecided senators, monitoring adherence to SALT II provisions on Soviet territory 
thousands of miles away was surely impossible to guarantee.551 Within days, however, 
it was revealed that the Soviet Union had been permitted the brigade in 1962 following 
the Missile Crisis, and that it was incapable of offensive operations; its existence having 
been forgotten by the intelligence services. Despite the legality of the brigade, the 
damage to SALT II ratification was considerable. The timing of the discovery and the 
mismanagement of the crisis by the Carter Administration was a major setback in the 
treaty's Senate passage after deliberations were suspended for a month. The episode was 
perceived as yet another indicator of Soviet strength, which further eroded support for 
the treaty.552 
CPD pamphlets had presented metrics and evaluations of U.S. military 
inferiority since 1976, and these studies plausibly identified the underlying cause of the 
apparent rise of Soviet adventurism. In 1979, perceived by many Americans as a year of 
crisis, the Committee's insistence on substantial qualitative and quantitative 
improvement in military capabilities seemed a reasonable solution to limit global 
instability.553 The Executive Committee was in no doubt that its analysis of a victory 
strategy had been verified by Soviet actions, and any delay in restoring the military 
balance and re-establishing containment was not only naive but also dangerous. 
An October 1979 Committee pamphlet, Considerations Bearing on the Merits of 
the SALT II Agreements as Signed at Vienna, concluded that ‘The present situation is 
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the result of the American tendency towards self-delusion.’554 The response to Soviet 
expansion, the Executive Committee was adamant, should not be the ratification of a 
treaty that would signal acquiescence to Soviet superiority. Instead, the response should 
be to accept the accuracy of the Committee's appraisal, encourage the public's 
understanding of this situation of weakness, and undertake an immediate strengthening 
of military forces. The Committee’s view was clear: Kremlin leaders ‘placed great 
reliance on military instrumentalities … Militarism is the very essence of the 
Communist mentality’.555 SALT II should be rejected as a first step in demonstrating a 
determination to match Soviet strength and provoke a ‘change in their view as to the 
probable evolution of the correlation of forces’.556  Higher defence spending would 
redress the military balance and demonstrate a firm commitment to oppose Soviet 
territorial ambitions. On the other hand, ratification of SALT II would signal 
acquiescence to Soviet superiority and, in effect, permit the militarist Kremlin to 
continue its Third World expansion. A return to confrontation and reversing the trend 
towards Soviet military superiority was critical to signal to Soviet leaders American 
determination to resist its expansion.557 
A Year of Crisis 
 
 The Executive Committee foresaw a substantial risk of Cold War defeat on the 
basis of current trends in Soviet military growth and its apparent territorial expansion. 
This section examines the CPD's perception of a series of crises over 1979 as Soviet-
inspired and indicative of a Kremlin orchestrated victory strategy. To the CPD, the 
SALT II debate was superseded in light of this alarming activity, as the necessity of the 
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treaty's rejection by late 1979 seemed obvious. The Committee pointed out that in the 
face of the Kremlin’s strategy of Third World expansion American military capabilities 
needed to be strengthened and not restricted by an arms control agreement. 
 The need to reject SALT II and strengthen military capabilities was indisputable, 
the Committee argued, as ‘the Soviet drive for dominance’ was underway.558 A series of 
crises seemed to corroborate the Committee's hypothesis that the Soviet Union was 
implementing a strategy of expansion. The Horn of Africa Crisis in 1977-1978, the 
Iranian Revolution of January 1979, crises in North Yemen, Grenada, and Nicaragua 
were all perceived by the Committee as components of a meticulously planned Soviet 
expansion strategy.559 Next, Rostow speculated, ‘I see the Soviets taking over Saudi 
Arabia and the rest of the Gulf.’560 
‘[T]he United States faces a world crisis’, the Committee explained, ‘caused by 
the Soviet Union’s lunge for dominance, and by our country’s inadequate response’.561 
The Soviet Union, the CPD argued, was seeking victory by targeting an expansion of 
influence into the Middle East in order to control oil exports. Soviet ascendency in the 
region would enable the Kremlin to restrict oil supplies, which would constitute an 
encirclement of import-dependent Western Europe. This situation would compel 
European leaders, the Executive Committee hypothesised, to improve relations with the 
Kremlin and abandon NATO. The result would be effective Cold War defeat for the 
United States. Nitze wrote on the Executive Committee's behalf in Is SALT II a Fair 
Deal for the United States?:  
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[T]he focus of Soviet strategy has been on Western Europe. By 
achieving dominance over the Middle East, they aim to outflank 
Europe. They propose to outflank the Middle East by achieving 
controlling positions in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq on one side, South 
and North Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique on the other … 
In seeking each specific objective within their global policy, the 
Soviet rulers use the lowest level of pressure or of violence necessary 
and sufficient to achieve that objective. The purpose of their 
capabilities at the higher levels of potential violence, all the way up to 
intercontinental nuclear war, is to deter, and if necessary control, 
escalation by us to such higher levels.562 
 
This ‘outflanking’ of the Middle East seemed well underway by the end of 1979. The 
CPD's pamphlet argued that American strategic vulnerability and the limited strength of 
its conventional forces in Third World nations were permitting Kremlin planners to 
extend Soviet influence. The African and Middle East crises of the past two years were 
of vital importance to this Soviet strategy, and the ability to project American power – 
in order to be in ‘a better position to raise the stakes’ – in these regions was therefore 
critical. 563  In Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?, Nitze, as he had 
recommended in 1950, called for additional strategic and conventional military strength 
in order to repair the ‘military shield’ and deter Soviet ambitions.564 
Rostow repeated this Soviet victory strategy theory to Henry Jackson in late 
November: ‘The events of the last two years in Iran constitute a Pearl Harbor for the 
United States and its allies and friends.’565 Soviet activity in Iran, Rostow explained, 
constituted ‘a volcanic change in the map of world politics, deeply and directly 
threatening our national security’.566 Because the Executive Committee assessed that 
Kremlin planners had devised a grand strategy aimed at outflanking Europe, any 
political development that conceivably matched the hypothesis was regarded as a 
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validation of this interpretation. Thus every Soviet action – real or perceived – 
represented a stage in the CPD’s nightmare scenario of encirclement, and became a 
‘Pearl Harbor’ moment that the Executive Committee hoped would finally spark a 
meaningful response from the president. John Mueller, a political scientist, agrees with 
this interpretation, suggesting that ‘shocking events were frequently taken to confirm 
previously alarmist warnings (whether they did so or not), and then were wildly and 
incorrectly extrapolated’.567 
The possibility that the Iranian revolution was an event independent of the 
superpower confrontation did not occur to CPD members: ‘The violent movements of 
social and religious protest of the last few years in Iran were actively promoted by the 
Soviet Union from the beginning.’ 568  The same was true of South American 
revolutionary movements. A January 1980 CPD pamphlet warned of a ‘steadily 
improving position’ for the U.S.S.R. in Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, which 
directly threatened ‘Atlantic sea-lanes’ and ‘the territory of the United States itself’.569 
In the Executive Committee's judgment, South America, Africa and the Middle East 
were all areas of vital interest to the United States. As each region appeared vulnerable 
to expanding Soviet influence, America’s reputation as a reliable ally suffered. The 
CPD suggested that by permitting Soviet gains through its own weakness American 
credibility to deter Soviet power had diminished. As Soviet gains gathered pace, foreign 
leaders would note American reluctance to confront Soviet power and would pursue 
accommodation with the U.S.S.R. in order to obtain political favour from the rising 
power. Thus without the military strength and political determination to resist Kremlin 
ambitions across the globe, Rostow explained to Vance in May, the U.S. would be 
perceived as having accepted its position of inferiority. The immediate result of 
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‘[r]atifying SALT’, he told the Secretary of State, would be to ‘weaken the [NATO] 
Alliance’.570 
The Committee was convinced that the underlying cause of Soviet expansion 
was American weakness. This situation was by 1979 a far more dangerous prospect 
than direct nuclear conflict, which ACEWA continued to argue, because military 
weakness permitted the Soviet Union freedom of action in areas of the world vital to 
U.S. national security. As Soviet strategic forces reached parity, the American nuclear 
umbrella no longer deterred Soviet conventional forces, as the U.S. could no longer 
threaten to launch a successful disarming strike, which would now invite a devastating 
retaliation. This explained the CPD's dissatisfaction with the SALT II treaty, which if 
ratified made it ‘difficult, if not impossible, to see how we can reverse recent adverse 
trends’ towards Soviet strategic superiority.571 The Committee assessed that American 
planners needed all options in order quickly to redress the military imbalance that was 
permitting Soviet expansion. 
Soviet activity in the Third World convinced the CPD that it was vital to restore 
American strength promptly before the Cold War ended in a Soviet victory. The CPD 
was no longer offering predictions of an abstract arithmetical military imbalance – in 
1979 they perceived that the threat was real and no longer hypothetical. Soviet 
behaviour over the past year demonstrated to CPD board members that the USSR 
possessed superior strength and had adopted a victory strategy. ‘At any given 
moment … retreat will become a rout’, Rostow wrote to Newsweek journalist Arnaud 
de Borchgrave on 21 February. 572  Committee members were convinced that only 
immediate and decisive steps to restore American military strength would give time for 
the necessary defence programmes to deploy and restore deterrent capabilities. SALT II, 
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Rostow argued in a July 1978 speech, constituted ‘an act of appeasement which can 
only invite more Soviet pressure’.573 In the same way that appeasement in the 1930s had 
only encouraged Hitler's ambition, so SALT II ‘would be a step toward war, not 
peace’.574 Only an unequivocal restoration of military parity would dissuade Kremlin 
leaders from their ambitions for expansion. 
In an October address that alarmed the Committee, President Carter rejected its 
assessment of the limitations of the American military shield. He reaffirmed his support 
of SALT II and assured Americans that ‘Our national defenses are unsurpassed in the 
world.’575 The Committee disagreed and charged that the president's claim that America 
possessed sufficient strength was ‘an Alice in Wonderland approach to meeting the 
Soviet threat’.576 American military strength was not unsurpassed, the CPD maintained, 
as the U.S.S.R. clearly considered that it possessed superior strength.577 The fact that it 
was already expanding its influence in the Third World without fear of an American 
response proved that the American military shield was deficient. Put simply, it was 
obvious to the Executive Committee that American forces no longer possessed the 
military strength that deterred Kremlin leaders from adventurism.578 
American nuclear strategy in 1979 rested on the concept of Mutually Assured 
Destruction to deter the Soviet Union from an all-out nuclear strike.579 Yet the end of 
unequivocal American nuclear superiority seemed to make MAD redundant. For the 
                                                
573 Eugene Rostow, ‘SALT II - A Soft Bargain, A Hard Sell. An Assessment of SALT in Historical 
Perspective.’, 25 July, 1978, Box 273, CPD Papers, 26. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Jimmy Carter: ‘Peace and National Security Address to the Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba 
and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.’, 1 October, 1979. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31458. (accessed 
22 December 2014) 
576 Nitze, “Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?”, 164. 
577 Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II”, 169. 
578 Pipes argued that Soviet ‘military programs [are] already operating at or close to peak capacity’, which 
meant that it would be difficult to regain American strength with or without a SALT II agreement. Pipes, 
“Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II”, 169. 
579 Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 383. 
 
168 
CPD, the notion that U.S. strategic forces targeting Soviet cities deterred Kremlin 
leaders from Third World expansion was no longer credible. ‘Mutual destruction is 
poppycock’, Pipes told the CPD board in 1977.580 The Executive Committee considered 
MAD an all or nothing strategy that gave the president few options besides a full 
nuclear response to Soviet aggression.581  In practice this meant that the American 
nuclear umbrella, for example, would not deter Soviet involvement in El Salvador. 
However, multiple Soviet gains in similar circumstances would soon amount to a 
'strangulation' of the 'non-Communist world'.582 This, as was argued in Is SALT II a Fair 
Deal for the United States?, ‘could result in forced accommodation to the Soviet Union 
leading to a situation of global retreat and Finlandization’.583 The Cold War would be 
lost, and MAD was therefore an ineffective strategy to thwart Soviet Third World 
adventurism. The solution, as the Committee had argued in its first statement in 1976, 
was to ‘restore an allied defense posture capable of deterrence at each significant level 
and in those areas vital to our interests’.584 Ensuring the sufficient deterrent strength of 
conventional as well as strategic forces was the only certain approach that would block 
Soviet activity. 
The Committee’s judgment of Soviet ambitions resonated in the spring of 1979 
as many Americans reflected on the apparent deterioration of their country's status and 
considered the merits of the SALT II agreement. Business Week, in one example, 
published a special issue on the erosion of American power in March 1979. An 
introductory editorial identified an 'unnerving series of shocks' that presented 'far more 
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evidence of retreat than of advance'.585 'If the decline in U.S. power is to be arrested', the 
magazine concluded, 'the trend toward spending a smaller share of the federal budget on 
defense must be reversed'. 586  This echoed the Committee's own analysis and 
demonstrates that the CPD, through its SALT II campaign and analysis of a Soviet 
victory strategy, ‘articulated and amplified the fears of the time’, as historian Robert 
Johnson has argued.587 The Committee offered an explanation for American decline 
with the necessary response incorporated within the analysis: with the advent of 
strategic parity the weakness of America's conventional capabilities invited Soviet 
adventurism, therefore defence spending needed to rise to give American forces 
credible deterrent strength. 
The SALT II ratification debate was thus a crucial issue for the Committee as it 
gave a national platform to share their interpretation of Soviet actions. Involvement in 
the ratification process was, Rostow judged, ‘a turning point’.588 It permitted the CPD 
‘to dramatize the significance of these problems [of defence] and the way in which we 
think they should be approached’.589 The Committee was able to link its call for a return 
to the principles of containment to a growing sense of decline among Americans. Is 
SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States? suggested that the longstanding American 
strategy of MAD was ineffective in deterring this Soviet adventurism. It was unlikely 
that the U.S. would risk a nuclear war over Afghanistan, Iran, or Nicaragua. However, if 
the Soviet Union controlled these areas then America would become increasingly 
isolated and the Cold War would soon be lost.  
 
                                                
585 “The Decline of U.S. Power: The New Debate Over Guns and Butter”, Business Week, March 12, 
1979, 2–3. 
586 Ibid., 3. 
587 Johnson, Improbable Dangers, 44. 
588 Rostow in ‘Committee on the Present Danger: Third Annual Meeting, Cassette 1’, 8-9 November, 
1979, Box 166, CPD Papers, 21. 
589 Rostow in ibid. 
 
170 
Rejection of Carter’s Conversion 
  
 Committee members were certain that President Carter did not grasp the 
immediate nature of the Soviet victory strategy and instead prioritised the ratification of 
the SALT II treaty above the strengthening of American deterrent capabilities. Carter's 
insistence on extolling the benefits of SALT II, despite the evident weakness of the 
military shield, deeply troubled the CPD. Carter, the Executive Committee assessed, 
was unable to countenance the Soviet Union's aspirations to capitalise on its current 
comparative strength and spread its influence. ‘The difficulty at the moment is not with 
Congress or the people’, Rostow told CPD board members in November, ‘but with the 
President, who refuses to ask for the military appropriations and the diplomatic 
programs needed to assure the safety of the nation’.590 The danger of Soviet expansion 
would not subside while the president refused even to recognise the validity of the 
Committee’s analysis, let alone enact a package of defence programmes consummate to 
the threat, Rostow despaired. While the administration did authorise a number of new 
defence policies over 1979, the Executive Committee thought that the administration's 
actions were motivated solely to assist SALT II ratification and did not reflect 
recognition of the Soviet expansion strategy. Carter raised defence spending, the 
Committee noted, but still did not explain the alarming nature of the Soviet threat to the 
American public. 
While preparing to sign the SALT II agreement with Brezhnev in Geneva, 
Carter made a number of announcements to assist the ratification process. The 
administration’s FY1980 budget was announced on 22 January 1979, and totalled 
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$135.5 billion.591 A decision on Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) on 18 
May indicated that Pershing II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) 
would be stationed in Europe.592  On 8 June, 10 days before the SALT II signing 
ceremony in Vienna, Carter also indicated that a 'full scale' MX missile system would 
be reactivated.593 These measures were designed to address the concerns that SALT II 
increased the risk of first strike vulnerability. 
Carter authorised these initiatives, the historian Fred Kaplan argues, ‘to buy off 
conservative senators’ wary of SALT II.594 The CPD also perceived the administration’s 
defence policies of 1979 as a response to the demands of uncommitted senators in the 
ratification debate. This meant that the administration enacted only the minimum 
policies acceptable to treaty critics instead of explaining the necessity of a response to 
Soviet adventurism. For the Executive Committee, Carter was moving in the right 
direction but for the wrong reasons. He ‘sounded more Trumanesque’, Rostow wrote in 
an article for Commentary magazine, but did not provide the policy substance: ‘his 
actions have remained McGovernite’. 595  Executive Committee members were 
concerned that Carter was paying lip service to the danger of Soviet Third World 
activity to assuage the concerns of uncommitted senators, but in practice offered an 
entirely inadequate response to block Soviet expansion. 
The CPD’s raison d’être was to publicise its conviction that the Soviet Union 
was gaining comparative strength and that American defence spending should rise 
before military capabilities became 'inadequate to assure peace with security'.596 This 
concern had steadily gained sympathy since 1976, and by late 1979 a clear majority of 
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Americans favoured an increase in defence spending. In December 1976, 25 percent of 
respondents to one poll favoured an increase and 27 percent favoured a decrease in 
spending. By October 1979, 58 per cent of respondents favoured an increase in defence 
spending and just 9 per cent favoured a decrease.597 The Committee noted that ordinary 
Americans supported its pleas for higher defence spending and that it was only the 
administration that still questioned the necessity of informing Americans of the urgent 
need to strengthen American armed forces. Rostow told the New York Times that the 
administration, because it announced new defence programmes yet continued its 
support of SALT II, 'specializes in paradox'.598 He argued that increased spending was 
incompatible with SALT II ratification, but even without the treaty the administration’s 
proposals were woefully inadequate. 
Despite Americans' growing desire for a more assertive policy towards the 
Soviet Union in general, including defence spending higher than the administration’s 
proposals, attaining an arms control agreement remained a key objective for the 
president. Carter cautioned on 1 October 1979 that ‘We must not play politics with 
SALT II. It is much too important for that—too vital to our country, to our allies, and to 
the cause of peace.’599 The Committee rejected this view: SALT II was not vital to U.S. 
interests but just the opposite as the treaty preserved the current military imbalance and 
limited the options that could restore deterrent strength to the military shield.600 
This disagreement over the desirability of SALT II was reflected even within the 
Carter Administration. Vance regarded the treaty as critically important. He did not 
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believe that Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, for example, should affect SALT II 
negotiations.601 Limiting the production of nuclear weapons was necessary to reduce the 
risk of an apocalyptic nuclear war, he believed, and SALT II was an important step in 
this process. Brzezinski, in contrast, advocated ‘linkage’. Soviet behaviour, he judged, 
should influence the arms control process.602 The treaty benefitted the U.S.S.R. as much 
as the U.S., and could therefore be used as a tool of diplomacy.603 These differing 
approaches to arms control at the heart of the administration were not resolved until 
1980 when Vance resigned prior to the attempted hostage rescue in Iran. These 
disagreements made administration policy, Rostow told Vance, ‘a mass of 
contradictions’. 604  Even though Brzezinski's approach seemed more palatable to 
Committee members, and there was a chance that Carter might eventually adopt it, 
Rostow explained to a CPD board member that ‘it doesn’t make any difference’.605 The 
administration, the Committee charged, was endangering national security. 
Determined presidential leadership was necessary to focus rising American 
discontent into support for defence programmes. The Committee was uninterested in the 
internal dynamics of Carter’s White House, and was only concerned with the 
president’s public statements and policy announcements. Despite Brzezinski’s influence, 
none of Carter’s addresses sufficiently conveyed a resolution to confront the Soviet 
Union, and the Committee accused the president of becoming a ‘SALT Seller’.606 Carter 
continued to state his support of SALT II without addressing the Committee's concerns 
of the threat posed by Soviet action in Africa, the Middle East, and South America. The 
administration's announced increases in defence spending were not carefully assessed 
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measures to restore deterrent capabilities and block Soviet Third World adventurism but, 
the Executive Committee believed, were required to persuade uncommitted senators to 
support SALT II ratification. By refusing to accept the Committee's estimations of 
Soviet strength and expansionist intent the administration was not trusted by the 
Executive Committee to maintain defence programmes beyond the resolution of SALT 
II ratification. 
In order to convince Committee members that the administration was in fact 
sympathetic to its analysis, Russell Murray II, Assistant Secretary of Defense, was sent 
by Carter to attend the Committee’s annual meeting on 8 November 1979. Murray told 
CPD members that he agreed that the key issue in assessing the military balance was 
whether Soviet and American leaders ‘perceive essential equivalence’ in each side’s 
nuclear strategic forces.607 If this was not the case, he continued, then ‘[t]he major issue 
is at what point does the [strategic] balance become such that the Soviets are 
emboldened to threaten us and we back down?’608 ‘That’s exactly the question’, Rostow 
agreed.609 This was the central issue in the disagreement over the military balance. By 
late 1979 how close to superiority did the U.S.S.R. think it was? Committee members 
believed that Soviet action clearly demonstrated that Kremlin leaders already perceived 
superiority, and were actively expanding. There seemed to be no explanation other than 
a current assessment of superiority for the U.S.S.R. aggressively to extend its influence 
in the Middle East, Africa, and South America. 
While the Executive Committee judged the administration's inability to perceive 
American weakness as inexplicable, Murray attempted to downplay the disagreement. 
He claimed that the difference between the administration and the CPD was merely over 
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timing and not over principle. Altering the administration's position from previous 
meetings with the Executive Committee, he conceded that ‘the balance has indeed been 
declining’ but tried to persuade the Committee that ‘by about 1981 … the balance 
should begin to improve again’.610 Murray explained that the administration assessed 
the military imbalance as a short-term problem that would be resolved following the 
completion of its enhanced FY1980 budget. Rather than ask the CPD to limit its 
criticism and support the administration as in previous years Murray now wanted to 
‘encourage the committee in its efforts to alert the American people’.611 Even though he 
supported SALT II ratification, it would be ‘a very serious error’, Murray conceded, if 
the American public regarded the problem of growing Soviet military strength as 
resolved.612  
In 1976, Carter had dismissed Nitze's analysis of Soviet strength as representing 
a 'doomsday approach'.613 In 1979, Murray told Nitze and his CPD colleagues that their 
concerns were recognised by the administration and would be resolved in the next 18 
months. Committee members were unsurprisingly sceptical of Murray’s newfound 
acceptance of their analysis. Executive Committee member William Van Cleave 
accused the president of creating the ‘illusion of awareness and action’. 614  If the 
administration recognised the alarming reality of Soviet superiority, Zumwalt asked 
Murray, ‘Why isn’t [Secretary of Defense] Harold Brown candid with the congress and 
the President candid with the public, as you have just been with us?’615 Pressing for 
SALT II ratification while recognising military inferiority in no way conveyed the 
severity of the Soviet threat to ordinary Americans, CPD board members pointed out. 
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Agreeing with the CPD's recommendations for increased military power to end the 
strategic imbalance in a private meeting was an entirely inadequate response given the 
potential consequences should the Soviet expansion strategy remain unchecked. The 
delivery of this warning to ordinary Americans should not be left to the CPD, board 
members judged. The president, as Rostow had personally requested as early as 1977, 
needed to tell Americans directly of the crisis situation himself ‘in a major speech’.616 
After three years of attempts to silence the Committee, members assumed the 
administration's change of direction would not outlast the ratification process. 
‘[W]hether or not those [spending increases] will stick once SALT is ratified, if it is 
ratified, is wholly dubious’, Nitze told fellow board members, ‘because many of the 
people who are behind these increases are behind them only for the purpose of assisting 
SALT through the ratification process’.617 The Executive Committee did not trust Carter 
to sustain the higher defence budget and the more assertive posture required to thwart 
the Soviet victory strategy. Rostow was convinced that the president was still ‘marching 
to an entirely different drummer’.618 The fulfilment of CPD goals in defence policy, 
Rostow concluded, ‘requires Presidential leadership’ that Carter was unable to 
provide.619 
Brzezinski, who also recognised the president’s image of weakness, brought the 
Committee’s criticism of Carter’s leadership of foreign affairs to the president’s 
attention. Brzezinski told Carter in a September memorandum: ‘I believe that for 
international reasons as well as domestic political reasons you ought to deliberately 
toughen both the tone and substance of our foreign policy. The country associates 
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assertiveness with leadership.’620 Carter’s reaction to the series of crises over 1979, 
Brzezinski recognised, was perceived as more troubling than reassuring. On 3 July, for 
example, the president cancelled a major speech on the energy crisis in favour of a 
retreat at Camp David.621 He hoped the retreat would provide an opportunity to reassess 
the direction of his administration and arrest the worrying decline in his approval rating. 
The result of the retreat was that Carter symbolically asked for the resignation of his 
entire cabinet, and subsequently accepted five.622 This strange act served only to raise 
more doubt of Carter's presidency. As the historian Laura Kalman asks of Carter’s 
retreat, ‘What would the president accomplish by self-criticism, except to provide his 
opponents with fodder?’623 Rather than re-establishing any authority, Carter’s actions 
attracted further criticism of his leadership abilities. A poll in late July revealed the 
lowest recorded approval rating of a president; only 25 per cent of respondents 
expressed a positive approval rating.624 
From the Committee's perspective it was not only a concern that the president 
was indecisive, it was his alarming inability to grasp the reality of increasing Soviet 
military strength and its pursuit of aggressive expansion that seemed particularly 
dangerous. Carter ignored CPD warnings of potential Soviet aggression and exhibited 
'dishonesty' in pushing for SALT II ratification.625 The Kremlin’s expansionist designs, 
the CPD pointed out in its pamphlet Why the Soviet Union Wants SALT II were assisted 
and not deterred by the agreement, which was ‘a device to inhibit the United States 
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response’.626 Rostow urged the president to ‘give up the delusions’ that motivated his 
administration's support of SALT II. 627  Events over the previous two years, CPD 
members believed, demonstrated even to the casual observer of international affairs that 
a Soviet expansion was underway. The fact that Carter intended to ratify SALT II even 
though it was ‘inherently beneficial to the Soviet Union’, jeopardised the ability of 
American armed forces to deter further expansion.628 
The Committee did not consider the Carter Administration to have addressed 
American military weakness. The defence programmes enacted over 1979 were 
attempts to secure the passage of SALT II through the Senate, and were not capable of 
deterring continued Soviet adventurism. Carter's failure to perceive danger, the 
Committee assessed, wasted precious time to rebuild American strength, extended the 
window of vulnerability, and permitted Soviet expansion to continue unchecked. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The CPD's role in the SALT II debate was to brief senators, highlight the risks 
of the treaty, and demonstrate that Americans would not punish opposition to the treaty. 
These were important functions and undoubtedly contributed substantially to the treaty's 
lack of support by the end of the summer. Through its participation in the treaty 
ratification debate, the Committee was also able to publicise its hypothesis of a Soviet 
strategy of expansion.  
 The chapter also argues that by the summer of 1979 the Committee perceived 
that its worst-case prediction of U.S.S.R. victory strategy was correct and a programme 
of global expansion was underway. MAD was no longer sufficient as Kremlin planners 
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expanded Soviet influence into areas that the U.S. could not credibly protect under its 
nuclear umbrella. New York would not be sacrificed for Afghanistan, the CPD reasoned. 
Unless credible deterrent strength was restored in the Third World the U.S. would 
gradually be outflanked and, in effect, defeated. 
 The CPD assessed that the administration’s defence policies were an attempt to 
mollify SALT II critics and not a strategy aimed at deterring further Soviet Third World 
expansion. The Executive Committee had little faith that the Carter Administration 
would honour its defence spending promises after the SALT II ratification process. 
After all, CPD members considered, they had tried since 1976 to convince the 
administration to adopt their analysis without success. They suspected that only the 
political necessities of SALT II prompted the policy changes and not the necessary 
fundamental reassessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities. 
By the end of 1979, it was difficult for groups such as the ACEWA to dismiss 
the CPD’s warnings of the threat from the Soviet Union as alarmist. Polls demonstrated 
that Americans increasingly supported the CPD's call for higher defence spending. This 
was because the Committee’s analysis of Kremlin ambitions to extend its global 
influence appeared justified after the Iranian Revolution, Cuban Combat Brigade 
discovery, and, in the last days of the year, the invasion of Afghanistan. The CPD 
attributed these incidents to American weakness and Soviet opportunism. The apparent 
losses in Africa, the Middle East, and South America would not cease, the Committee 
predicted, until American strategic and conventional forces once again possessed the 
capabilities to deter Kremlin leaders. This would require presidential leadership that the 
CPD judged Carter incapable of providing. 
As a result of perceived Soviet activity over 1979, the Committee made a 
significant shift in its warning of danger. In its first two years of operation, the CPD had 
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devised and publicised metrics that suggested a worrying trend in military capabilities 
that might soon result in Soviet superiority. This was a ‘present danger’ but not yet a 
current threat. At the end of 1979, before the Afghanistan invasion and even more so 
afterwards, the Committee was convinced that it was now warning of an escalating 
Soviet lunge for victory. This was obviously a dangerous situation to CPD board 
members, but even more worrying was that the leader of the nation refused to 
acknowledge their assessment. The CPD had not just lost faith in Carter, by late 1979 
they judged him a dangerous man.  
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1980 – Anyone But Carter 
‘The reason I don’t trust Carter, why I feel he is a dangerous man, is he has rejected the 
policies of containment.’629 
 
 Rostow told Senator Edward Kennedy in late January 1980 that ‘The Soviet move 
into Afghanistan is like Hitler's move into the Rhineland. It offers us our last clear 
chance to protect our interests without general war.’ 630  The Executive Committee 
assessed that an aggressive Soviet expansion strategy was underway, and that only 
prompt and decisive action would prevent its continued success. This chapter argues 
that the CPD's role in 1980 was to ensure that this urgent warning was repeated 
throughout the presidential election campaign. This message, from the majority 
Democrat CPD, directly benefitted the Reagan campaign as it prevented Carter from 
positioning himself as a 'peace' candidate in opposition to the 'aggressive' Republican 
candidate. 
 A first section examines the Committee's reaction to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, which dominated American politics in early 1980. The president's State of 
the Union address on 23 January announced a number of measures that he argued would 
demonstrate American resolve to punish the invasion and deter further Soviet 
aggression. On 25 July he also signed Presidential Directive 59 – the document was 
leaked on 15 August – which attempted to address concerns about the inadequacies of 
MAD.631  The section concludes that none of these measures convinced Committee 
members that Carter grasped the existential threat of the Soviet expansion strategy, nor 
that he was prepared to take decisive steps to counter the threat. The Executive 
Committee warned American voters that Carter was blind to Soviet aggression, was 
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incapable of mounting an adequate response, and was jeopardising America's position 
in the Cold War.  
 The result, the second section demonstrates, was that the CPD was determined 
that Carter be defeated in the November presidential election. Accordingly, over 1980, 
the Committee assisted a number of presidential candidates including the Democratic 
challenger to Carter, Edward Kennedy. In effect, the Committee had an anyone but 
Carter agenda in 1980, supporting any candidate who had a realistic chance to supplant 
the sitting president. In addition to advising presidential hopefuls, CPD members also 
continued to contribute to media discussions on national security issues in order to 
highlight the ominous Soviet threat and the urgent need for enhanced military 
capabilities to restore the military shield and block Soviet expansion. 
The final section argues that the severity of the danger facing the U.S. meant 
that the Committee, after Carter secured the Democratic Party nomination in the 
summer, felt obligated to support the Republican nominee. Between the two candidates 
only Reagan, who had joined the CPD in March 1977, recognised the enormity of the 
threat from the U.S.S.R..632 He permitted the Committee to advise his campaign on 
issues of Soviet relations and defence and used the group’s material during his 
campaign to justify his arguments for increased military spending and confronting the 
Soviet Union. Committee members, while ostensibly remaining neutral in the election, 
also addressed the Republican Platform Committee in July, and in October held a joint 
SALT II press conference with the Reagan campaign. The section concludes that these 
activities prevented Reagan's defence policies from being dismissed as reckless and 
hostile, as his critics charged. 
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Overall, 32 Committee members advised the Reagan campaign and, following 
his defeat of Carter, received appointments in the new administration. CPD board 
members intended to bring an appropriate sense of urgency to the Reagan 
Administration that they felt had been lacking in the Carter Administration. With luck 
and determination, CPD members contemplated at their annual meeting days after the 
election, the U.S.S.R.'s victory strategy might now be challenged by developing CPD 
analysis into ‘a program for action both in general and in connection with particular 
theatres [sic] of crisis’.633 The Executive Committee expected that containment would at 
last be restored as the basis of national security policy. 
The chapter concludes that the CPD's influence in the 1980 election was to 
ensure that Reagan's 'Peace Through Strength' platform was more difficult to dismiss as 
unnecessary and provocative than it might otherwise have been. The Committee's 
continued appeals to recognise the threat of Soviet military power activities blunted 
Carter's attempt to portray himself to voters as the 'peace' candidate. 
 
Carter's Failure 
 
 In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Carter recognised that ‘the 
Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step … The implications of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the 
Second World War.’ 634  Carter finally adopted the strong language the Committee 
expected of an American president. In response to the invasion the president revised 
defence spending upwards, announcing a 4.5 per cent increase to the defence budget in 
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each of the next five years.635 He also outlined the Carter Doctrine: ‘An attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the 
vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force.’ 636  In addition to this warning an 
embargo of grain exports to the Soviet Union was enacted and Carter announced a 
boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games. 637  It appeared that the president finally 
accepted the Committee’s analysis of an expansionist U.S.S.R. and the need for 
confrontation, and was willing to discuss these national security issues in public.  
Yet Carter's conversion left the Committee unimpressed. The president admitted 
in Time magazine that 'My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the 
last week [more] than even in the previous two and a half years before that.’638 Ronald 
Reagan, even though his CPD membership was suspended while campaigning for 
political office, reflected the view of the Executive Committee when he pointed out that 
the only person surprised by Soviet actions was Carter himself:  
Our President’s admission the other day that he at last believes that the 
Soviets are not to be trusted would be laughable if it were not so tragic. 
Even as he said it, he acknowledged that he would probably be willing 
to trust them in the near future when he will once again take up the 
SALT II treaty.639 
 
The Afghanistan crisis was clearly a turning point for Carter in his approach to U.S.-
Soviet relations, but not for the Committee. His reaction to the invasion seemed to 
validate the CPD’s criticism of him. In conceding the legitimacy of the Committee's 
assessment of a Soviet victory strategy, Carter in effect admitted that his own approach 
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to Soviet relations had been in error for his entire first term.640 This misjudgement, the 
Committee believed, jeopardised American national security, and was unforgivable for 
an American president: Carter had demonstrated that he was incapable of directing 
national security policy. 
On behalf of the CPD, Nitze authored an unenthusiastic response to Carter’s 
State of the Union address. The president’s actions, he charged, merely 'indicate our 
displeasure' at the Afghanistan invasion.641 Nitze questioned 'whether the other actions 
he proposes are equal to the crisis he has described'.642 If the president did recognise 
that the Soviet Union possessed ambitions to expand its influence into the Persian Gulf, 
then an Olympic Boycott and grain embargo were unlikely to deter Kremlin leaders 
from pursuing this objective. In order to confront and block further Soviet activity, 
Nitze advocated strengthening 'naval, air, and ground' forces, updating the nuclear 
posture, and improving relations with allies.643 These were regarded as the minimum 
requirements to re-establish an effective deterrent. Nitze concluded that Carter's speech 
announced the intention to intervene and block Soviet expansion but that it was 'wholly 
doubtful, however, that the U.S. has the capabilities' required to repel Soviet forces in 
practice.644 
Rostow also regarded Carter's response to the Afghanistan invasion as entirely 
inadequate, and he assessed the State of the Union Address as consistent with the 
president's record on Soviet relations. Rostow argued that ‘Carter's actions are neither 
inconsistent nor incoherent. They constitute a clear pattern — that of illusion, 
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appeasement, withdrawal to isolation, and impotence.’645 Rostow still did not trust that 
Carter, despite his State of the Union Address, recognised the Soviet threat. He believed 
that the tone of the president's speech was confrontational only because Carter was 
responding to popular opinion and would not sustain this confrontational approach for 
long. The Executive Committee, after years of having its analysis ignored by the 
administration, had no faith that Carter was capable of leading the American response to 
Soviet aggression. Rostow believed that once outrage over the Afghanistan invasion and 
the Iranian Hostage crisis subsided Carter would back down from his hostile stance.  
In a March 1980 letter to David Packard Rostow contended that ‘Carter will be 
tempted to retreat from his post-Afghanistan position once the threat from his left is 
eliminated, and his nomination is sewed up. Then he would campaign on the tried and 
true slogan, "He kept us out of war.”’646 The Executive Committee worried that Carter, 
to assist his re-election campaign, would attempt to diffuse the sense of crisis by 
appeasing Kremlin leaders. They feared that he would again push for SALT II 
ratification, leave the Afghanistan invasion unpunished, and fail to enact the 
programmes necessary to restore military strength. In attempting to secure re-election, 
Carter's actions would serve only to encourage further Soviet expansion. 
Executive Committee members were so concerned at the administration’s 
inability to perceive the threat of Soviet expansion that they decided to plan 
independently for a potential U.S.-Soviet conflict. Rostow wrote to Nitze on 12 May 
1980 to suggest that the Committee ‘bring together a small planning group’ to consider 
preparations for the next Soviet invasion. ‘[T]he odds favor a Soviet lunge for decisive, 
strategic, nearly irreversible gain in the Middle East, in Jugoslavia or Greece, or perhaps 
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in the Far East’, Rostow predicted.647 The Committee should therefore ‘come up with 
ideas about how to forestall such a Soviet move, and how to deal with it if it occurs’.648 
Executive Committee members were certain that the Carter Administration was not 
undertaking such prudent planning. Kremlin planners would consider continuing their 
expansion a costless strategy in the absence of credible plans for an American response. 
After all, the Executive Committee reasoned, the Afghanistan invasion had not 
provoked a meaningful improvement in American defence capabilities; therefore there 
was no reason that Kremlin leaders would fear an American response to the next step in 
their expansion programme. 
The administration’s failure to plan for another Soviet invasion meant that the 
CPD considered the Carter Administration negligent. ‘The President's question whether 
the Soviets will use their power for colonial conquest is incorrectly phrased’, Nitze 
believed.649  ‘There can be no doubt but that the Soviet Union proposes to use its 
increasing military power in support of what they call "wars of national liberation." By 
that term they mean wars of conquest by themselves or wars of subversion supported by 
proxy communist regimes such as Cuba.’650 The Executive Committee assessed that 
Carter was incapable of conceiving of the Kremlin revolutionary mentality that 
informed its strategy of expansion and also ‘refuses to acknowledge that the United 
States has been becoming Number Two’.651 This was the only explanation, the CPD 
judged, for his lack of urgency in restoring military strength that would enable a 
containment of the Soviet expansion programme. 
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 This perception of Carter’s inability to perceive and prepare for challenges 
facing America was not unique to the Committee. Gerald Rafshoon, Carter’s 
Communications Director, wrote to the president during the campaign warning that 
‘Leadership is the single biggest weakness in the public perception of you. You are seen 
to be weak, providing no sense of direction, unsure yourself about where you want to 
lead the country and unable to lead if you do discover where you want to go.’652 The 
president, addressing Rafshoon’s assessment, attempted to convey strength and 
decisiveness in the final months of the election campaign. On 25 July 1980, Carter 
signed Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), which superseded MAD as the basis for U.S. 
nuclear doctrine.653 The new targeting strategy allowed for more strike options in an 
American nuclear response to Soviet aggression. Missiles would no longer target 
population centres, but would instead target military installations. Counterforce theory 
proponents suggested that a precision nuclear strike on military targets would not 
immediately invite an apocalyptic retaliatory response on American cities. 654  This 
targeting shift was intended to provide a more credible threat of an American strike in 
response to Soviet aggression.  
Following a leak of the decision on 15 August – it remained a classified 
document – the Committee welcomed the new ‘countervailing strategy’ but did not 
believe Carter would ensure American forces had the capabilities necessary to carry out 
the strategy. ‘Has the leopard changed its spots or has it merely camouflaged itself for 
the duration of the political campaign?’, Executive Committee member Edward Rowny 
questioned in a CPD memorandum. 655  ‘If the latter is the case, and Presidential 
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Directive Number 59 falls by the wayside, the nation will be the loser.’656 Rowny 
suggested that PD-59 amounted to another empty promise from Carter and that it was 
doubtful whether the announcement would alter the effective deterrent capabilities of 
American forces. Nor did it alter the Executive Committee’s assessment of the 
administration. By the summer of 1980 the Committee was convinced of Carter’s 
inadequacies; Rostow viewed the president’s State of the Union address and the leaked 
PD-59 targeting strategy as constituting 'fraud and deception'.657 The president, CPD 
members charged, was making election-year promises that would not be fulfilled. They 
judged that Carter was playing politics with national security. 
For the Executive Committee, Carter’s inadequacies were not just lamentable 
but also potentially catastrophic. Rostow argued that ‘there is no evidence that the 
Administration is aware that the United States is being nibbled to death, and is 
preparing an alternative doctrine or strategy. Punch-drunk, numb, groggy, it sinks 
towards oblivion without a word, and without even the impulse to fight back.’658 For 
Rostow, the administration was content with the status quo, did not recognise the danger 
of Soviet expansion, and had no intention of restoring containment. As a result, the CPD 
sought to ensure that Carter would be replaced in the White House by a leader who 
genuinely recognised the severity of the Soviet threat and was dedicated to attaining the 
capabilities to confront further Soviet activity. Since 1976, the Executive Committee 
noted, Carter had done neither. His lack of leadership meant that the Committee sought 
to offer their advice, expertise, and support to any candidate who might defeat the 
sitting president and pursue these goals. This represented a complete rejection of Carter, 
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who, for Rostow, ‘demonstrated in nearly four years of responsibility that his view of 
the world is indistinguishable from George McGovern's’, a cardinal sin.659 
The CPD's relationship with the Carter Administration had deteriorated to the 
point where Executive Committee members, most of whom were Democrats, believed 
that the only solution to America’s weakness was to campaign against the sitting 
president of their own party. The CPD leadership were never convinced that Carter 
understood the challenges facing America from the Soviet Union, and, even though he 
adopted more confrontational language in 1980, doubted ‘whether the newly-
enlightened Administration can be counted on to act out of character’.660 CPD members 
asked themselves 'Can the Carter Administration be counted upon to put its money 
where its mouth is?'661 Their assessment was that it could not. As a result, the Executive 
Committee was determined that anyone other than Jimmy Carter should lead the 
country's response to Soviet aggression. 
 
Anyone but Carter 
 
 By offering to advise all the major candidates, as well as continuing to publish 
its analytical pamphlets, the CPD remained an important source of intellectual 
leadership for national security issues in the 1980 election year. In addition to two CPD 
pamphlets published in 1980, the Executive Committee also delivered 244 speeches and 
debates, and contributed 141 articles to the press between November 1979 and 
November 1980.662 As an organisation, the Committee did not publicly endorse any 
candidate in the lead up to the November election. Instead the CPD's approach was to 
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contribute to the discourse on defence issues and ensure their assessment was addressed 
by the media and, most significantly, by all the presidential candidates. 
 Rostow wrote to the CPD board in July 1980 explaining that Executive 
Committee members ‘have been equally available to all candidates and their staffs, to 
members of Congress of all persuasions, to the Administration, and to the press. We 
have continued to provide information, opinions, and evaluations of foreign and defense 
policy issues in response to requests from every quarter.’663 This activity meant a direct 
contribution to a number of presidential candidates, including Democrats Henry Jackson 
and Edward Kennedy, as well as Republicans John Connolly and Ronald Reagan.664 
This supporting function was an extension of the Committee's SALT II campaign tactics; 
the CPD raised national security issues in ostensibly well-evidenced pamphlets and 
ensured that theses analyses were available to all interested parties. 
The CPD's major publication of 1980 was Countering the Soviet Threat, 
released in May.665 The pamphlet listed the defence programmes that the Executive 
Committee decided were needed to ensure the capability of ‘arresting and containing 
the Soviet drive’.666 Its plan sought ‘to reverse negative trends in this country's defenses 
and to enable the nation to look forward with confidence to a more secure and peaceful 
world’.667 While acknowledging the need to 'stabilize the economy', a major election 
topic, the Executive Committee recommended significant expenditures. 668  The 
programme would include 'industrial mobilization', increased arms transfers to allies, 
higher military pay, and enhanced equipment maintenance. To restore deterrent strength, 
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the Committee assessed, American conventional forces needed five additional Army 
divisions, nine tactical air wings, ten airlift squadrons, and a 650-ship navy.669 Nuclear 
forces required two additional Trident submarines, 100 B-1A bombers, 300 enhanced 
Minuteman ICBMs, and the implementation of a meaningful civil defence 
programme.670 The Committee estimated the costs all these initiatives at $260 billion 
dollars, and warned that additional measures would be needed to 'avoid worsening the 
rate of inflation', though it was not specified how this would be achieved.671 
The purpose of Countering the Soviet Threat was to demonstrate the extent of 
the programmes that were required to challenge Soviet expansion. Whoever was in the 
White House, the pamphlet emphasised, would need to address American military 
weakness. Countering the Soviet Threat was sent to 13,350 mailing list recipients and, 
the Executive Committee intended, would put pressure on the Carter Administration to 
explain how it intended to meet the commitments of the Carter Doctrine given that the 
CPD assessed that current American forces were unable to do so.672 
Executive Committee members assessed a risk of Cold War defeat, and as such 
were unconcerned by party politics. They believed that a Soviet invasion of the Persian 
Gulf was imminent and continuing the CPD’s penchant for chess analogies, would 'give 
them checkmate'.673 Given this danger, the CPD decided at its 1979 annual conference 
that it would support any candidate who signalled interest in 'one basic program' of a 
pro-containment manifesto. 674  The CPD was convinced that Carter's inadequate 
response to the Afghanistan invasion would not deter, but would invite further Soviet 
aggression. 'The Administration is simply not being serious', Rostow charged, and he 
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and the Executive Committee were determined to ensure the importance of the issue 
was recognised and taken seriously by the other candidates during the election 
campaign, whatever their party affiliation.675 
There was no mention of candidates in Countering the Soviet Threat, only an 
'alternative program' to that of the Carter Administration.676 The Executive Committee 
undoubtedly favoured the candidacy of Ronald Reagan in the November presidential 
election as only he gave resolute support to the Committee's proposal, but members 
attempted to influence all viable candidates before each party’s nomination had been 
confirmed. CPD board members wanted to avoid the situation of the past four years 
when they had effectively been frozen out of White House decision-making. Nitze 
recalled that in the 1980 election 'Rather than take sides with one candidate or another, I 
decided to make myself available to any and all who wished my advice.' 677  CPD 
members did not want to find themselves excluded from White House influence once 
again. 
The Committee recognised the election as the most important opportunity to 
correct the military imbalance in 1980. 'Everything depends on what our political 
leaders say and do in an election year', Rostow told presidential hopeful Senator Edward 
Kennedy. 678  The CPD understood that the candidates set the political agenda and 
therefore intended to contribute to each campaign in order to influence how the issues 
of defence and national security were approached. Kampelman urged that ‘the 
influential people in our Committee do their best to attach themselves to each of the 
Presidential candidates’ to ensure that CPD analysis would be incorporated in the 
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campaign debate.679 Adhering to its own restrictions, the Committee did not officially 
endorse a candidate in the 1980 election, and the CPD instead provided its updated 
analyses of the military imbalance and Soviet expansion strategy to anyone who asked, 
discussed its findings with journalists, and accepted invitations to appear on television 
programmes. 680  If the threat was understood, the Executive Committee remained 
convinced, then a return to containment would be supported. Rostow had 'no doubt that 
the people will respond and will rally and will vote and will support’ increased defence 
expenditures, he told board members in late 1979.681  
The CPD's public relations strategy was once again successful as its analysis of 
the Soviet threat gained considerable publicity in the election year. The result was that 
Americans increasingly accepted the idea of a Soviet expansion strategy. One poll 
revealed that 78 per cent of respondents assessed a 'major reason' for the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan was to attain 'more influence over the oil-producing countries 
of the Middle East'.682 Pointing out Soviet aggression was no longer controversial. The 
principal campaign narrative surrounding foreign policy was no longer whether the 
Soviet Union was expanding aggressively, but how best to address the crisis. 
The Committee was concerned that Carter intended to turn his muted response to 
Soviet aggression into a campaign advantage by claiming to have kept the U.S. out of a 
Middle Eastern war. Despite public support for increased defence spending, the 
Committee worried that Carter's suggestion that he was the peace candidate would 
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prove popular.683 Under a second Carter Administration, the Executive Committee had 
no doubt, America would be ill-prepared for further Soviet expansion, a scenario that 
Rostow considered 'would greatly increase the risk of general war'.684 The Committee 
therefore focused their efforts on discrediting Carter's approach, and suggested that his 
lack of leadership was an unacceptable risk to national security. For the Committee, 
Carter had to be defeated in order to avert war. 
As a result of their close relationship during the SALT II ratification debate, the 
Executive Committee encouraged Senator Jackson to challenge Carter for the 
Democratic Party nomination. Rostow wrote to Jackson in April 1980 predicting ‘a 
revolt against Carter at the convention. It can happen. It should happen. It must happen. 
Be prepared.’685 For Rostow and the Executive Committee, Jackson had an impeccable 
record on defence issues, especially after leading the opposition to SALT II in the 
Senate, which he had labelled 'appeasement in its purest form'. 686  A Jackson 
Administration would immediately solve the CPD's national security concerns: decisive 
leadership, adequate defence programmes, and a determination to confront the Soviet 
Union. Jackson's candidacy, however, was a non-starter. He chose not to lead a revolt 
against Carter and did not support Reagan's campaign, despite their shared backing of 
'Peace Through Strength'. Jackson, his biographer argues, was too 'loyal a Democrat'.687 
Another challenger to Carter was Edward Kennedy, the Democratic senator 
from Massachusetts, who announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination three 
days after the Iran Hostage Crisis began in November 1979.688 Committee members 
noted Kennedy's popularity and met with him to discuss 'the critical national security 
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issues ahead of us' on 23 January 1980.689  On behalf of the Executive Committee 
Rostow wrote Kennedy a memorandum on foreign policy as the basis of discussion for 
the meeting indicating that the CPD wanted the Carter Doctrine extended from 
defending the Middle East to rolling back the Soviet expansion worldwide. Rostow 
suggested that 'we could respond to Afghanistan not only by supporting Pakistan and 
Iran, but by liberating Cuba and taking over Libya, some of the Soviet bases in Africa, 
etc'.690 He continued, 'we should be rearming, and pulling together our Allies and China 
in a program of military solidarity based on the principles of the Truman Doctrine'.691 
The Middle East was not the only region in which the U.S. should confront the U.S.S.R.: 
'[N]o country or region', Rostow stressed, 'can be excluded from the area of our 
concern'.692 Rostow's memorandum was accompanied by a draft speech in which he 
expressed his  hope that Kennedy would unambiguously explain the Soviet expansion 
strategy to American voters. Rostow wanted Kennedy to tell Americans, as Carter was 
reluctant to do, that 'it was beyond question' that the U.S.S.R. sought to 'seize control' of 
the Middle East.693 If Kennedy were to incorporate these principles as the basis of his 
campaign's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, CPD members would enthusiastically 
support his candidacy. 
The Massachusetts senator, however, quickly dispelled the CPD's hope that his 
candidacy would incorporate their interpretation of the Soviet threat. In a speech at 
Georgetown University on 28 January, just days after their initial meeting, Kennedy 
seemed to repudiate the Committee's views by calling Carter's response to the 
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Afghanistan Invasion an overreaction.694 By July, the Executive Committee regarded 
Kennedy as no better than Carter. While Kennedy agreed with CPD board members in 
private he would not explain the magnitude of the crisis in public. 'I hope that your 
speeches and those of your campaign associates will soon reflect these views', Rostow 
implored.695 If he were to ask for public support later in the campaign, Rostow told 
Kennedy, 'you may be sure I shall consider it then carefully and sympathetically'.696 
Even though the Kennedy campaign was ‘actively in touch’ with the Committee as late 
as July, Rostow and the rest of the Executive Committee refused publicly to support 
Kennedy. 697  The Democratic Party, the Committee acknowledged by the summer, 
would not nominate a candidate who proposed the necessary changes to national 
security policy in the 1980 election. 
 
The Reagan Campaign 
 
Carter accepted his nomination as the Democratic presidential candidate on 14 
August. He explained to convention delegates that ‘experience is the best guide to the 
right decisions’ and suggested that 'I'm wiser tonight than I was 4 years ago’. 698 
Anticipating Carter's nomination, and unconvinced that Kennedy would advocate 
containment even if he had secured nomination, Executive Committee members flocked 
to the Reagan Campaign over the summer of 1980. They did not take seriously Carter's 
appeal for support based on his experience in office; his performance had even caused 
Executive Committee member Clare Boothe Luce to question her 'faith in 
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Democracy'. 699  The prospect of another four years under Carter was anathema to 
Committee board members, as it would prevent the U.S. from attaining the capabilities 
necessary to oppose the expansion of the Soviet Union. In a two party race — the CPD 
did not consider the independent candidate John Anderson a viable candidate — 
Committee members felt that they had little choice but to oppose Carter and support the 
Republican frontrunner, Ronald Reagan. 
In accordance with the CPD's policy of offering advice to all who requested it, 
Nitze and Pipes addressed the Republican Platform Committee on 8 July. They urged 
that the Republican platform should 'take a firm and unequivocal position on the two 
basic points, that there is a danger to United States security from the Soviet drive for 
hegemony and that the adverse trends in the military balance must be reversed'.700 These 
were the principles that had guided the CPD since 1976 and that the Carter 
Administration had failed to acknowledge. Nitze and Pipes' plea was incorporated into 
the Republican platform and enthusiastically backed by the presumed Republican 
candidate, Ronald Reagan.701 
Reagan was confirmed as the candidate on 17 July at the Republican National 
Convention in Detroit. Throughout his campaign, Reagan used the kind of 
confrontational language when discussing Soviet relations that the CPD thought 
consummate with the nature of the Soviet threat. While Reagan's acceptance speech 
focused predominately on domestic issues, he also announced: 'We know only too well 
that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is 
then that tyrants are tempted. We simply cannot learn these lessons the hard way again 
                                                
699 Clare Boothe Luce to Paul Green, 3 March, 1980, Box 182, CPD Papers. 
700 Paul H. Nitze, ‘Statement of Paul H. Nitze Chairman, Policy Studies Committee on the Present Danger 
Before the Republican Platform Committee Detroit, Michigan’, 8 July, 1980, Box 186, CPD Papers, 2. 
701 John Kenneth White, Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1998), 186. 
 
199 
without risking our destruction.' 702  When compared to Carter's response to Soviet 
aggression it was no surprise that Committee members, in a two-way race, backed the 
Reagan Campaign.  
Executive Committee members, however, were not only admiring supporters. 
Richard Allen, himself an Executive Committee member and national security advisor 
to the Reagan campaign, assured CPD supporter Mrs. St John Garwood that Reagan 
was a keen recipient of Committee material, and looked ‘very closely at Committee 
publications’.703 ‘The Committee is a valuable national resource’, Allen told Garwood, 
‘and we intend to make good use of it during the campaign.’704 The Reagan campaign 
did not just read CPD pamphlets. With Allen's encouragement the Republican nominee 
also consulted the Executive Committee directly. On 29 July, the Executive Committee 
met with the Reagan Campaign to discuss foreign policy and national security issues.705 
Given the differences in opinion between Reagan and Executive Committee 
Democrats on a number of domestic issues, the influence of Richard Allen was crucial 
in building the relationship between Reagan and his CPD colleagues.706 Allen was a key 
Reagan aide as well as an Executive Committee member. It was he who had encouraged 
Reagan to join the CPD, and also for Reagan to make use of Committee material on the 
campaign trail for the 1980 election. Allen was the national security advisor in the 
Reagan campaign and, as a result, the most prominent Republican in the CPD Executive 
Committee. These dual roles facilitated a direct link between the Committee and the 
Reagan campaign. Allen later explained: 
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It was not immediately that I thought of taking them [the Executive 
Committee] to Reagan, but I wanted to take them slowly towards 
Reagan, because knowing Reagan’s thoughts and his views which 
were identical with theirs, but without the detail and experience that 
they had, people who were basically embracing the same goals … 
they ought to be talking.707 
Allen's efforts were successful. On 1 August, CPD Director Charles Tyroler noted that 
32 of Reagan's 100 foreign policy and defence advisors were CPD members.708 In 
particular, Executive Committee members Van Cleave, Pipes and Rowny had been 
appointed as defence advisors to the Reagan campaign.709 
 
Carter's presidency no longer inspired confidence among voters, and leadership was a 
major issue in the election. In contrast, Reagan, by wide margins in polls, was perceived 
as a decisive leader who could get things done and rejected suggestions of decline and 
limitations.710 The Republican candidate expressed his enduring faith in the American 
people to overcome any short-term limitations: 
I don’t believe the people in this country lack the will and the stamina. 
What we lack is the truth and the information that our government 
owes us about our situation. I believe a president of the United States 
should go over the heads of the Congress to the people of the country, 
tell them what our situation is, and I believe the people in this country 
will make whatever sacrifice is necessary to keep this country 
strong.711 
 
This was exactly the type of inspirational leader that CPD board members regarded as 
necessary to rally support to rebuild American military strength before it was too late. 
Reagan's involvement in the Panama Canal debate and opposition to SALT II were 
important in creating a perception of resolve and determination in national security 
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issues.712 His candidacy appealed to the Democratic Executive Committee members 
exclusively on the basis that he perceived the Soviet Union as the central threat facing 
the country. In the 1980 election CPD members were essentially single-issue voters; 
they assessed an existential threat that necessitated urgent action. Put simply, Reagan 
recognised the seriousness of the threat, and Carter did not. 
Rostow explained why he would be voting for Reagan in Why Democrats 
Should — And Will — Vote For Reagan.713 ‘The Republican platform says we should 
rebuild our deterrent and strategic forces’, Rostow pointed out, which was a pledge that 
could be trusted because ‘In Reagan's case, unlike that of his rivals, his campaign 
promises correspond to the positions he has taken throughout his public career.’714 This 
was a deliberate rebuke to Carter's claim of experience. Rostow rejected the perception 
of Reagan as reckless and instead claimed that the candidate was ‘prudent, astute and 
farsighted’.715 This was because Reagan echoed the CPD's views in stark contrast to the 
confrontational meetings with Carter over the past four years.  
Rostow conceded that he did not agree with Reagan’s social and economic 
policies, but did not believe Reagan would ‘dismantle social services’.716 This again 
demonstrates the primacy of national security to Rostow's support of Reagan. Of the 
two main candidates only Reagan was unequivocal in his support of containment and 
the need to raise defence spending. The Committee wanted the American president to 
point out the existential nature of the threat from Soviet expansion, because without 
containing the Soviet Union no other national ambition – aspirations for a human rights 
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based foreign policy or domestic economic reform, for example – could be realised.717 
In this context, the CPD hoped for a Reagan victory because without the restoration of 
American military power Cold War defeat seemed a worrying possibility. 
The CPD's support for Reagan's defence policy was unmistakeable at a joint 
press conference with the campaign on 24 October on SALT II. Carter had begun 
referring to the SALT II treaty again in the final weeks of the campaign, after 
suggesting on 7 March that he intended to seek ratification if re-elected.718 The joint 
conference featured Rostow and Nitze who were introduced to the press as registered 
Democrats and CPD Executive Committee members. 719  Rostow told the press that 
Carter was 'raising SALT now only as electoral theatre. There is no conceivable chance 
of ratification by a lame duck Senate.'720 He accused Carter of 'contempt of the process 
of democratic dialogue' by reviving a debate that the CPD considered already lost.721 
Nitze was also furious, and regarded the revival of SALT II as 'the cornerstone of the 
political effort to associate one candidate with "war" and the other with "peace"'.722 By 
reviving SALT II, Nitze suggested, Carter was attempting to create a false distinction 
between himself and Reagan. Rostow explained that only the Republican candidate was 
being honest to voters about ‘the risks of war’.723 It is impossible to gauge the effect of 
the CPD's defence of Reagan on the election outcome, but the press conference 
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encapsulates the rationale for the Executive Committee's support of Reagan and their 
function of tempering Carter's attacks on the Republican candidate. 
The successful ‘peace offensive’ by the Carter campaign that the CPD feared did 
not materialise. Instead, on 4 November 1980, a board member of the Committee on the 
Present Danger was elected president of the United States. Days later Reagan wrote to 
the CPD and its supporters: 'The work of the Committee on the Present Danger has 
certainly helped to shape the national debate on important problems … it is the 
embodiment of a truly bipartisan approach to the formulation of national security 
policy.'724 Yet despite this important victory, the CPD’s 1980 annual meeting was not as 
celebratory as might be expected. Rostow, as Executive Committee chairman, chose to 
exercise caution. The Committee’s work, he told board members, would continue ‘on a 
crash basis’.725 The danger had not diminished and therefore the CPD would continue 
its efforts to warn of the Soviet expansion strategy. After the election Rostow hoped to 
persuade the Reagan transition team to adopt the Executive Committee's plans on how 
to deal with the on going crisis of weakness.  
On 10 November, Rostow wrote a letter to Richard Allen cautioning that 'It is 
highly probable that President Reagan will have to order our armed forces into 
combat.' 726  In the following month, on 8 December, Rostow wrote a detailed 
memorandum to CPD board member William Casey, the Reagan Campaign manager 
and soon to be appointed CIA director, explaining the Executive Committee's analysis: 
'[T]he process of Soviet imperial expansion', he cautioned, 'will be the central problem 
                                                
724 Ronald Reagan to Board Members and Friends of the Committee on the Present Danger, 7 November, 
1980, Box 162, CPD Papers. 
725 ‘Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the Board of Directors of the Committee on the Present Danger by 
Eugene Rostow’, 6 November, 1980, Box 207, CPD Papers, 7. 
726 Eugene Rostow to Richard V. Allen, 10 November, 1980, Box 207, CPD Papers. 
 
204 
of our foreign and defense policy for the indefinite future'. 727  There was no 
reassessment of the CPD's concerns of impending setbacks even though Carter had been 
defeated and their own board member had won the election; the danger remained and 
the continuity of containment needed to be guaranteed. This demonstrates how 
dangerous CPD members perceived America's strategic situation at the end of 1980. 
Rostow summarised the state of affairs: 'We are at a turning point in the history of 
civilization. What the United States does and fails to do during the next few years will 
determine whether barbarism or enlightenment will prevail for the next half century or 
more.' 728  Reagan's election, though a step in the right direction, did not allay the 
Executive Committee’s fears of an imminent Soviet drive for Cold War victory. 
Over thirty CPD board members joined the Reagan Administration.729  Sally 
Sherman, who had worked at the CPD's office, wrote to her friend in early December 
1980 that 'it sometimes seems as if CPD has taken over DOD!' 730  The Executive 
Committee received important positions in the Reagan Administration. 731  Rostow 
became Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the highest ranking 
Democrat in the administration. Nitze was appointed Chief Negotiator for the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Richard Allen became Reagan's National 
Security Advisor. Richard Pipes became Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs.732 Rowny was given the rank of Ambassador, and was appointed as the Chief 
Negotiator for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Van Cleave was Director 
of the Department of Defense Transition Team, and subsequently became a senior 
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consultant to the Department as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA). Max Kampelman was appointed Ambassador to the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Numerous CPD board members were also given important 
administration appointments. William Casey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John Lehman, and 
Richard Perle, for example, were prominent members of the new administration.733 
Executive Committee members' ambition for their involvement in the Reagan 
Administration was to continue to pursue the goals held since 1976: to restore 
containment and block the perceived Soviet victory strategy. Their intention in 
government was not to rebuild strength in order to attain American Cold War victory, 
but to prevent American Cold War defeat. 'As a result of the election, the United States 
has a real chance to head off the appalling war towards which the world has been 
sliding', Rostow wrote to Casey.734 The CPD hoped that as members of the Reagan 
Administration, they could finally ensure that its warnings would be acted on and 
American military strength restored. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In January 1980 Committee members were bewildered at the Carter 
Administration's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Nitze charged that the 
president's State of the Union address was underwhelming, and his proposals to 
confront the issue ineffective. As the CPD had already identified the U.S.S.R.'s strategy 
of expansion, the Soviet invasion was just another indicator that their analysis of 
aggressive expansion during a period of American military weakness was correct. A 
revision of nuclear targeting strategy, PD-59, was another Carter initiative that appeared 
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an important step towards containment, but which the Committee perceived as having 
no real substance. CPD board members reasoned that Carter's approach constituted 
absurd behaviour as the Red Army expanded into the Middle East while the president 
made only symbolic gestures of resistance. Carter, the Executive Committee decided, 
was incapable of addressing fundamental national security problems and therefore a 
more able leader was required to lead the American response. 
To this end, Committee members offered their assistance to all the viable 
alternative presidential candidates. This included Senator Jackson, who they hoped 
would challenge Carter, and Senator Kennedy, who eventually did. The Committee also 
continued their public relations programme, and Executive Committee members were 
active in the media during the summer of 1980. When Carter eventually secured the 
Democratic nomination, the Executive Committee felt that they had no choice but to 
support the Republican candidate.  
The Committee's support of Reagan was based on a single issue: he recognised 
the Soviet threat and was prepared to do something about it. The Reagan campaign 
made use of the Committee's material and personnel and several meetings were held 
with CPD board members, a number of whom joined the campaign’s national security 
team. The Committee's most important role, however, was to remain ostensibly 
bipartisan and defend Reagan's position on national security issues against accusations 
of unwarranted hostility towards the Soviet Union.  
Even after Reagan's victory Committee board members' fears of Cold War 
defeat as the Soviet military threat remained. Over 30 CPD board members were 
appointed to the Reagan Administration eager to restore American military power in 
sufficient time to prevent Cold War defeat. The Committee on the Present Danger's 
1976 warning of the limitations of détente had by 1980 become a desperate attempt to 
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strengthen American military power to forestall an apparent Soviet drive for victory. 
Reagan’s victory was not a cause for celebration. Despite their role in advising 
the successful Republican candidate, Committee board members were not jubilant on 6 
November when they convened for their annual conference. For four years they had 
warned of Soviet military strength and the need to strengthen the American military 
shield, but vindication at their warning being recognised as valid was of little comfort. 
They believed their role within Reagan’s new Administration would be to attempt to 
forestall the Soviet lunge for victory that they assumed was in progress. 
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The Committee on the Present Danger in Perspective 
‘It is good to think that we have had a part in the big push which has turned our foreign 
and defense policy around, thwarted the ratification of SALT II, and given the nation a 
chance to save itself. Our function now is to help define and clarify the new policy, and 
to rally support for it. Let’s hope it is not too late.’735 
 
 This final chapter assesses how the CPD's analysis between 1976 and 1980 
evolved from warning of the dangers of détente to warning of potential Cold War defeat. 
Executive Committee members joined the group to criticise détente. They believed that 
the policy obscured the necessity of maintaining sufficient military power to deter the 
U.S.S.R. from ordinary Americans. Board members’ driving ambition was to disabuse 
any notion that the Cold War had subsided, especially given the growth of Soviet 
military power during a period of 'drift' in the early 1970s, as the CPD labelled 
détente.736 By 1980, this message of potential risk had morphed into an assessment of 
dangerous inferiority and the imminent prospect of Soviet expansion across the globe. 
The chapter concludes that between 1976 and 1980 the CPD's initial goal to compile 
National Intelligence Estimates on a worst-case basis evolved from a recommended 
strategic planning methodology into the lens through which the group assessed Soviet 
capabilities and intentions. The CPD was not guilty of deliberate and cynical threat 
inflation but rather the group came to assess that its worst-case projection, instead of a 
method to ensure a margin of safety over expanding Soviet military power, was an 
accurate estimate of Soviet strength and intentions.  
 A first section establishes that the CPD's success in influencing the public 
perception of national security issues, meant that the Executive Committee decided on 3 
July 1980 that the group 'should remain active and indeed enlarge its program' 
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regardless of whether or not Reagan was elected.737 The effect of this decision was to 
ossify the Committee's warning of the 'present danger'. After assessing its own 
influential role in alerting Americans of danger over the past four years, the Executive 
Committee intended to continue its efforts in order to ensure that détente would not be 
revived. Despite Reagan's election there was no assurance that popular support for the 
defence expenditures required to reinstate containment would be sustained. The 
Executive Committee no longer based this assessment on estimates of comparative 
military strength, but considered their continued warning of danger as a requirement of 
American domestic politics: they feared that the U.S. might not survive a resurgence of 
détente. 
A second section examines the Committee's difficulty in advocating specific 
policies to redress the military imbalance, which the group found much more 
challenging than simply highlighting potential dangers. Specifically, CPD members 
could not agree on which of its metrics was most important to rectify in order to end the 
disparity. The CPD was a private citizens' group and under no obligation to propose 
coherent policy recommendations, and therefore these disagreements did not have to be 
reconciled. At the CPD’s third annual meeting, for example, a debate on where the 
group should focus its attention after the SALT II ratification debate ended was left 
unresolved. Instead, all suggestions from board members were incorporated into the 
group's analysis. Its 1980 pamphlet Countering the Soviet Threat listed numerous 
military programmes but did not provide a clear priority for restoring an effective 
deterrent.738 By encompassing the concerns of all its expert members, the CPD created 
not just a worst-case assessment, but a collection of its members' fears. 
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A final section argues that the CPD's assessment of American military inferiority 
was based solely on this flawed analysis of comparative military strength and 
preparedness. The CPD did not argue that American leaders insufficiently trumpeted the 
morality of the Cold War cause, as some scholars have argued. The metrics that the 
Executive Committee created became the only meaningful indicator of Cold War 
success for strategic planners. In effect, their metrics of the military balance became the 
Executive Committee's proxy Cold War struggle; a competition that they did not believe 
America could afford to lose. This infatuation with estimated metrics of military power 
explains why the CPD became so fearful of America's prospects in the Cold War. 
The chapter concludes that the CPD's four-year campaign between 1976 and 
1980 was not based on disingenuous and manipulative threat inflation. The group's 
membership was adamant that their quantified assessment of the Soviet threat, based on 
the collective wisdom of its board members, was valid. Its Executive Committee was 
comprised of strategic planners and military commanders who conceived of the Cold 
War purely in military terms and who each contributed their assessment of Soviet 
military power. The composite result – the sum of their fears – was a projection of the 
most powerful and aggressive Soviet Union that the groups' board members could 
justifiably conceive. Between 1976 and 1980 the CPD came to believe its own worst-
case assessment and therefore entrenched the belief that higher defence spending and a 
commitment to intervention would always result in greater security when faced by a 
relentless Soviet foe. 
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Always a Present Danger 
 
 The CPD's 'emergency' campaign to highlight the present danger of Soviet 
military power was made permanent in 1980.739 The Executive Committee regarded 
their mission as incomplete – and the emergency unresolved – even though Reagan, a 
CPD board member, had been elected president. The CPD's public engagement efforts 
were still required, its members considered, to ensure continued support for the new 
administration's defence programmes.740 The group would therefore continue to warn of 
the present danger so that the necessity of maintaining military strength would never 
again be questioned. This choice ossified its thesis that the Soviet Union was 
opportunistically pursuing a victory strategy, an assessment based on the Executive 
Committee's own metrics and the dogma that every setback to American interests was 
orchestrated from Moscow. 
In 1976, the Committee, dismissing ‘an illusory détente’, was determined to 
‘help promote a better understanding of the main problems confronting our foreign 
policy’.741 After the CPD had revealed its facts over the following years, Rostow judged 
in the days following Reagan's victory in 1980, ‘The American people dislike what they 
saw on looking around, and started on a new course.’742 For Rostow, the role of the 
CPD in this change was to have ‘raised and reiterated these questions’ of national 
security. 743  Executive Committee members had little doubt that their efforts had 
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contributed to the shift towards support of increased military strength.744 Green, the 
Committee's public relations officer, wrote to a CPD supporter after the SALT II debate 
had ended favourably in November 1979, explaining that the group's 
strategy has produced significant dividends. The Committee has 
received a tremendous amount of media coverage, and our spokesmen 
have appeared frequently on national and local television and on public 
platforms. As a result, we believe our strategy has been reasonably 
successful, and we claim at least some credit for the change in public 
opinion polls toward a greater awareness of the Soviet threat.745 
 
Writing in Alerting America in 1984, Kampelman agreed with Green's view: 'To what 
extent this [change] was due to the efforts of the Committee is impossible to gauge. It 
could be merely a coincidence but our presumption is that it is not.' 746  The CPD 
undeniably achieved a high profile among the groups that raised defence issues, though, 
as Kampelman notes, it is difficult to assess its direct influence on opinion and 
policymaking. However, the Committee's numerous Senate testimonies, meetings with 
politicians, and wide distribution of its publications among Washington opinion-makers 
all suggest that its activities were at the very least one important factor in restoring the 
respectability of containment as a guiding principle of U.S.-Soviet relations at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
Over the four years between 1976 and 1980 there was a clear and significant 
shift in popular opinion on defence spending.747 In 1976, a majority of Americans were 
concerned with 'abuse of power' in government rather than defence issues and voted for 
Carter, who was regarded as a man of high integrity.748 By 1980, a sense of global crisis 
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meant that Reagan's ability to 'inspire confidence' and 'stand up most firmly' to the 
Soviet Union ensured that he was the favoured candidate.749 This shift in voter priorities, 
even if the Committee's campaign was just one factor in prompting the shift, 
demonstrates that the CPD message increasingly appealed to Americans at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The CPD, in short, both reflected and contributed to the 
changing public mood. 
In 1976, the CPD judged that it was American leaders who had been seduced by 
détente and not ordinary Americans. The Executive Committee expressed 'faith in the 
maturity, good sense and fortitude' of the American people.750 As the contradictions of 
peaceful coexistence were repeatedly and forcefully highlighted in CPD and Coalition 
for Peace Through Strength materials, voters viewed détente less favourably. The Soviet 
Union, the CPD stressed, continued to support revolutionary movements and, most 
alarmingly, continued to improve its military capabilities. Highlighting this message 
reaffirmed to the public the centrality of U.S.-Soviet relations in national security.751 
After these developments Carter abandoned his attempts to reform the basis of foreign 
policy and returned to confrontation.752 Rather than favouring a reduction of military 
spending, as had been the case in 1976, by July 1980 an 84-13 per cent majority of 
respondents to one poll were favourable towards the Republican call for 'increased 
defense spending so the United States can regain military superiority over the 
Russians'. 753  This shift towards supporting higher defence budgets reflected the 
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persistence of containment thinking: the CPD's analyses repeatedly emphasised the 
reasonableness and common sense of demands to raise defence spending.754 
 Even as CPD board member Ronald Reagan prepared to enter the White House 
the problem of insufficient defence spending remained. Rostow told board members in 
November 1980 that America's key national security problem was that ‘we lack a 
doctrine, a strategy, an agreed position on tactics … we recite the liturgy of the Truman 
Doctrine without conviction, energy, or faith’.755 The inadequacies of defence policy 
had, for Rostow, turned ‘what had been a situation of danger’ into ‘a world crisis’.756 
The Committee's chief aim after Reagan’s victory was to assist the new leadership in 
explaining the danger and regaining sufficient strength for American military power to 
deter Soviet expansion. The Executive Committee wanted containment decisively 
reaffirmed by the Reagan Administration, and, because the policy was not yet 
rehabilitated or backed by adequate military strength, ‘the need for the Committee still 
exists strongly’.757 For Rostow, the CPD still had a role to play because the danger from 
the Soviet Union remained imminent and U.S. countermeasures were unrealised. 
Rostow declared that ‘we cannot afford even a day of holiday after the election’, 
demonstrating the urgency that the CPD perceived even after Reagan's electoral 
success.758 
 Reagan's victory, the Executive Committee recognised, did not indicate that 
Americans now readily and permanently accepted the necessity of containment. Polls 
taken immediately after the 1980 election revealed that Americans, despite supporting 
additional defence expenditures, still had little appetite for involvement in foreign 
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conflicts.759 Poll respondents expressed concerns over Soviet superiority and desired a 
restoration of military parity, but were not necessarily prepared to commit American 
forces overseas. Rostow understood that this attitude undermined the credibility of 
containment, which required that American troops be committed to block potential 
Soviet adventurism across the globe. 'No region of the world can be excluded in 
advance from the agenda of our concern', Rostow told Casey in late 1980, but this was a 
strategy that would have troubled a majority of Americans. 760  Polls revealed a 
somewhat contradictory stance. Respondents indicated a strong preference to equal the 
Soviet Union in military strength as a matter of principle, and were prepared to meet the 
costs of doing so, but when considering the deployment of this military power there was 
a considerable lack of support.761 In short, Americans desired equal military strength but 
were reluctant to see it used.   
 The Executive Committee considered, therefore, that there was still a need for 
the CPD because the necessity of global intervention to block Soviet expansion was still 
not acknowledged. Rostow told Casey that it was 'likely' that American troops would 
have to be deployed during the Reagan Administration’s term.762 As a result, Rostow 
wrote, 'it can be said with confidence that for present purposes nothing less than the 
May, 1980 estimates of the Committee on the Present Danger should be proposed to 
Congress for immediate correction of the Carter military budget'.763 Without additional 
military power to confront the Red Army alongside renewed determination to use it 
when required, the credibility of the American deterrent remained in doubt. The 
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Committee's updated purpose was to assist the Reagan Administration in making the 
case for the build up of American strength and to ensure support for intervention against 
Soviet expansion should the need arise.764 
 Thus, even after Carter's defeat in November 1980, the CPD's public relations 
strategy remained to warn of Soviet strength and their pursuit of a victory strategy. The 
CPD would make sure that support for détente would not be revived by ensuring that 
Americans continued to appreciate the danger they faced. The CPD was the ideal 
organisation to fulfil this function, Rostow told board members at the group's 1980 
annual meeting, because it had ‘become the acknowledged hair shirt of the foreign and 
defense policy community’ by raising uncomfortable policy issues.765 The strength of 
the Committee after four years of operation, Rostow boasted, was that ‘[r]espectable 
people cannot dismiss us as cranks … After all, we write sedate federal prose, and wear 
the old school tie.’ 766  The ability of the Committee to make a credible case for 
confronting the Soviet Union meant that despite the rejection of the SALT II treaty and 
the election of a CPD member ‘our work must move, on a crash basis, into new areas … 
[as] [t]he noose is being tightened’.767  
 The decision to continue the CPD after the 1980 election, even as over 30 
Committee members joined the Reagan Administration, was intended to ensure that a 
strong, independent voice in favour of containment remained to influence national 
security debates. This also meant that the Committee would not reconsider its analysis 
of comparative American weakness. After considering that its worst-case predictions 
had proven to be accurate, the CPD’s process became dogma: there was every chance 
that the next worst-case assessment would also prove to be correct. Having created a 
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respected platform, the Executive Committee decided it would continue to offer its 
analysis and therefore act as 'prophets who proclaim what comfortable people don't 
want to hear, but know they cannot ignore'.768 
 This attitude is demonstrated by the Executive Committee's application to 
charitable foundations to fund a yearly update to its Is America Becoming Number Two? 
pamphlet, first published in 1978.769  This project would have assessed comparative 
military strength each year in a similar process to Team B, essentially updating the 
Executive Committee's worst-case estimates each year. The Executive Committee 
believed that this project would facilitate an independent and objective analysis of 
American strength that could be used to influence defence policymaking. 770  This 
epitomised the CPD's contribution to the politicisation of intelligence in the era; the 
CPD intended to make the Team B adversarial format a permanent feature of threat 
analysis, ensuring that the worst-case analysis would always be available to those 
policymakers sympathetic to the CPD's assessment of inherent Soviet malevolence. In 
late 1980, Rostow told Casey of the need to counter-balance 'our habits of “mirror-
imaging” [which] are tenacious' and it was clear that Rostow wanted the CPD to 
perform this function.771 Team B had warned of mirror-imaging in 1976, arguing that 
intelligence estimates could not assume that Kremlin leaders thought like American 
leaders as Soviet military planners were focused on expansion, and not defence. In 1980, 
to counteract the effect of mirror-imaging, the Executive Committee intended to warn of 
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the dangers of Soviet military power indefinitely because if they did not, Rostow 
considered, it was not clear who would.772 Without this pressure détente might yet be 
revived, which the Committee thought would invite disaster. 
After a four-year campaign advocating higher defence spending and a return to 
containment, the Committee had institutionalised its message of present danger. What 
had begun as an emergency Committee to warn of the current dangers of détente was 
now a message that there would always be a present danger, and the Executive 
Committee intended to make its campaign to highlight this danger permanent. Rostow 
told the Boston Globe that the CPD would 'make sure to keep plenty of strength on the 
barricades'.773 The CPD's decision to remain active even after Reagan's victory shows 
that after 1980 its campaign was no longer to ensure that détente would not hamper the 
American Cold War effort, but was to ensure that Americans continued to fear the 
hypothetical threat of Soviet military expansion. The CPD initially used the risk and 
uncertainty of military estimates to warn of potential global intervention by Soviet 
forces. Once the Committee's analysis of these metrics seemed to have been confirmed 
over 1978 and 1979, the Committee no longer felt the need to update its assessment of 
the Soviet Union's inherently expansionist posture. The CPD’s role after November 
1980 was to ensure that Americans would not forget this fact; despite what devious 
Soviet leaders – or naive American politicians – might claim; the U.S.S.R was 
determined to expand and only U.S. military power could stop this. 
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Disagreement within the CPD 
 
 It was easier for the Committee to continue warning of danger than it was to 
propose a detailed defence procurement programme capable of guaranteeing deterrent 
strength. This section argues that the CPD's expert membership, unchecked by the 
pragmatism of governing between 1976 and 1980, facilitated the increasingly 
pessimistic worst-case assessments of Soviet military strength and intentions. The 
Executive Committee respected the views of its expert board members on numerous 
aspects of national security, but by incorporating all of these concerns into their 
assessments, the CPD's analysis came to outline an oversized Soviet threat and an 
exaggerated American weakness. However, this assessment of severe threat also meant 
that adequate solutions to match Soviet strength could not be agreed even within the 
CPD's Executive Committee. The CPD never explained in detail which programmes 
would satisfy its calls for strengthened American military power. The only function the 
Committee could perform without undermining group consensus - critical to its public 
image - was to repeat warnings of the various dangers that Soviet military power 
presented. 
 Board members joined the CPD because of their concern at increasing Soviet 
military strength and of inadequate American response. In 1976, CPD board members 
accepted membership in the group after Rostow asked if they felt ‘an obligation to 
speak out’ on the issue.774 Given their concerns over the policy of détente and the need 
to match the Soviet military build-up, it was straightforward to establish board 
membership consensus around the need to highlight this danger to the American people. 
Pointing out the present danger did not necessitate a detailed articulation of remedial 
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defence programmes, as it was initially more important for the threat simply to be 
acknowledged rather than for new defence policies to be proposed. This shared sense of 
purpose over highlighting the Soviet threat ensured that disagreements among 
Committee members over policy before 1979 were relatively minor and did not 
adversely affect the group’s functioning or reputation. On joining the CPD, board 
members were assured that ‘There is no obligation on your part beyond a general 
endorsement of our effort.’775 A small number of board members, however, did not 
approve of the Committee’s activities and left the group. 
William Colby, for example, left the CPD in April 1977 after he questioned the 
Executive Committee's emphasis on the military balance above all other elements in 
U.S.-Soviet relations.776 Colby told Rostow that while he still believed ‘that there is a 
present danger’ he did not believe ‘that my views and those of the committee as a whole 
are fully compatible’.777 He considered that the Committee’s alarmist style and focus on 
nuclear forces distracted Americans from the more important fields of political and 
economic competition. 778  George McGhee also disagreed with the Executive 
Committee's approach, and left the CPD in February 1979.779 'Since you and Paul [Nitze] 
and Professor Pipes are very much in the public eye with your own views', he wrote to 
Rostow, 'the general impression is of course that they represent the views of the 
Committee’.780 The Executive Committee were the voice of the CPD and had to take 
care to represent the board of directors. Another board member, John Claya, a Michigan 
attorney, also registered his displeasure that the Executive Committee dominated CPD 
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messaging and noted a ‘lack of effort being made to increase regional input. Is the 
Committee not in danger of becoming a Central Committee?’, he asked Tyroler.781 
Colby, McGhee, and Claya, it should be stressed, were in the minority. The 
Committee’s membership increased year on year and resignations were infrequent. 
Their cases do show, however, that there was no guarantee of consensus within the 
group on what were the most significant of problems within the military imbalance as 
highlighted in CPD publications. 
 In 1976, the Committee advocated ‘decisive steps’ along with ‘a conscious 
effort of political will’ in order to ‘restore the strength and coherence of our foreign 
policy’.782 The SALT II ratification debate over 1978 and 1979 focused the Committee's 
efforts on a single issue, which helped maintain the group's sense of purpose. During the 
debate the CPD focused on the risks of the agreement rather than offering 
recommendations for remedial policies that would redress the military imbalance. Even 
in private meetings the Executive Committee refrained from discussing specific 
programmes that would restore strength. This lack of policy specificity was because 
CPD leaders could not agree on the policies that would most effectively diminish the 
threat. Rostow admitted at the CPD’s 1978 annual meeting that the group 'would be 
deeply divided as to what to do in the event of a [Federal] budget surplus, the happy 
event of a budget surplus'.783 As late as October 1979 Nitze, on behalf of the CPD, 
advocated ‘appropriate steps to correct the problems’, but did not set out the specific 
measures that would satisfy his demand to match Soviet strength.784  
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 At the end of 1979, following supplemental Congressional appropriations, a 
surplus in defence appropriations could be foreseen. Both Rostow and Nitze recognised 
that the Committee was in a period of transition after its successful SALT II campaign. 
‘[T]he whole purpose of the [SALT II] debate’, Nitze told board members, ‘should be 
toward building a consensus which will give a platform from which you can act 
thereafter’.785 It had not been decided, however, how the group should proceed at the 
conclusion of the SALT II campaign: what policies did Executive Committee members 
want the administration to enact? Tyroler, the CPD’s director, recognised in November 
1979 that the Committee 'could do a great deal more in the coming year in trying to 
identify what this committee believes are some of the specific elements in the 
reorientation of national policy'.786 With polls indicating support for higher defence 
spending, it was increasingly appropriate for the Committee to shift the focus of its 
efforts away from highlighting the threat of the U.S.S.R. and towards advocating the 
specific defence programmes necessary to end the strategic imbalance. The Committee, 
whose membership included scientists, policy advisors, and former military 
commanders, clearly possessed the necessary expertise to recommend such specific 
elements.  
The historian Skidmore argues that ‘the CPD acted as a foreign policy 
establishment in exile’, and indeed the group did seem to perform the role of an 
independent State Department Policy Planning Staff.787 This was no surprise as many 
Executive Committee members had worked in that office, most notably Nitze, who was 
its director when he authored NSC-68 in 1949. However, the CPD operated without the 
responsibilities of a government department. They had no oversight committee to report 
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to or wider administration political objectives to consider. As a private citizens’ group 
Committee members shared their professional fears of Soviet strength and strategy with 
their colleagues; after all, the group had been created as a forum to create analyses and 
publicise such concerns. The result was that the CPD's analyses came to incorporate 
these fears, which were readily included because not only were they expressed by 
subject experts but in toto emphatically made the case that more defence spending was 
urgently required.  
The nature of the CPD as a private group seeking to highlight danger without the 
essential oversight that might be expected of a legitimate government department meant 
that the group felt no obligation to submit detailed cost projections for the specific 
measures that would address its warnings. Rather than deliberate which was the most 
significant aspect of military weakness and carefully consider how this might be 
rectified, the Executive Committee instead took a scattergun approach and incorporated 
all its members' fears into CPD studies to add further credence to its claims of danger. 
 Authoring the specific requirements to allay the fears of its members thus 
proved far more difficult than agreeing on the multiple threats the Soviet Union 
presented. As the political scientist Richard Betts points out, in the 1970s groups such 
as the CPD ‘proclaimed the advantages that accrued to Moscow from the shift in the 
nuclear balance’, but these voices ‘developed no significant means … to rectify 
materially the situation they had characterised as so dangerous’. 788  Within the 
boundaries of realistic defence budget constraints – which the CPD, as a private group, 
did not have to consider in any significant detail – it was impossible to guarantee, as the 
Committee advocated, ‘credible deterrence at the significant levels of potential conflict’, 
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and match Red Army capabilities in all categories of military power across the globe.789 
Yet the Committee seemed to suggest it was only with these capabilities that American 
national security could be assured. 
At the CPD’s third annual meeting in November 1979, board members debated 
which policies should be recommended to redress the military imbalance the group had 
highlighted for the past three years. While a number of solutions to American inferiority 
were proposed, no consensus on the CPD’s next programme could be attained. Board 
members all agreed that the U.S. was in danger of reaching military inferiority but could 
not agree on how best to address this situation.  
Edward Teller, the noted nuclear physicist and CPD board member, suggested at 
the meeting that the Committee should advocate substantial investment in civil 
defence.790  He argued that this was the most cost effective measure to redress the 
strategic imbalance, as it was a relatively cheap solution to the first strike problem; civil 
defence measures would reduce the potential damage of a Soviet strike and permit a 
president greater bargaining strength in a pre-launch crisis. Donald Brennan, another 
board member, shared this view.791 ‘Civil defense’, he agreed, ‘has more leverage … 
than anything else you can do with strategic forces’.792 Teller believed that the relative 
simplicity of the programme – building shelters, hardening strategic assets – was well 
within American capabilities and budget constraints given the immediate need to 
redress the overall military balance.793 Nitze disagreed, and thought a large-scale civil 
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defence programme ‘not yet appropriate’.794 Hobart Taylor Jr., a board member, sided 
with Nitze.795 ‘[T]o turn to a defensive program that is related to preparing shelters at 
home’, he pointed out, ‘might confuse our image’. 796  Nitze instead proposed that 
research and development in electronics should receive substantial additional funding, 
as improvements in microelectronics would represent the greatest challenge for the 
U.S.S.R. to maintain parity in an increasingly important area of the military balance.797 
The Committee's focus on nuclear strategic forces, other board members argued, 
was misplaced, as it was not the most important factor in restoring the military balance. 
Instead, American forces should diminish its comparative disadvantage in conventional 
forces. In 1977, General Matthew Ridgway first suggested that the CPD did not 
sufficiently highlight the importance of conventional forces in its publications.798 As 
future programmes were contemplated over 1979, Ridgway again passionately 
advocated expanding the Army: ‘Our situation in conventional war-making is perilous 
NOW.’799 He advocated substantial investment in the military production base and the 
manpower of the Army in particular. Zumwalt, in November 1979, prioritised an 
expansion of the Navy to ensure a capability of defending the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf, 
and the western Pacific, because ‘it seems clear to me that anything less than a three-
front capability carries immense risks’.800 Zumwalt and Ridgway believed that disparity 
in their own respective arms of the U.S. conventional force, not in strategic forces, was 
causing the most harm in the overall military balance. 
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These were substantial disagreements over national security options, and show 
that by the end of 1979 the CPD had become straitjacketed by its own worst-case 
thinking. Between 1976 and 1979, board members shared their fears of Soviet strength, 
which had been incorporated into CPD publications. The sum of these fears was a dire 
assessment of Soviet military strength. As the CPD’s view that Soviet forces out-
matched those of the U.S. gained acceptance, board members could not agree on which 
particular vulnerability should be addressed first. Pointing out multiple areas of Soviet 
strength rallied support for expanding U.S. military capabilities in general, as a number 
of polls revealed, but it was unclear how this warning should be addressed in specific 
policy terms. The Executive Committee found that advocating deterrent strength 
‘beyond the shadow of a doubt’, as the Committee argued in Is America Becoming 
Number Two?, was not the basis of a precise programme to enhance national security 
now that the political climate favoured higher defence spending.801 
 Why did the CPD struggle to define the requirements for national security? At 
Executive Committee meetings its military strategists conceived of potential threats and 
the countermeasures required to confront them. The strategists – Nitze, Burton-Marshall, 
and Rostow, for example – wanted to provide a range of credible military options for 
those responsible for national security, thus performing the same function as they had in 
the State Department Policy Planning Department in the 1950s. The former military 
commanders in the Committee's board membership corroborated the need for enhanced 
capabilities. As it could not be foreseen whether the U.S.S.R. would continue its 
military growth and territorial expansion, the Executive Committee projected the worst-
case for Soviet strength in each military category and planned to deter Soviet strength 
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on that basis. In Looking for Eggs in a Cuckoo Clock, a January 1979 pamphlet, the 
CPD stated that, 
The present obligation is to make provident resource allocations so as 
to ensure for those to be responsible for national security later on in 
face of events not now foreseeable adequate means to protect the 
territorial base, to fend off forcible intimidation from without, and to 
assure access to external sources of materials necessary for national 
well-being.802 
 
In a rather intelligible manner, the pamphlet made the point that current procurement 
decisions would affect future military capabilities, and the obligation of contemporary 
leaders was to provide future leaders with sufficient deterrent strength. But this 
confusing prescription was not precise; what allocations were 'provident'? By focusing 
on the potential threat and formulating an analysis incorporating all Executive 
Committee members' concerns, the CPD made a realistic plan for remedial actions near 
impossible. Countering the Soviet Threat, the CPD's May 1980 pamphlet, was not a 
carefully considered procurement plan, but a wish list of Committee board members 
who were convinced that without each of the military programmes they mentioned 
American forces would be woefully incapable of deterring a Soviet expansion 
strategy.803 
 Any negative foreign policy issue that could be attributed to the Soviet Union 
was incorporated into the Executive Committee's assessment of Soviet strength. This 
was justified in the Committee’s initial statement, which allowed for any aspect of the 
Soviet threat to add to its analysis of danger. The statement proposed that ‘The threats 
we face are more subtle and indirect than was once the case … [The U.S.S.R.] continues, 
with notable persistence, to take advantage of every opportunity to expand its political 
and military influence throughout the world: in Europe; in the Middle East and Africa; 
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in Asia; even in Latin America; in all the seas.’804 This suggested the U.S. needed to 
deter every Soviet opportunistic action throughout the world to ensure national security, 
and the Committee, to emphasise this warning, would point out as many of these 
'opportunities' that its members' expertise would allow. The result was the creation of 
composite threat assessments that over time convinced Committee members themselves 
that the threat was truly ominous. 
 'In an age of deterrence', historian Nancy Mitchell argues, 'perception was 
reality’. 805  For CPD members, perception indeed became reality after setting wide 
parameters for detecting Soviet subterfuge. In planning to meet scenarios of Soviet 
expansion that could happen, Committee members soon believed that these scenarios 
would happen or had already happened. This progression in Executive Committee 
members’ thinking is epitomised by Zumwalt, who in 1970 was dismayed at Kissinger's 
pessimism in suggesting that the U.S. 'has passed its historic high-point'.806 By 1979, 
however, Zumwalt expressed similar despair: ‘[W]e’re not going even to begin to regain 
capability strategically and conventionally in competition with the Russians, but [we’re] 
merely analyzing how does one best spent [sic] inadequate funds to maintain some 
doubt in the Soviet Union as to how well they could do.’807 After adopting a worst-case 
methodology, Soviet capabilities seemed dangerous and getting worse to the CPD.  
 This warning had been extremely effective in attracting attention to the CPD, but 
by 1979 the Executive Committee had come to believe its own projections reflected not 
a risk but reality itself. The CPD criticised détente as 'mirror-imaging', but the 
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Committee was 'mirror-imaging' its own pessimistic projections by the end of 1979.808 
The CPD’s accusation of mirror-imaging in 1976, which suggested advocates of détente 
projected their own optimistic intentions onto their Soviet counterparts, could now be 
levied against the Committee itself - board members mirrored their own pessimistic 
approach onto Kremlin leaders. At the Committee's 1979 annual meeting Rostow 
pleaded for the Carter Administration to 'emerge from the cocoon of our dreams, and 
deal with the world as it is'.809 The Executive Committee had, however, strayed in the 
opposite direction: they did not see the world as it was but as they feared it to be. 
In summary, the CPD was a group of strategic planners and military 
commanders who shared a fear of American weakness in face of growing Soviet 
strength. After joining a group dedicated to publicising analyses of threat, the CPD's 
members’ fears were soon incorporated in the group’s studies. As a result these studies 
presented estimates of an opponent with alarming strength. Committee members 
perceived any setback as Soviet opportunism, and thus grew ever more certain that their 
assessment was correct: perception became reality. As a result, the CPD's attempt to 
correct the 'rosy picture' of the U.S.S.R.'s capabilities and intentions that détente 
encouraged morphed into the Committee's terrifying conclusion that America was on 
the brink of Cold War defeat.810 
 
Strategists not Moralists 
 
 
 The CPD's worst-case thinking considered only comparative military 
capabilities and the effect on Cold War grand strategy. It was not particularly concerned 
with the ideological component of the Cold War or of distinguishing between 
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authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.811 Because the Executive Committee believed 
that the Soviets were pursuing expansion they based their analysis on the assumption 
that Soviet forces either already possessed or aspired to possess the capabilities 
necessary to achieve this goal. In this context the CPD attempted to compile their 
assessments of comparative military balance on what they considered to be a risk-averse 
and prudent basis as it was American military strength alone that could block Soviet 
aggression. This approach was justified, the Committee considered, because the risk of 
underestimating the strength necessary to deter the U.S.S.R. would be calamitous -- 
Soviet Cold War victory. 
 The Executive Committee were convinced that a return to containment was a 
pragmatic strategy that would ensure national security based on the conviction that the 
Soviet Union was 'a different society', inherently expansionist, and restrained only by 
military power.812 Therefore, the Committee concluded, 'the key to our quest for peace 
and our survival as a free society' was to ensure sufficient American military strength.813 
The CPD attracted to its board those who agreed with the assessment that the trend of 
global geopolitics was moving against the United States in favour of the U.S.S.R.. 
Committee board members joined to lend their personal credibility to the CPD mission 
to highlight the 'indirect aggression' of the Soviet Union, a serious threat to 'the world 
balance of forces on which the survival of freedom depends'.814 This was not a morally 
based argument pitting the merits of capitalism against the evils of communism, but an 
attempt to generate lasting support for the necessary 'military strength' and 'commitment 
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to leadership' that would deter Soviet expansion.815 The Committee judged that without 
being made aware of the military threat there was no reason for Americans to support 
the level of defence spending necessary to deter the U.S.S.R.. 
 A number of scholars have suggested that the CPD campaign was motivated 
primarily by a concern for American moral decay at home. Craig and Logevall, for 
example, charge that the CPD's activities amounted to an effort ‘to develop a 
thoroughgoing, moralistic attack on the Carter Administration's foreign policy’.816 They 
argue further that ‘The committee accused the White House of … insufficiently 
trumpeting the superiority of the American system.’817 The historian Linenthal also 
suggests that  
The CPD saw itself as a significant actor in the great cosmic battle 
between good and evil in the nuclear age. It was motivated by an 
apocalyptic view of history and sought to awaken Americans from 
their spiritual bondage caused by the degenerative processes at work 
in the nation.818  
 
In this interpretation it is argued that the Committee believed that it had to emphasise 
the moral struggle between good and evil in order to rally American society to the Cold 
War challenge. 819  Yet such a moralising rallying call did not underpin the CPD's 
analysis. No Committee pamphlet disparaged American morality. The CPD's activities 
were based on producing materials to inform the people of the Soviet military threat; no 
Executive Committee member attempted 'to sound the alarm about the inner disorder 
the nation faced', as Linenthal argues.820 
 The CPD was not focused on ‘trumpeting’ American moral superiority, as they 
were instead fixated on estimating the military balance and publicising the need to catch 
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up to the Soviet Union militarily. The CPD criticism of détente, in fact, was much more 
pragmatic than highlighting 'cosmic battle[s]'.821 The Committee existed to make certain 
that Americans would be told about the existential threat that they faced; inherent Soviet 
expansionism coupled with a period of military superiority meant that the U.S. required 
greater deterrent strength. Failure to contain Soviet aggression would lead to defeat and 
therefore increased military strength was a reasonable and practical response to Soviet 
growth in military power. 
 The CPD, rather than seeking to reaffirm moral clarity in the Cold War, were 
more concerned at the loss of control over national security after the apparent 
emergence of overall strategic parity. As the historian Johnson argues,  
U.S. fears about the consequences of supposed Soviet nuclear 
superiority in the late 1970s and early 1980s were probably more 
significant as a delayed reaction to the U.S. loss of control over its 
own survival than they were as reflections of new specific threats to 
U.S. security.822 
  
Strategic parity and the perceived risk that the Soviet Union was seeking 'irreversible 
change while we are still behind militarily' meant that for CPD board members the 
threat would remain until American strength was restored.823 This explains why there 
were not distinct Soviet capabilities that the Committee was determined to match. It was 
the uncertainty of what rough strategic parity meant that prompted the CPD's wish to re-
establish American superiority. 
 However, despite the Committee’s insistence that higher defence spending 
would result in a more effective deterrent, the U.S. would no longer be able to prepare 
for every hypothetical 'Pearl Harbor' scenario that Executive Committee members could 
devise. By the late-1970s the U.S.S.R. had attained the capacity to launch a first strike, 
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and no amount of planning or warning would negate that capability.824 In formulating 
its fears of potential Cold War defeat, the CPD misinterpreted Soviet activity. Its Third 
World 'adventurism' was not part of an opportunistic drive for Cold War victory 
strategy, as the CPD suspected.825 Rather than opportunism encouraged from a position 
of strength, Soviet activities were more often conducted from a position of weakness. 
As the historian Zubok argues, the Afghanistan Invasion was, for example, 'the first sign 
of Soviet imperial overstretch', and a situation that Brezhnev was unable to control.826  
 The CPD's calls for higher defence spending were not entirely without reason, 
however, and its members were not alone in fearing Soviet intentions. An important 
question to consider is not whether Committee members deviously inflated their 
concerns, which were genuinely held, but why they were so fearful. In this way Vaïsse’s 
charge of exaggeration is less convincing: 
Sincere worry is one thing, deliberate exaggeration another, and it is 
clear that the CPD exaggerated in its public statements and 
publications. The logic was simple: fear was the best ally of those who 
favored a stronger defense posture and larger military budget. The 
CPD was able to move the debate in its direction precisely because it 
exaggerated the threat and painted a frightening picture.827 
 
The central issue is not that the CPD fabricated the evidence that underpinned its 
material but whether its worst-case projections of military balance were warranted. 
Many analysts shared the CPD's assumptions in 1980 after the events of the previous 
year in Afghanistan and because of Soviet activity throughout the Third World in the 
1970s. The Economist, for example, argued that America had indeed 'gone soft' in a 
January 1980 article.828 Vaïsse argues that it was unlikely American military leaders 
would have exchanged equipment with their Soviet counterparts, but the CPD were not 
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exclusively concerned with the current military balance.829 They were unconvinced that 
the Soviets would restrain their military procurement programmes even after attaining 
rough parity. 
 The CPD's worst-case scenario thinking was not cynical threat inflation, but 
structural threat inflation. Each CPD board member, drawing on their own professional 
assessment, believed they were rationally explaining what would happen if current 
trends in Soviet defence spending continued. They identified 'dangerous shifts in the 
world balance of power achieved by the Soviet Union', and did not see why Kremlin 
leaders would restrain their ‘push for military superiority’ given the gains 'in Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean' that had been 'made feasible by that buildup'.830 
After the Afghanistan invasion, board members considered that their worst-case 
assessment as no longer merely a projection but as a correct assessment of a process that 
was underway. Kremlin leaders evidently could not be trusted to restrain their 
expansionist ambitions, which meant that increased American military strength was 
urgently required. At stake, therefore, was 'the political independence and territorial 
integrity of the United States', or, in other words, Cold War defeat.831 
Vaïsse points out correctly that ‘it is possible to be both sincerely worried and 
sincerely mistaken’, which accurately characterises the CPD.832 However, we can only 
assess that the Committee was mistaken in hindsight. In late 1980 it was not at all clear 
what the Kremlin’s intentions in Afghanistan were, nor whether they would continue to 
invest in military capabilities. It was not fanciful to hypothesise continued expansion. 
The CPD did not act as ‘propagandists and alarmists’ who 'trumpeted' the findings of 
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Team B, as the historian Walter Uhler argues, but rather it drew on its members' 
expertise to form an opinion on what U.S.S.R. strategy might be.833 As the historian 
Garthoff observes, ‘Worst-case analysis was thereby transformed from a device for 
predicting and understanding potential dangers into a device for articulating the 
policymaker's alarms.’834 Their estimated metrics of imbalance – first calculated in 1977 
– seemed superfluous evidence for Executive Committee members by 1980; the Soviet 
Union had demonstrated its resolve to send troops into battle. They considered that their 
worst-case thinking was indeed prudent given the Afghanistan invasion, and perhaps 
marked the first step in a period of Soviet superiority.835 
There is no clear juncture where warning of a potentially existential danger 
becomes threat inflation. Garthoff accuses the CPD of asserting Soviet superiority ‘with 
much hue and cry’ and ‘sounded the alarm to gain support’ though he concedes that ‘the 
concern was often genuine’.836 But from the Committee’s perspective how else were 
they to draw attention to a situation that they perceived as existentially threatening? 'The 
period immediately ahead is the period of greatest danger', Rostow told Kennedy in 
January 1980. 'The Soviets are trying to achieve irreversible change while we are still 
behind militarily.' 837  The Executive Committee’s concerns demonstrate that they 
assumed that without their work there would soon be an 'irreversible' setback. They 
therefore set out to draw attention to the threat of the Soviet Union.  
The historian Robert Johnson suggests it was 'understandable that nuclear 
strategists should have been concerned with anchoring deterrence by ensuring the 
survivability of U.S. deterrent forces'. 838  But he stresses that what 'has been less 
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justifiable has been the elaboration by the strategists of complex theories based upon 
highly implausible scenarios that forecast the possibility of general breakdowns of the 
deterrence order and a frightening loss of control by the United States of its 
international environment'.839 Can the CPD's 'complex' assessments be justified? To 
them, effective deterrence was the only strategic calculation that mattered, so the group 
– led in this effort by Nitze – attempted to calculate it.  
Executive Committee members' fears – implausible scenarios, for Johnson – 
became a method to determine the variables for these calculations because of the 
existential nature of the threat. In the absence of accurate intelligence of Soviet military 
strength, the Committee's estimated metrics of strength became a measure of which side 
was ahead in the Cold War.840  Comparing estimates, therefore, was how the CPD 
Executive Committee - strategic planners and military commanders - fought their proxy 
Cold War. Rostow, Nitze, and Zumwalt were sincere when they articulated their vision 
of a Soviet plan to expand its influence by opportunistic involvement in Third World 
politics because, it could be assumed, that is what they would themselves have done if 
in the place of their Soviet counterparts. Thus the Executive Committee's logical 
strategic thinking, supposedly based on meticulously prepared statistics of military 
strength, was essentially ‘bean counting’ rather than rational national security 
planning.841  
Such bean counting was the most effective tool a strategic planner had to assess 
national security requirements, despite its inherent inaccuracies. Nitze wrote to Rostow 
on 18 July 1980 to concede the difficulty of assessing probabilities of Soviet actions. 
'The most difficult judgment concerns what evidence, if any, can be found which would 
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persuasively argue for one estimate or another.'842 Nitze reasoned that it was therefore 
prudent to opt for the least favourable estimate, especially as the potential risk of 
underestimation was catastrophic. Committee board members did not feel they had to 
explain this methodology; to them it was self-evident that the U.S.S.R. was expansionist, 
and self-evident that American forces did not, in 1980, possess the strength to deter this 
threat. 
Despite the CPD's insistence that their approach was prudent, their exclusive 
focus on military metrics did impose significant costs. At the group's launch in 1976 
Lane Kirkland characterised the CPD's desire for higher defence spending as 'fire 
insurance' against the U.S.S.R., which he described as 'a pyromaniac', but by 
overestimating the threat the Committee advocated an excessively expensive 
premium.843 Their insistence that higher defence spending resulted in greater security 
took away national resources from other deserving areas of American society. The 
CPD's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations underestimated the importance of economic 
strength in the Cold War confrontation and over-estimated the importance of indicators 
of military strength. As Johnson points outs  
At some point, obviously, probabilities become so low that focusing, 
and spending massively, on seeking to prevent the great disasters one 
can imagine becomes an exquisite self-indulgence and profoundly 
foolish policy.844 
 
By overestimating the threat of the U.S.S.R., the CPD encouraged unnecessary defence 
spending that would have benefited American domestic life. 845  CPD emphasis on 
military capabilities neglected alternative but equally important measures of assessing 
strength. Defence expenditures, for example, placed insurmountable burdens on the 
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Soviet economy, an assessment the CIA offered but was dismissed by CPD board 
members reluctant to undermine their own call for higher defence spending.846 It might 
be argued that this was a foresighted attitude and an approach designed to hasten the 
demise the USSR, but the CPD never made such an argument. They simply believed 
that American forces were of inferior strength, which risked defeat. In stressing the 
significance of Soviet military strength and arguing that it presented an existential 
danger, the CPD itself disguised the Soviet economic slump that had been unfolding 
since the early 1970s.847  The Soviet expansion into the Third World was not cost 
effective: the apparent expansion of influence was in fact a burden to the Kremlin and 
not a prelude to Cold War victory.848 Overstating Soviet strength and misinterpreting its 
intentions obscured this hypothesis of Cold War advancement in the 1980s. 
The CPD did not justify its case on moral grounds but on the arithmetic of 
comparative military assessment. But this myopic focus on the military balance, it has 
been suggested, was misplaced. By attempting to create metrics on which they could 
base ‘prudent’ strategic plans, and using worst-case assumptions to do so, the CPD 
proved to itself that its fears were substantiated. Assuming that the Soviet Union 
possessed such formidable strength also meant that indicators of weakness in its 
economy were overlooked or dismissed. The Committee's methodology for assessing 
threat was not prudent, as the Executive Committee claimed, but fuelled hostility and 
placed unnecessary costs on the American federal budget in the 1980s. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has argued that the CPD's worst-case thinking led to the assessment 
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of a threat that was ever more alarmist over the 1976 to 1980 period. The CPD decided 
to continue to warn Americans that the U.S.S.R. pursued a victory strategy that would 
be assisted if American forces let their guard down, even after board member Ronald 
Reagan was elected president. 
 The CPD had been able to establish its credibility by attracting board members 
to support the group's primary objective of pointing out the enduring Soviet threat while 
détente formed the basis of national security policy. However, as the group's warning 
gained acceptance board members found it difficult to agree on the specific 
requirements to contain the threat. Because the group was a private citizens' 
organisation there was no government oversight and therefore no requirement to 
reconcile these differences of opinion over defence priorities. Instead, all the fears of 
board members were amalgamated into CPD assessments thus providing evidence of an 
overwhelming threat from the Soviet Union. 
 It should be noted that the CPD based these concerns purely on assessments of 
the military balance, and not on concerns of American moral shortcomings. Their self-
styled ‘prudent’ assessments of Soviet capabilities became the abstracted battleground 
for their Cold War struggle as national security planners. For four years the Executive 
Committee compiled metrics, formulated scenarios of Soviet expansion, and publicly 
presented their findings. By the end of 1979 CPD members believed they had accurately 
assessed Soviet aims. It is important to note that the Committee was not alone in 
reaching this conclusion regarding aggressive Soviet expansion. Soviet Third World 
adventurism appeared ominous to many observers outside the CPD, and in this way the 
group reflected and amplified existing unease at Soviet conduct. 
 The chapter concludes that the CPD cannot be dismissed as disingenuous threat 
inflators. Board members conceived of the Cold War exclusively in military terms, used 
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their expertise to demonstrate an imbalance, and then continued to warn of the need to 
keep the balance in check. As they assumed that the U.S.S.R. was committed to 
spreading socialism, a strong American deterrent that kept pace with any Soviet military 
growth was required. While the CPD judged this a prudent approach to ensure national 
security, the group failed to appreciate other factors such as how reduced economic 
strength and leadership changes might prompt a change in the assessment of the Soviet 
threat. Instead, the Committee on the Present Danger judged that its worst-case 
assessments of Soviet capabilities and intentions had been proven correct. Therefore the 
Committee permanently adopted this worst-case approach; there would be a present 
danger to the United States as long as the Soviet Union remained in existence.  
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Conclusion 
 
 A critical reassessment of the Committee on the Present Danger has presented 
the group in a different light than most existing studies. The CPD has attracted 
significant attention from scholars since its establishment in 1976, but few scholars have 
attempted a study of the group without political agenda. Warning of the dangers of 
détente was not a particularly controversial objective in 1976, as the recruitment of a 
politically diverse board of directors demonstrates. It was the group's structure over the 
following years that facilitated an evolution of its message from a warning of risk to a 
prediction of defeat. The shift towards this alarmist prediction was caused by the 
composition of the group's Executive Committee, the pursuit of estimating the military 
balance on a worst-case basis, and confirmation bias as the CPD believed that they were 
observing a Kremlin victory strategy. 
 The evidence suggests that the CPD was not a disingenuous propaganda group, 
composed predominately of neoconservatives deliberately seeking methods to stoke fear 
among Americans. Instead, it was a group led by national security experts who sincerely 
came to believe that the Cold War was at a tipping point; America was close to defeat 
after being lulled into a false sense of security through détente, and by permitting the 
U.S.S.R overall military superiority as a consequence. Committee materials were 
developed to explain this analysis in what the Executive Committee perceived as a 
logical manner based on hard evidence. This evidence, however, was in turn based on 
estimates that incorporated professional fears and rejected optimistic interpretations. As 
Kennan and Nitze's 1978 joint feature in the New York Times demonstrated, basing 
national security policy on pessimistic rather than optimistic assumptions, especially 
when quantified, seemed the more credible method to many Americans. 
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 The CPD's principal objective in 1976 was to instigate a national discussion in 
order to restore a consensus behind containment, but in promoting this discussion the 
group's board members came to believe their own worst-case predictions were accurate. 
This was especially true once they considered that this prediction had been confirmed 
by the events of 1979, a crisis year. Committee materials considered that optimistic 
assessments of future military developments – extending the American advantage in 
cruise missile technology, for example – should be rejected as risky and even reckless 
assumptions. Instead, the CPD argued, assumptions that informed national security 
requirements should be informed by the least optimistic view. It was axiomatic for 
career national security apparatchiks that this should be the case; they wanted to provide 
a range of options for future American leaders to deter the Soviet threat. They reasoned 
that it was better to be prudent than to give the U.S.S.R. a lead in an aspect of the 
military equilibrium that could potentially tip that equilibrium and permit overall Soviet 
superiority. 
 This esoteric debate over the basis of intelligence assessments was made public 
first by Team B and then on a more permanent basis by the CPD through its 
involvement in the most important national security debates of the late 1970s. 
Participation in the SALT II ratification debate secured the CPD's status as an 
influential group, as it provided a focal point for its members’ increasingly alarming 
critique of national security. The Committee's role was to function as expert witnesses 
for the Peace Through Strength movement, successfully providing credibility to their 
message of danger, which was needed to restrict senate support for SALT II ratification 
and to facilitate a more assertive approach to national security planning. 
 The evidence in the CPD’s archive does not support a conclusion that the group 
undertook an insincere and manipulative propaganda effort during its involvement in 
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these debates. The Executive Committee worked hard to create and maintain an image 
of expertise and credibility, and the role of national security advisers was one that 
former bureaucrats and military commanders were well qualified to perform. Authoring 
pamphlets, attending televised debates on national security issues, meeting newspaper 
editorial boards, and briefing politicians were familiar functions for the CPD's 
Executive Committee. They were able to influence the discussion of national security 
issues through their abilities, expertise, and credibility in such venues. Their appeal to 
prudence when considering national security requirements proved increasingly popular 
in an uncertain global environment. 
 Where the CPD fell short was in its efforts to 'democratise' debates over national 
security. Its materials did not make clear that the metrics they introduced were estimates, 
and not facts. In informing the readers of its pamphlets that the Soviet Union was 
gaining superiority, the Committee felt that it was justified to exclude the rarefied 
debates over parity. This omission was not necessarily manipulative. Executive 
Committee members believed that worst-case planning was justified but that détente 
had numbed Americans to the risks of the Soviet adversary – after years of being 
presented with the rosy picture, they felt it was time to correct the narrative. 
 However, it is clear that this was not a disingenuous appeal to recognise the 
Soviet threat, as by 1979 Committee members themselves believed their underlying fear 
of a concerted push for Soviet Cold War victory to be fact. Prompted by perceived 
Soviet adventurism in Ethiopia, a hand in the Iranian Revolution, involvement in 
Central America, and, most alarming, an invasion of Afghanistan, Committee board 
members believed that their estimates of strength and predictions of a victory strategy 
had been confirmed by events. 
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 Their opposition to Carter was over his perceived inability to grasp the 
seriousness of this situation that the CPD had identified and repeatedly warned against. 
After an initial attempt at cooperation in 1977, the Executive Committee deemed the 
Carter Administration unfit for the task of overseeing national security requirements. As 
with Nixon and Ford before him, Carter was blind to the Soviet threat due to his mirror-
imaging of Kremlin leaders: The Committee was adamant that Soviet leaders would not 
hesitate to make use of their military superiority and attempt Cold War victory. 
Whereas the danger under Nixon and Ford had been the potential manipulation of the 
Soviet Union to improve its military capabilities and strive for superiority, under Carter 
the CPD perceived that the threat had increased. In the CPD’s view, the U.S.S.R. had 
reached the point of superiority by the late 1970s – yet the president inexplicably 
neglected to reduce this existential risk. 
 The conviction that its assessment had been confirmed meant that the 
Committee felt entirely vindicated in its rejection of détente and its approach to threat 
assessment. While the Soviet Union remained there would always be a present danger, 
and this assumption was an important legacy of the CPD's activity in the late-1970s. 
The effects of the politicisation of intelligence estimation would prevent the demise of 
the Soviet Union from being perceived in the 1980s, even though such predictions had 
been made by the CIA in the late 1970s, and dismissed by the CPD.  
It is therefore not sufficient to label the Committee on the Present Danger as 
another example of a threat inflation group, repeating a feature of the American post-
Second World War political landscape. Its members were national security experts who 
sensed a turning point in history. Domestic politics are critical to understanding 
American foreign policy, as the case of the Committee on the Present Danger once 
again makes clear. In this way, the fact that the group created an assessment of the 
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Soviet Union based on the sum of all their fears is as important as the fact the group was 
able to popularise this view. Threat assessment, the case of the CPD emphasises, can 
never be truly objective. This is especially true in a democracy where consensus is 
required to pursue one strategy over another. The basis of estimating enemy strength 
and intentions is ultimately another tool of persuasion, and more often than not in 
American Cold War history – and certainly in the example of the Committee on the 
Present Danger - the worst-case basis underpinned the most persuasive argument.  
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